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CHAPTER XIII
THE TRAGIC PASSIONS

The question which we have now to face is more obscure and difficult than any we have yet consideied. In the language used by Thucydides when he speaks of the tragic passions, are we to see mere poetical metaphor, out of which all literal meaning has faded; oi does some of this meaning still linger behind the words, as an unanalysed fund of mythical conception? When Thucydides boirowed the form of the Aeschylean drama, much, certainly, of the explicit theological theory which had been the soul of that form, was left behind in the transmission. On the other hand, there seems to be a residuum of implicit mythical belief which is inherent in the artistic mould, and so inseparable from it that the adoption of the mould might involve an unconscious or half-conscious accept tance of some of its original content. This content is more primitive than the philosophy of Aeschylus himself, and much older than the drama in which it became incorporated. We now propose to trace back the tragic theory of human nature as far as we can follow it, in the hope that a sketch of its development may help us to answer our question, how much of it survives in Thucydides. When we look at the passage in Diodotus' speech (note 1) which contains in summary form the motives of Cleon's drama and of the tragedy of Athens, we observe that the so-called `personifications' named in it fall into a series or cycle. We begin with the various conditions (juntux[[currency]]ai) of human life; and in particular the two extreme conditions of grinding Poverty and licentious Wealth--Penia and Ploutos

[1. Thuc. iii. 45. See above, p. 122, for text and translation.]

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([[section]]jous[[currency]]a). (note 1) These are possessed by irremediable and mastering powers--Daring (tÒlma), sprung from Poverty; and Covetousness (pleonej[[currency]]a), Insolence (Ïbriw), and Pride (frÒnhma), sprung from Wealth.Then come Eros and Elpis, the inward tempters; with Fortune, the temptress of external circumstance, completing the intoxication. These lead finally to Ruin--the wreck and downfall of a human life or of a nation's greatness.

The first terms in the series, Wealth and Poverty, are themselves juntux[[currency]]ai, the outcome of lucky or unlucky coincidence--of Fortune. Our chain of causes leads us back to a mysterious and unknown agency, which appears again at the crisis, in `reversal'. The circle of thought revolves round the very simple and universal observation of the mutability of Fortune, chance, or luck. In ages before the laws of causation and of probability were even dimly divined, this mutability must have been the most terrible and bewildering phenomenon in human events--more terrible, because more incalculable, than death itself. Not only in the great catastrophes, in flood and avalanche and earthquake, but again and again in the turns of daily experience, man finds himself the sport of an invisible demon Now, by some unforeseen stroke, his long-cherished design is foiled; now, with equally unintelligible caprice, goods are heaped on him which he never expected.

A reversal of Fortune, coming suddenly, is the primitive root of all tragedy. Professor Bradley (note 2) quotes the conclusion of the monk's tale of Croesus in the Canterbury Pilgrims:--Anhanged was Cresus, the proudè kyng;

His roial tronè mighte hym nat availle.

Tragédie is noon oother miner thyng,

Ne kan in syngyng criè ne biwaille

But for that Fortune alwey wole assaille

With unwar strook the regnès that been proude;

For whan men trusteth hire, thanne wol she faille,

And covere hire brighte facè with a clowde. [1. i. 38 Ïbrei dcents ka< [[section]]jous[[currency]]& ploÊtou: Ar. Rhet. b 17 filotimÒteroi ka< éndrvddeg.stero[[currency]] efisin tå >=yh ofl dunãmenoi t<<n plous[[currency]]vn diå tÚ [[section]]f[[currency]]esyai ~sa [[section]]jous[[currency]]a aÈto>w prãttein diå tØn dÊnamin.

[2. Shakespearean Tragedy, p. 8.]

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Professor Bradley continues: `a total reverse of fortune coming unawares upon a man who "stood in high degree" happy and apparently secure--such was the tragic fact to the mediaeval mind. It appealed strongly to common human sympathy and pity; it startled also another feeling, that of fear. It frightened men and awed them. It made them feel that man is blind and helpless, the plaything of an inscrutable power, called by the name of Fortune or some other name--a power which appears to smile on him for a little, and then on a sudden strikes him down in his pride.'

The external agencies to which these reversals are attributed will vary at different stages in the development of thought. In a primitive stage they would be thought of simply as spirits; later, perhaps, as a single spirit, called Fate (Mo>ra) or Fortune (TÊxh), who will be placated or `averted' by magical rites and observances. In any case, the overthrow was thought of as coming from without--an unexpected stroke out of the surrounding darkness.

To the early Greeks not only the sudden fall from prosperity, but equally the sudden rise from adversity, was a part of the tragic fact. (note 1) Both the extreme conditions are dangerous the transition from either to the other is a `reversal'. Ploutos and Penia are also known as Resource and Resourcelessness (Poros and Aporia, or Amechania (note 2)), and again as Licence

[1. In this point the Greek view is darker than the Mediaeval. Thus at the conclusion of the Monk's Tale above quoted, the Knight breaks in:Hoo! quod the Knyght, good sire, namoore of this!

That ye han seyd is right ynough, y-wis,...

I seye for me it is a greet disese,

Where as men han been in greet welthe and ese,

To beeren of hire sodeyn fal, allas!

And the contrarie is joye and greet solas,

As whan a man bath ben in poure estaat,

And clymbeth up, and wexeth fortunat,

And there abideth in prosperitee;

Swich thyng is gladsom, as it thynketh me.[2. Herod. viii. 111. Themistocles, demanding money of the Andrians, said he had brought `two mighty gods, Peitho and Anankaia', to enforce his demand. The Andrians replied that they were cursed with `two unprofitable gods, Penia and Amechania', and could not pay.]

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and Constraint (Exousia and Ananke,--both of which terms are used by Diodotus). Eros and Elpis may be associated with either. In the Symposium, Plato for his own purposes makes Eros the child of both: he was born, in the garden of Zeus, of Poros and Penia. But in an earlier stage Elpis, at any rate, was more closely associated with Poverty.As a personality, she first appears in Hesiod, who mentions her twice. He warns the labouring man to pass by the sunny portico where the poor gather for warmth the winter season, when the frost has stopped work in the fields. Otherwise, in the hard winter-time, Amechania and Penia will swoop down on him. `An idle man, waiting on empty Hope, gathers many evils to his heart. Hope is an ill guide for a needy man,' sitting there and chattering when he has not enough livelihood. (note 1) Such are the sinister associations of lElpis, the temptress, prompting evil thoughts which we, with our different conception of Hope, associate rather with the daring of despair.

No less significant is Hesiod's other mention of her, which occui's in the second, and more primitive, of the two versions which he gives of the Pandora myth. Mankind originally lived free fiom evil and pain and the sprites (Keres) of disease. These were all shut up safely in the great jar; but `a woman' lifted the lid and they all flew abroad, filling land and sea. `Only there, in a house not to be broken into, abode Elpis, inside the mouth of the jar, and flitted not

[1. Hesiod, Erga, 493 ff. mÆ se kakoË xeim<<now ÉAmhxan[[currency]]n katamãrc[[dotaccent]] sÁn Pen[[currency]][[dotaccent]]... ÉElpfrag. 221 (Diels) ÉElpTheognis, 643:âA deilØ Pen[[currency]]n, t[[currency]] [[section]]mo>w [[section]]pikeimdeg.nh  moiws<<ma kataisxÊneiw ka< nÒon <=mdeg.teronafisxrå ddeg. mÉ oÈk [[section]]ydeg.lonta b[[currency]][[dotaccent]] ka< pollå didãskeiw,[[section]]sylå metÉ ényr~pvn ka< kãlÉ [[section]]pistãmenon;]

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forth; for the woman first shut down on her the lid of the jar.' (note 1)It seems probable that several notions are confused in the myth. The uppermost and latest stratum, like the story of the Erichthonius snake, is tinged with satire against feminine curiosity. Woman is the source of evil, as she is in Hesiod's other version of the Pandora myth. But the woman herself is tempted by Elpis, who is one of the baneful sprites inside the jar. Perhaps in the earliest version there was no woman at all, but only Elpis, the temptress, who stays with man in his utter destitution and besets him with dreams of wealth. This idea is crossed by the opposite (and later) notion that hope is the sole comforter of poverty; (note 2) and finally the introduction of the curious woman who lets out the evil sprites completes the confusion.

How ever the story is to be disentangled, it is certain that

[1. Erga, 90-105 moÊnh dÉ aÈtÒyi ÉElpErga, it seems likely that Hesiod does not mean expectation of evil, but a false and flattering expectation of goods, which will not be realized. Another critic says: `The jar (p[[currency]]yow) is appropriately introducad, because of the allurement (pe[[currency]]yv) that comes from women; it is empty of good and contains only vain hopes.' This writer shows that he is on the true scent, by associating Elpis with Peitho, though, of course, the word-play (p[[currency]]yow--peiy~) is late. He sees, too, that Elpis is not a good, but an evil; and this, we believe, was what the authors of the myth intended.

[1. Theogn. 1135 ff. ÉElpvii sap. conv. 153 D t[[currency]] koinÒtaton; ÉElpboth a comforter and a delusion are combined by Sophocles in the Antigone chorus (616): è går dØ polÊplagktow ÉElpw mcentsn ^nasiw éndr<<n, pollo>w dÉ ÉApãta koufonÒvn [[section]]r~tvn, and by Thucydidas (v. 103) in tha paallel passage from the Melian dialogue (see above, p. 184).]

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Elpis is a Ker; and this gives us one primitive form in which the passions were conceived as external spiritual agencies. Eros retained to the last some resemblance to the Keres; the Erotes are always winged sprites. (note 1) These figures are something very different from what we think of as `personifications of abstract ideas'. They are not the intolerable, bran-stuffed dummies which stalk absuidly through eighteenth-century verse. They are spirits, unseen, and swift, and terrible in onset. How did they come into being? The solid fact from which we must start is that many of these `personifications', as we call them, were objects of established worship, possessing shrines and altars. In Athens alone we know of altars to Aidos, Pheme, Horme, Anteros, Ara, Eirene, Eleos, Eukleia, Lethe, Nike, Peitho, Philia, Tyche, and others. (note 2) Of those which specially concern us here, Tyche is known to have been worshipped at a great number of places; Penia had an altar at Gades; Elpis was not, so far as we know, the object of any cult; Eros, on the contrary, is the most real and personal of all, and finds his way--much transformed, it is true--into Olympus.

Now it is certainly possible, in an advanced state of civilization, for a cult to be artificially founded in honour of an abstraction. Democratia, to whom the Athenian Generals made offerings in Boedromion, must always have been little more than an epithet of Athena, never an independent person. In such a instance the cult must have been established merely from political motives, and it remains as unreal and artificial as the worship of the Goddess Reason at the time of the French Revolution. But the case is not the same with others of the names above enumerated: some

[1. Miss J. E. Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, p. 632. Eros, as a developed personality, seems to be a complex product of several different elements. We are here only concerned with one of these--the psychological affection of violent desire, whether sexual or other. Democritus, frag. 191 (Diels), calls Jealousy, Envy, and Hatred K[[infinity]]rew: taÊthw êrÉ [[section]]xÒmenow t[[infinity]]w gn~mhw eÈyumÒterÒn te diãkeiw ka< Ùl[[currency]]gaw K[[infinity]]raw [[section]]n t" b[[currency]][[florin]] di~seai, FyÒnon ka< Z[[infinity]]lon ka< Dusmen[[currency]]hn.

[2. The evidence will be found in Roscher's lexicon, a v. Personifactionen.]

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of these cults were too ancient to have been anything but genuinely religious. In an early state of society we caauot suppose that personified abstractions, regarded as such, could become the objects of a permanent cult. How, then, did these cults arise?Looking through the list, we find that a fair number of these entities are psychological. Aidos, Anaideia, Eros, Anteros, Eleos, Elpis, Himeros, Horme, Hybris, Phobos, Pothos, are all names of states of mind; and to these we will confine our attention. Their origin must be sought in mental experience; and we may suppose that it occurs in some such way as this. At moments of exceptional excitement, a man feels himself carried away, taken hold of, `possessed' by an impulse, a gust of emotion, which seems to be not a part of himself, but on the contrary a force against which he is powerless. This is even to a civilized person a somewhat terrifying experience. The inexplicable panic which will suddenly run through an army, the infectious spirit of a crowd, the ecstasy produced by intoxicants, the throes of sexual pleasure, the raving of the seer and of the poet--all these are states of mind in which the self appears to be drowned and swept away. By what? There can be but one answer: some spirit, or daemon, has entered the soul and possesses it. This is the very language used by Diodotus; (note 1) and, centuries later, Porphyry (note 2) describes in very similar terms the invasions of maleficent spirits. `Having in general a violent and insidious character, which moreover is without the tutelage of the higher spiritual power, they for the most part make their assaults, as though from an ambush, with vehemence, so as to overpower their victims, and suddenly, since they try to escape notice. Hence the passions that

[1. iii. 45 dÉ êllai juntux[[currency]]ai Ùrg[[ordfeminine]] t<<n ényr~pvn ...w *kãwth tiw katdeg.xetai ÍpÉ énhkdeg.stou tinow kre[[currency]]ssonow. See above, p. 122.

[2. Porph. de abst. ii. 39 b[[currency]]aion går ~lvw ka< Ïpoulon [[paragraph]]xontew [[Sigma]]yow [[section]]sterhmdeg.non te t[[infinity]]w fulak[[infinity]]w t[[infinity]]w épÚ toË kre[[currency]]ttonow daimon[[currency]]ou, sfodråw ka< afifnid[[currency]]ouw o[[perthousand]]on [[[section]]j] [[section]]ndeg.draw ...w tÚ polÁ poioËntai tåw [[section]]mpt~seiw, p[[ordfeminine]] mcentsn lanyãnein peir~menoi, p[[ordfeminine]] dcents biazÒmenoi. ~yen Ùjdeg.a mcentsn tå épÉ [[section]]ke[[currency]]nvn pãyh, afl dcents ékdeg.seiw. (cf. Diodotus' énhkdeg.ston) ka< katory~seiw afl épÚ t<<n kreitsÒnvn bradÊterai dokoËsin.]

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come from them are swift and keen; and the remedies and restorations due to the higher spirits seem to be too slow. When we have traced these agencies back to this stage, it is only one step further to the most primitive theory of causes and motives which we find among existing savages.

`I can see,' says Mr. Sidney Rartland, (note 1) `no satisfactory evidence that early man entertained any great faith in the order and uniformity of nature... If he took aim at his enemy and flung his spear, or whatever primitive weapon served the same purpose; if it hit the man, and he fell; he might witness the result, but the mere mechanical causation, however inevitable in its action, would be the last thing he would think about.' What he does think about, Mr. Rutland, surveying the whole field of savage life as now known to us, and drawing evidence from every part of it, explains in convincing terms. Every known object has to the savage an elementary personality, endowed with qualities which enable it to persist and to influence others; and by virtue of these qualities it possesses, inherent in it and surrounding it, a sort of atmosphere charged with power. The Iroquois in North America call this atmosphere or potentiality, orenda. A good hunter is one whose orenda is good, and baffles the orenda of his quarry. At public games, in contests of skill or endurance between tribes, `the shamans--men reputed to possess powerful orenda--are employed for hire by the opposing parties respectively to exercise their orenda to thwart or overcome that of their antagonists.' (note 2) When a storm is brewing, it (the storm-maker) is said to be preparing its orenda. Of one who has died from witchcraft it is said `an evil orenda has struck him'. This idea of orenda, says Mr. Rartland, although it may not receive everywhere the same explicit recognition, `is implied in the customs and beliefs of mankind throughout the world.'

[1. Presidential Address to the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1906.

[2. Quoted from J. N. B. Hewitt, American Anthropologist, N.S. iv. 38.]

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The savage whose spear has struck down his enemy does not, and cannot, think of the two events--the spear-blow and the enemy's death--as cause and effect. His view is that `his own orenda felt in his passion, his will, his effort, (note 1) and displayed in his acts and words, the orenda of the spear, either inherent in itself, conceived as a personal being, or conferred by its maker and manifested in the keenness of its point, the precision and the force with which it flies to its work and inflicts the deadly wound--these would be to him the true causes of his enemy's fall. His orenda is mightier than his enemy's and overcomes it.' (note 2)

We have here the notion of cause traced to its root--the psychological experience of effort, the putting forth of will to constrain or master an opposing effort. Now, in states of violent excitement, man feels himself controlled and swept away by something which seems to exercise over his will a compelling force of the same kind as that which he is at other times conscious of putting forth out of himself. He regards this as the orenda of a spirit coming from outside.

At first the invading daemons will be associated only with the peculiar experiences which they severally cause. Phobos is simply the spirit which falls upon an army and inspires panic; Eros the spirit which possesses the lover, and so on. For a long time they may have had no fuller personality, and not even a continuous existence. They were momentary beings, sweeping into the soul from nowhere and passing out again into nothingness. Their continuous existence would begin when first some rude, unshapen stone was set up and conceived as their dwelling. The invisible agency can be conveyed by incantation into a rock or tree, which thus becomes a fetish. The famous unwrought stone at Thespiae was the habitation, not the image, of Eros--his baetyl, or beth-el. The personalities would gradually fill out, as stories

[1. In Homeric language, his flerÚn mdeg.now.

[2. When Thales said that `all things are full of spirits' (da[[currency]]monew), and that `the magnet has a soul (cuxÆ) because it moves iron', he was using a notion very like that of orenda. Like a savage, he thought that what moves something else must have a `soul', a life-force in it.]

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were told about them. Cult would secure their permanence; myth would invest them with a character and history. In the transition from aneikonic to eikonic cults, we see the figure literally emerging out of its pillar habitation and growing into human shape. (note 1)We must think of all this as occurring long before the earliest literature we know. Homer and Hesiod preserve much that is primitive, but they preserve it in a late and artificial dress; far behind them stretches a period of popular myth-making, and it was in that period that these `abstractions' reached their fullest reality and life. This growth of a mythical person is something utterly different from the allegorical personification of an abstract idea. To grasp an abstraction distinctly and then to assign it personal attributes is a proceeding which can only occur in a very advanced state of culture. These figures which we are now considering are originally not allegorical, but mythical; not personiflcations, but persons.

Allegory is a kind of story-telling, and in so far akin to myth; but, in order of genesis, the fabrication of allegory is the very reverse of myth-making. Allegory starts with a consciousness of the prosaic truth and then invents an artificial parable to clothe it withal. Christian sets out with neighbour Hopeful on a pilgrimage from the city of Mansoul to the New Jerusalem. The company he meets by the way, Giant Despair and Mr. Worldly Wiseman, are personifications which can only impose upon a child. Delightful as he is, we never quite forget that Apollyon is a pantomime bogey in pasteboard armour. It seems that an abstraction, once escaped, can never get back into the concrete; abstract and lifeless it must always remain. Allegory is an artificial business from the first, and foredoomed to failure. It is not thus that children--even modern sophisticated children--tell themselves stories; it was not thus that primitive man told himself myths. Eros and Elpis, Ienis and Eris, Nemesis and Ananke--these and their like are not allegorical fictions.

[1. Note, for instance, that Peitho, in the relief (p. 209), is sitting on the top of her pillar; Aphrodite, in the vase-painting (p. 195), is emerging from hers.]

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Man has not made them; it is they who make him, and bitter his fate if ho defy them. They have a long course to run before the dissolution sets in, whereby the body falls away from the soul, the presentment from the spirit. They will become personifications only when they die. How these discarnate passions came to develop into personalities, which could be represented in human shape, we can only guess. It is the work of myth-making imagination, helped probably by the fully developed anthropomorphism of the Olympian religion. Hesiod, by the devices of affiliation and marriage, somehow brings them into his multifarious pantheon; but they look queer and unreal when they get there, because they properly belong to a more primitive, non-anthropomorphic, system of belief. They dwindle into pale shadows beside the radiant and solid inhabitants of Mount Olympus. Some of them, we remark--though our impressions on this point are not very trustworibyhave won and retained a fuller degree of personality than others. Aidos, Peitho, Eros are more real to us than Eleos, Horme, or Philia. It seems certain that to the Greeks also some were fainter, others more vividly conceived. How far any one of them would advance towards complete divinity would depend on all sorts of accidents, and partly on the real frequency and importance of the states of mind which the power in question inspired.

Their later history confirms this impression. Some of them retain their independence, others lose it. It is suggested by Hermann Usener in an illuminating discussion of this subject (note 1) that the fact that their names have a known meaning weakens them as against the completely developed personal god with a proper name, the meaning of which is forgotten. It is easy to see what would happen if this world of daemons were invaded by a hierarchy of gods who had reached full anthropomorphic concreteness. The originally independent, but shadowy, personalities would yield to the stronger and become attached to them as attendants or even as epithets. So we hear of Athena

[1. Götternamen, p. 869.]

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Nike, Athena Hygieia, Artemis Eucleia, and so forth. The weakest will in this way almost disappear; their personality is absorbed and they sink into adjectives. Others however maintain their independence. Nike is not lost in Athena; Peitho never becomes Aphrodite. A long-established cult would be an anchor to save these ancient figures from being swept away. If myth has wrought for them a fairly distinct character and history, their personality will resist absorption. Though many of the take lower rank as attendant and ministering spirits, they will long retain a hold of their own in the minds of their simple worshippers. If in one way they are less human than the gods, in another they have remained closer to the elementary feelings of humanity.Figurative art will also contribute its help. If it is markedly anthropomorphic and has advanced far enough to fix a traditional human type with well-known traits and attributes, its figures will not give way altogether to newly- imported personalities whose traits and attributes are different. In actual fact, Eris, Apatê, Peitho, and some others do remain in Greek vase-painting. They are only subordinated to the Olympians, not effaced by them, and often the divinity and the attendant spirit appear side by side. The existence of a familiar archetype counts for much, especially as polytheism has no objection to indefinite multiplication of divine or daemonic personalities, and all religions have a remarkable power of `reconciliation'. Christianity finds room for as many saints and martyrs as Greece had daemons and heroes. In the modem world saints are kept alive and independent by local cults. They are also preserved by literature which gives a fixed and enduring form to popular hagiology. Greek poetry did the same service to the primitive daemons, for the clear imagination of poets arrested the fiux of popular myths, and prevented the disappearance of figures which might otherwise have melted. In the Ker stage, before they became humanized under the influence of Olympian anthropomorphism, Eros and Elpis were beings of the same order as that out of which the

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Erinyes and the Moirai developed. They were closely akin to the angry ghosts and the avenging spirits; and it was easy for them to be associated with the malevolent daemon who causes reversals of fortune, (note 1) since these reversals are often due to excess of confidence, intoxication, the sudden access of blind and violent feeling. Thus the passions take their place in the cycle of the tragic fact----Elpis beside Penia, Eros beside Ploutos. This first stage of the tragic theory is religious, but not theological; and it is quite non-moral.With the advent of the Olympian gods we reach a second stage, which, though still non-moral, is theological. The spirits of vengeance are now employed by the gods to punish man, not for moral offences, but for arrogant presumption. The notion of the divine Jealousy (fyÒnow) is now prominent. If man seeks to overstep the limits assigned him and to become as a god, he excites the resentment (ndeg.mesiw) of higher powers. Great prosperity is one of the divine prerogatives, and the tragic passions of unrestrained desire and ambition are offences against the gods. The reversal of fortune, formerly attributed to an independent daemon, now becomes an act of divine punishment. (note 2) `God is wont to lop and cut

[1. As the Erinyes are in Aesch. Agam. 468 kelaina< dÉ ÉErinÊew xrÒn[[florin]] tuxhrÚn ^ntÉ êneu d[[currency]]kaw palintuxe> tribò b[[currency]]ou tiye>sÉ émaurÒn. ÉElp[[currency]]w occurs in the Orphic Hymn (lix) to the Moirai : a.tÉ [[section]]p< l[[currency]]mnhw | Ùrfna[[currency]]hw... | na[[currency]]ousai pepÒthsye brot<<n [[section]]pÉ épe[[currency]]rona ga>an. | [[paragraph]]nyen [[section]]p< brÒteon dÒkimon gdeg.low [[section]]lp[[currency]]di koÊf[[dotaccent]] | ste[[currency]]xete--a reminiscence of the winged (koÊfh) Ker-Elpis.

[2. One of the earliest expressions of this theory is in a recently deciphered Babylonian book, dated before 2000 B.C., the story of Tabi-utul-Bel, King of Nippur:`How can mortals fathom the way of a god?

He who is still alive in the evening may be dead the next morning;

In an instant he is cast into grief; of a sudden he is crushed;

One moment he sings and plays,

In a twinkling he wails like a mourner.

Like day and night their fate changes;

If they hunger they are like corpses,

When they are satiated they think themselves equal to their god;

If things go well they talk of ascending to heaven,

If they are in distress, they speak of going down to Irkalla.'Morris Jastrow (A Babylonian Job, Contemp. Review, Dec. 1906, p. 805), from whom the above rendering is taken, discusses the document.]

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down all excess'; (note 1) it is Zeus who `abases the high, and exalts the low'. (note 2) Countless stories of the attempts to scale Olympus, and of men who have aspired to the love of goddesses, belong to this order of thought. These latter sins are the offences of Eros; but Elpis, who dares to count upon the future as assured, is also guilty of impious presumption. `Some day,' says Pindar, `I may say for certain what shall be; but now, although I hope, with God is the end.' (note 3) Such is the cautious language of piety. `In every matter,' says Solon to Croesus, `one must look to the end and see how it will turn out; for there are many to whom God gives a glimpse of prosperity and then overturns them root and branch.' (note 4) It is not safe to call a man happy until he is dead; premature congratulations will bring ill luck on him.As a third stage in the development of these ideas, we next encounter the Aeschylean notion that God uses the tragic passions themselves as agents of punishment, and bringgs the sinner to ruin by increasing the arrogant delusion. His ministers of Justice are Delusion (ÉApãth), and Blindness (ÖAth) ; (note 5) the former sometimes takes the shape of Elpis or of Eros. Thus the very causes of offence are enhanced by God to lead the guilty man deeper into the snare which Ruin spreads. This is the theory stated by Sophocles in the chorus we have already quoted. Elpis, the Delusion who wings the dreams of Desire, steals upon the sinner unawares. He is blinded and becomes unable to distinguish

[1. Herod. vii. 10 fildeg.ei går i yeÚw tå Íperdeg.xonta pãnta koloÊein.

[2. Laert. Diog. i. 3.2 Chilon asked Aesop how Zeus was employed; fãnai dÉ aÈtÒn: tå mcentsn Íxhlå tapein<<n, tå dcents tapeinå Ív<<n.

[3. Pind. Ol. xiii. 103. Cf. Theogn. 659 oÈdÉ ÙmÒsai xrØ toËyÉ ~ti mÆpote prçgma tÒdÉ [[paragraph]]stai: | yeo< går toi nemes<<sÉ, o[[perthousand]]sin [[paragraph]]pesti tdeg.low.

[4. Herod. i. 32 fin.

[5. Aesch. fragm. 301 ÉApãthw dika[[currency]]aw oÈk épostate> yeÒw. One means of delusion, used by the gods is the riddling oracle, which is of the nature of an ordeal. If a man is right-minded, he will interpret it. correctly and take warning; but if he is infatuated, it will mislead him. Cf. the terms in which Thucydides (v. 103 cit. supr. p. 178) speaks of oracles, divination, ka< ~sa toiaËta metÉ [[section]]lp[[currency]]dvn luma[[currency]]netai, and Dionysius' paraphrase, <= parå t<<n ye<<n [[section]]lp[[currency]]w.]

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right from wrong. (note 1) Moral offences, as distinct from presumption against the gods, gradually become more prominent. One of the earliest is excess in vengeance, (note 2)--though this, perhaps, was at first only a theological offence against the divine prerogative of cruelty.The notion that a passion like Eros can be the instrument of the divine Jealousy finds an interesting expression on a vase (note 3) of the same class as the Darius krater figured on p. 195. In the central field the `death of Meleager is represented inside a house. Outside, and on a higher level, sits Aphrodite, with her head inclined in sorrow, watching the scene. In her left hand she holds a bow and arrow; and beside her stands Eros. He is unmistakable, but the name inscribed above him is not his own, but Phthonos (FYONOS). The significance is clear: Aphrodite symbolizes the love of Meleager for Atalanta, of which she is the supernatural cause, the parait[[currency]]a; Eros-Phthonos is the enhanced passion which has led Meleager to overstep the bounds assigned to man, and brought on the doom by which the Jealousy of Heaven is appeased. (note 4)

This moral and theological theory and the drama based on it concentrate attention more on the abasement of pride than on the exaltation of the lowly; and the tragic fact comes to consist chiefly of the former. Hence the original associations of Penia and Elpis have faded for us, while those of Ploutos and Hybris are vivid. Elpis and Fros, too,

[1. Soph. Ant. 822 tÚ kakÚn doke>n potÉ [[section]]sylÚn | t"dÉ [[paragraph]]mmen ~t[[florin]] frdeg.naw | yeÚw êgei prÚw êtan. Lycurgus in Leocr. 92 (cit. Jebb ad loc.) quotes from `ancient poetry': ~tan går ÙrgØ daimÒnvn blãpt[[dotaccent]] tinã, | toËtÉ aÈtÚ pr<<ton [[section]]jafaire>tai fren<<n | tÚn noËn tÚn [[section]]sylÒn, efiw dcents tØn xe[[currency]]rv trdeg.pei | gn~mhn, .nÉ efid[[ordfeminine]] mhdcentsn oen èmartãnei. Similarly the chorus in the Antigone (791) addressing Eros: oÁ ka< dika[[currency]]vn éd[[currency]]kouw frdeg.naw paraspòw [[section]]p< l~b&.

[2. Herod. iv. 205 ...w êra ényr~poisi afl l[[currency]]hn fisxura< timvr[[currency]]ai prÚw ye<<n [[section]]p[[currency]]fyonoi g[[currency]]nontai. The moral, and non-theological, equivalent of this is expounded in Hermocrates' words (Thuc. iv. 62) quoted above on p. 170.

[3. From Armentum, now at Naples in the Museo Nazionale CoIl. Santangelo, No. 11. Interpreted by Kekulé, Strenna festosa efferta a G. Henzen, Roma, 1867.

[4. See Koerte, Ueber Personzationen psychol. psychol. Affekte in der späteren Vasenmaleren, Berlin, 1874.]

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become almost indistinguishable; both are characteristic of Hybris, and ministerial agents of Nemesis. We have entered upon this short and imperfect description of primitive psychology with a view to bringing out the pre-Aeschylean beliefs about the tragic passions and their relation to reversals of fortune--their place in the cycle of the tragic fact. Unless our description of the form of Aeschylean tragedy was altogether fanciful, we found in the double structure of his drama certain features which pointed back to the primitive, mythical theory of the passions. Aeschylus conceives them as ministerial agencies, external to man and yet embodied and personified in him. On the ideal plane of the lyric they seemed still to keep something of their old independent existence as elementary, supernatural persons. Hybris was not a mere name for Agamemnon's pride; Eros was something more than the lust of rapine in the conquerors of Troy. The old notion of incarnation or spiritual possession, combined with the subordination of daemons to the gods, provides at this stage of development a working theory to reconcile the supernatural with the natural causation of human action. The characters of the play are not merely the blind puppets of higher powers; they have inward springs of motion, and yet these are agencies sent from God. Thus for a moment is the balance poised between the two sets of powers which shape human destiny.

But only for a moment. The theory involves so delicate an equilibrium between natural and superhuman, so nice a compromise of faith and knowledge, that it cannot be maintained for long. The balance must turn, and there is no doubt which scale will sink. The supernatural must fade and recede. The gods must surrender again to man the life with which, as he slowly learns, himself at his own cost has lavishly endowed them. Human nature re-enters upon its alienated domain, conscious of itself, and of nothing else but a material world which centres round it. Desire and Hope must resign their dream shapes, and all that will be

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left of them is a hot movement of the blood, the thrill of a quickened nerve. Vengeance and Ruin will be at last transformed into facts of heredity and causal sequences of physical excess and pain, Destiny will give place to Law. The question which can no longer be postponed is, how far this process, with all the loss and gain it carries with it, had advanced for Thucydides. The common assumption is that the language of Diodotus is only poetical metaphor,-- that it means no more than a writer of our own day would mean by it. `Thucydides,' we are told, `has made a clean sweep of the legendary and novelistic sympathies, and primitive beliefs, rarely mitigated by the light of criticism, which marked Herodotus.' In a single generation he had leapt across the whole gulf which separates us from Aeschylus and Pindar.

In the course of this study the conviction has been growing upon us that the comparisons commonly made between Thucydides and Herodotus are based on false assumptions and misleading. It is usual to speak of Herodotus as primitive, and religious to the point of superstition; of Thucydides, as advanced and sceptical to the point of irreligiousness. Herodotus is treated as a naive and artless child; Thucydides as a disillusioned satirist and sometimes as a cynic. These representations seem to us to be founded simply on the external fact that Herodotus was by a generation the older of the two, and on the false assumption that, because their books are both called histories, Thucydides must have started where Herodotus left off, and developed the tradition he originated. Our own view is almost exactly the reverse. If either of the two men is to be called religious, it is Thucydides; if either is sceptical, it is Herodotus. Naivety and artlessness are not terms we should choose to apply to either; something closely akin to cynicism and fiippancy is common enough in Herodotus; there is not a trace of either in Thucydides. A single passage at the beginning of Herodotus' history

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will illustrate our meaning. In tracing the earlier stages of the quarrel between East and West, Herodotus has occasion to relate the story of Io, the cow-maiden beloved of Zeus and persecuted by Hera. (note 1) Putting quietly aside the Greek legend, (note 2) which was primitive, gross, and supernatural, Herodotus gives the story as told by the Persian chroniclers. In this version Io, an Argive princess, was carried off to Egypt by some Phoenicians who were trading along the Aegean coasts. Herodotus also gives a slightly different version, current among the Phoenicians, in which Io became the captain's paramornr, and, to escape her parents' anger, sailed to Egypt of her own free will.`It is curious,' says Rawlinson, (note 3) `to observe the treatment which the Greek myths met with at the hands of foreigners. The Oriental mind, quite unable to appreciate poetry of such a character, stripped the legends bare of all that beautified them and then treated them, thus vulgarized, as matters of simple history. Io, the virgin priestess, beloved by Zeus, and hated by jealous Hera, metamorphosed, Argus-watched, and gadfly-driven from land to land, resting at last by holy Nile's sweet-tasting stream, and there becoming mother of a race of hero-kings, is changed to Io, the paramour, &c.... Herodotus, left to himself, has no tendency to treat myths in this coarse, rationalistic way: witness his legends of Croesus, Battus, Labda, &c. His spirit is too reverent, and, if we may so say, too credrnlous. The supernatural never shocks or startles him.'

The critic's mind is filled with the Io legend as presented in the Supplices and the Prometheus, and he quarrels with the Phoenicians for not having read and appreciated their Aeschylus. But what was the story of Io, before Aeschylus made it mysterious and beautiful? Apollodorus preserves the edifying tale (note 4) which `the Semitic race, unable to enter

[1. Herod. i. 1 ff.

[2. i. 2 oÏtv mcentsn ÉIoËn [[section]]w A[[daggerdbl]]gupton épikdeg.syai ldeg.gousi Pdeg.rsai, oÈk ...w ÜEllhnew. That is all he says about the Greek story.

[3. Translation of Herodotus, note ad loc.

[4. Apollod. Bibl. 2. 1. 3. Io was priestess of Hera, and Zeus violated her. Caught iu the act by Hera, he changed the maiden into a white cow, and swore he would not touch her again. That is why, says Hesiod, the breaking of lovers' vows does not draw down the anger of the gods. Hera begged the cow from Zeus, and set Argus to watch her. He tied her to an olive-tree. Then Zeus sent Hermes to steal the cow, but Hermes was detected by Hierax (the Hawk) and he killed Argus with a stone. Hera sent a gad-fly to drive Io from land to land, till at last she came to Egypt, was changed back into a woman, and bore Epaphos.]

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into the spirit of Greek poesy', (note 1) vulgarized and stripped bare of its beauty. Herodotrns, `left to himself,' would have been too reverent to be shocked by it; but apparently the Persians and Phoenicians stood over him with a stick and terrorized his `reverent, and if we may so say, credulous' spirit. They did their work pretty thoroughly. They corrupted their innocent victim to the extent of making him repeat a comment, which is not quite the sort of thing we expect to hear in the nursery. `Now the Persians argue that to carry off a woman must of course be considered as the act of a wicked man; but, when the elopement has taken place, to make great ado about vengeance is the mark of a very foolish man, and to take no notice whatever is the mark of a very wise one. For obviously, if the victim herself had not wished it, there would have been no elopement. Now they themselves (they maintain) had acted like wise men,' &c. (note 2)Where else in Greek literature shall we find this flippant, Parisian, man-of-the-worldly tone? Not in the Athenian authors--Aeschylus, Sophocles, Thucydides, Euripides, Plato--no, nor yet in Aristophanes. It is not Athenian, but Ionian; (note 3) we must look for a parallel to the latest and most decadent passages of the Ionian Epos; just as, to match the `Milesian' tale of Gyges, to which Herodotus next turns, we must look to Boccaccio and Brant6me. Herodotus stands, not

[1. Rawlinson, ibid.

[2. Herod. i. 4. Plutarch, malig. Herod. ii. (856) protests against this utterance as an `apology on behalf of the ravishers' find as involving impiety, since, if the women were carried off willingly, the punishment of the gods upon the ravishers was unjust.

[3. The contrast between the Ionian spirit and the Athenian was suggested to me by an unpublished lecture of Mr. Gilbert Murray, which I have been privileged to read, and which suddenly illuminated this part of my subject, Whatever truth there is in the view expressed is due to him, though he is in no way responsible for the expression of it.]

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at the beginning, but at the end of a tradition. He is not the father of history; he is the last of the Homeridae, turning the refined and polished product of centuries of festal recitation into material for his amusing and instructive tale of the quarrel of East and West. The process is, to our eyes, unscientific; but it was then the most advanced and enlightened treatment of saga. There is not a word in either of the two versions given by Herodotus which might not be literal fact. (note 1) Such incidents must have occurred as frequently when the Phoenicians bartered beads and gaudy stuffs with the simple natives along the Aegean coasts, as they do now when European traders ply exactly the same business along the shores of Africa. Herodotus is, to our minds, unscientific only in three respects. First, he does not understand that primitive myths are not garbled history, any more than he was aware that garbled history is a sort of myth. Second, he imports into the heroic age the international courtesies and decently conducted negotiations by herald and envoy, which prevailed in his own time. Third, he does not care which story--the Persian or the Phoenician--is true. `About this matter,' he says, `I am not going to say whether it happened this way or that.' `I will tell no lies, George, that I promise you,' says the younger Pendennis; `and do no more than coincide in those which are necessary and pass current, and can't be got in without recalling the whole circulation.' (note 2)

[1. The treatment of this myth illustrates a remark we made above (p. 133); to the effect that rationalization may easily efface the clues by which the elements of fiction and truth can be discriminated. Herodotus leaves only the name of Io and the voyage to Egypt, suppressing the transformation into a cow. Now it is almost certain that the element of historical fact which lies behind the story is a primitive cow-worship at Argos, probably even earlier than the worship of Hera. Io is possibly a primaeval cow-goddess whom Hera replaced. The voyage to Egypt is purely mythical, having been invented when Io was identified with Isis. Thus the most rational part of the story is absolutely unhistorical; while the gross and supernatural features of it, which rationalism refines away, are the clue to historical truth.

Rationalization is the converse of the mythical `infiguration' of history: it imparts the form of a possible series of events to a supernatural and impossible story.

[2. Thackeray, Pendennis, lxviii.]

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It is against this light and careless Ionian temper that Thucydides protests, as Aeschylus, in his way, bad protested before, and Plato, in his, will protest later. To Aeschylus it seemed irreligious; to Thucydides, regardless of truth; to Plato, immoral. Aeschylus had taken Homer and made the religion of Zeus spiritual by incorporating with it a profound interpretation of those gross and primitive myths, like the story of the cow-maiden, which the Ionians had rejected or turned to ridicule in the parodies of mock Epic. Plato finds Homer too thoroughly penetrated with immorality to be rendered serviceable even by drastic expurgation. (note 1) To Thucydides the Ionian tradition of Epos and story-telling is anathema; his introduction is ajudicial and earnest polemic against it and all its works. There was as little of the Ionian in his temperament as there was in his blood. It is almost certain that he was related on his mother's side to the Philaidae, for his tomb was to be seen close to those of Kimon and Miltiades. (note 2) His father bore a Thracian name, and came probably of that hard-drinking and fighting stock which worshipped Ares and the northern Dionysus; and it is to the religious drama which grew up at Dionysus' festivals in Pelasgian Athens, not to the Epos which bad flowered at the Ionian gatherings and now was overblown, that Thucydides turns for his inspiration.

Herodotus picks up a good story where he can. His dramatization of the expedition of Xerxes is tinged with Aeschylean religion, because Aeschylus had created the Persian legend on this type and fixed the lines which any one who wished to glorify Athens and to please an Athenian audience must follow. But in Herodotus the religious notions are ill-digested and lie close to the surface. They are the theme of illustrative and fabulous anecdote, not the deep-set framework of earnest thought. It is not in this manner that Thucydides works when he turns the great moral of Aeschylus' Persians against the Athenian Empire.

[1. When Homer is called `the Bible of the Greeks', these points tend to be overlooked.

[2. The Philaidae were an Aeginetan family. Miitiades, the victor of Marathon, married a Thracian wife.]

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In doing so, the historian inevitably borrowed much of the structure of Aeschylean tragedy. This unhistoric principle of design came in on the top of his first, chronological plan, and he allowed both to shape his work, leaving long tracts of uncoloured narrative between the scattered episodes of his drama. The tragic theory of human nature involved in the dramatization differs from the Aeschylean in being non-theological--at least on the surface and so far beneath it as we are allowed to see; for in place of all-seeing Zeus, Thucydides has Fortune. In thus removing the theological element, he has reverted in a curious way to the pre-theological conception of the tragic fact, which existed long before Aeschylus. The language of Diodotus expresses that conception in its completeness and with great precision. We have in fact in that statement an instance of rationalizing. The accretion of theological belief is removed; but what is left is a mythical construction which contains and carries with it conceptions still more primitive. Just as Thucydides in rationalizing the story of Pausanias cut away the fabulous anecdotes, and never saw that rvhat remained was not fact, but dramatized legend; so in rationalizing the theology of Aeschylus, he was unaware that what remained was mythical in origin, and not a fresh statement of the facts of life drawn from direct and unbiassed observation. We have traced the theory through three stages: (1) a primitive, pre-Olympian stage, in which it might be called religious, but neither theological nor moral; (2) a theological, but still non-moral stage, in which the Jealousy of the Olympians is a dominant conception; and (3) a stage both theological and moral, in the drama of Aeschylus. Thucydides adds a fourth stage in which this train of thought ceases to involve theology, while it remains moral. But through all its phases it is more or less mythical.

How much warmth and life these primitive ideas still held for him, what degree of reality Fortune, Elpis, and Eros retained--these are questions which cannot be answered with certainty. Our own impression is that the anthropomorphic

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mode of thought was so habitual and vivid in the Greek mind, that only the most determined rationalists could shake it off. Perhaps even they could not get free of it. Euripides, like Thucydides, is hailed as a modern of the moderns, and (to our thinking) with better reason. The tragedian has none of the historian's detachment; he will risk the success of an artistic effect to gain a point in theological controversy; he is not coolly, but fervently, rationalistic. And yet, when we read the Hippolytus, and still more when we see it played, the feeling grows upon us that reason falls back like a broken wave. A brooding power, relentless, inscrutable, waits and watches and smites. There she stands, all through the action, the white, implacable Aphrodite. Is she no more than a marble image, the work of men's hands? Is there no significance in that secret smile, no force behind the beautiful mask, no will looking out of the fixed, watching eyes? And yet, how can there be? Is she not one of the outcast, dethroned Olympians, a figment of bygone superstition, despised and rejected of an enlightened age? No, she is more than this, and much more. But what can she be ?--a personification of the `life-force'? A thousand times, no! It must be that poetry has forced on reason some strange compromise. We cannot detect the formula of that agreement; but we know that somehow a compact has been made. Had the poet, in one of the long days of musing in his seaward cave on Salamis, seen a last vision of the goddess, rising in wiathful foam?In the Hippolytus we are approaching the modern conception of the tragic fact, in which the interest lies in the inward conflict of purely natural motives; but we have not yet quite reached it; and if the supernatural quality of the elementary human passions is still felt by Euripides, it is no great paradox to find traces of it in the historian, who looked to drama of a much more primitive type.