[2] Ibid. 99.
[3] Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense-Perception," Aristotle's De Anima in focus, ed. Michael Durrant (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 80.
[4] Ibid. 80-81.
[5] A similar objection to Slakey's interpretation is made by Richard Sorabji in his article "Body and Soul in Aristotle," Aristotle's De Anima in Focus, ed. Michael Durrant (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 173.
[6] T.W. Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," Aristotle's De Anima in Focus, ed. Michael Durrant (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 107.
[7] Ray Jackendoff, Patterns in the Mind (New York: BasicBooks, 1994) 171-183.
[8] T.W. Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," Aristotle's De Anima in Focus, ed. Michael Durrant (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 100.
[9] Ibid.
[10] See, for example, Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1991)
[11] T.W. Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," Aristotle's De Anima in Focus, ed. Michael Durrant (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 104.
[12] Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth, How Monkeys See the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
[13] Thomas Nagel, "What Is It like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXIII, no. 4, October 1974: 435-450.