[[39]]
CHAPTER IV
THE WESTERN POLICY
The commercial relations of Athens with the West dated from early in the
sixth century; the black-figured Attic vases found their way to Etruria before
550. But Athens had no colony of her own in Italy or Sicily. After the fall
of Chalkis, however, and the loss of her marine (about 506), Athens succeeded
to her position, and the Chalkidian colonies looked to her for support against
Syracuse. The occupation of Naupactos in 459 was regarded as a menace to
Corinthian connections with the West. Athenian commerce was growing in that
quarter; the Attic vases of the fifth century completely oust Corinthian ware
in Etruria. There was also a considerable export to Campania, and a somewhat
smaller trade with Sicily. Athens imported corn, pigs, and cheese from Sicily,
metal-ware from Etruria, and woven stuffs from Carthage. `All the pleasant
things of Sicily and Italy were brought together at Athens.' (note 1) They were
paid for partly in pottery and partly in Attic sliver. The Euboic-Attic
standard was already in use in most Sicilian states at the end of the sixth
century.
Politically, the relations of Athens with the Western Greeks can be traced as
far back as the middle of the fifth century. We hear of an embassy from
Egesta, asking for help against Selinus, in 454-3; but Athens, just then
weakened by the loss of the Egyptian expedition, could do nothing. She was
invited to share in the settlement of New Sybaris in 453. The first important
step was the foundation of Thurii for trade with Campania and Etruria (443).
Pericles tried to give the enterprise a panhellenic character; but Thurii was
soon
[1. Ps.-Xen. de rep. Ath. ii. 7.]
[[41]]
a centre of purely Athenian influence in Southern Italy. It became rich
and prosperous.The founding of Thurii is not mentioned by
Thucydides in his account of the fifty years between the Persian war and the
Peloponnesian. We might have expected some notice of it in a work which leads
up to the great effort after expansion in the West. But, if this omission is
curious, his silence on another incident is much more remarkable. Just on the
eve of the war, Syracuse and her Dorian neighbours were fighting with Leontini,
the other Ionian colonies, and the Italian Locrians. Athens concluded an
alliance with Leontini, and another, in the same year, with Rhegium. (note 1)
Of these treaties, made about the time when the two Athenian squadrons were
dispatched to Corcyra, Thucydides says not a word, until he comes to the
embassy of Leontini, six years later, in 427. Even there we have only the
merest allusion: `So the allies of Leontini sent to Athens, in accordance with
an old-standing alliance and because they were Ionians, and induced the
Athenians to send a fleet.' (note 2) That is the only reference which is. to be
found in the history; so long as Pericles is on the scene there is complete
silence about his colonial policy in the West, complete silence about political
relations with Sicilian and Italian states.
The part played by Pericles in the alliance with Corcyra is also utterly
effaced in the long story of the negotiations. (note 3) We are given speeches
by the Corcyreans and by the Corinthians, but no utterance of the Athenian
statesman. The conclusion of the alliance is narrated in very summary language,
as follows: (note 4) `The Athenians heard both sides, and two meetings of the
Assembly were held. At the first they inclined to the arguments of the
Corinthians; but at the second they changed their minds. They would not go so
far as an offensive and defensive alliance with Corcyra, for if they
did
[1. CIA. iv. 1, 33 a, p. 13. CIG. 74 = CIA. i. 33. Both
treaties are dated in the archonsbip of Apseudes (433-2). [2. Thuc. iii. 86
katã te palaiån jummax[[currency]]an ka<...
[3. Thuc. i.
22-44.
[4. Thuc. i. 44.]
[[41]]
so a demand from Corcyra that they should cooperate against Corinth
would involve them in a breach of their treaty with the Peloponnesians. They
concluded, however, a defensive alliance. War with the Peloponnesians appeared
to be inevitable in any case, and they did not want to let Corcyra, with her
strong navy, join Corinth. Their plan was rather to embroil the two states
more and more with one another, so that when war came Corinth and the other
naval powers might be weaker.' (note 1) In the next chapter Thucydides plunges
straight into the story of the naval operations off Corcyra.Now,
in all the twenty chapters, of which the last has just been quoted, there is no
mention of Pericles; we hear only of `the Athenians'. Who effected the change
of feeling at the second assembly, when Athens was converted to the Corcyrean
side? Why have we no account of this second meeting, like the long account of
the Mythenean debate, at which a similar conversion was effected? Surely at
this critical point in the story of the quarrel which led to the war,
Thucydides has missed an opportunity of explaining somewhat more fully why
Athens allied herself with Corcyra. At least he might have told us in three
words whose policy it was, even if he could not tell us whether this decisive
step had any bearing on larger schemes, whose schemes they were, and what
Pericles thought of them. He has, however, given us just the bare minimum of
enlightenment on these points.
In the above translation of i. 44 we have omitted a short sentence at the end
which comes in as a sort of afterthought. It is this (note 2): `And further it
seemed to them that the island (Corcyra) was conveniently situated on the
coasting-route to Italy and Sicily.' These words refer to one of the numerous
arguments urged in the Corcyreans' speech. Corcyra, they say, `is conveniently
situated for the coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily, so as either to prevent a
fleet from coming
[1. One short sentence, to which we shall
return in a moment, is omitted here. [2. 44. 3 ëma dcents
t[[infinity]]w te ÉItal[[currency]]aw ka< Sikel[[currency]]aw
kal<<w [[section]]fa[[currency]]neto aÈto>w <= n[[infinity]]sow
[[section]]n parãpl[[florin]] ke>syai.]
[[42]]
from those countries to the aid of the Peloponnesians or to help a
fleet from here on its way thither, and is very useful, generally.' (note 1) The point is then immediately dropped.These two sentences,
where they stand in the long story of the negotiations, are exceedingly
inconspicuous; but when we have noticed them we are set wondering why they are
there at all, if it is true, as Grote for instance says, that the Athenians
began to conceive designs on the West seven or eight years after the outbreak
of the war. Assertions of this sort are made, against all other ancient
testimony, on the authority of Thucydides alone; but when we look closely, have
they even that authority? What is the point of the two short sentences quoted
above? Every one seems content to remark that the Corcyreans only mean--as
indeed they say--that they could hinder help coming from Sicily to the
Peloponnesians. But that is not all; why do they add `or help a fleet from
here on its way thither? This tiny, inconspicuous clause has no meaning
unless some one at Athens was already contemplating a transference of the scene
of war to Sicilian waters. The argument was addressed to the Athenians; and,
together with the other consideration, that the second and the id naval powers
in Greece would be weakened by division. it decided them to form an alliance
with Corcyra. A series of expeditions to the West were actually made by
Athens, and the Corcyrean democrats did what they could to facilitate their
passage. The conclusion is irresistible that here, as in other instances, the
fidelity of Thucydides has preserved an indication of critical importance.
So long as we assume that when Thucydides says `the Athenians', he means
Pericles, that Pericles and his majority were completely agreed in their ideals
and policy, and that Thucydides' version of Pericles' policy is correct and
complete, we must, in the teeth of a whole series of indications and
testimonies, go on asserting that `Athens' had no designs on the West until
Pericles was dead. But these current
[1. i. 36. 2 t[[infinity]]w
te går ÉItal[[currency]]aw ka< Sikel[[currency]]aw kal[[Delta]]w
parãplou ke>tai, Àste mÆte [[section]]ke>yen
nautikÚn [[section]]çsai Peloponnhs[[currency]]oiw
[[section]]pelye>n tÒ te [[section]]nydeg.nde prÚw téke>
parapdeg.mcai, ka< [[section]]w tïlla jumfor~tatÒn
[[section]]sti.]
[[43]]
assumptions will not account for the fact that Thucydides completely
effaces the action of Pericles in regard both to the Megarian decrees and to
the Corcyrean alliance. We suggest that when Thucydides says `the Athenians',
he means the Athenians and not Pericles, because `the Athenians' had a policy
of their own, which Pericles adopted only when his hand was forced. The
historian conveys the correct impression, that the policy in question was not
originated by the nominal leader of the demos.He gives us
another indication in the speech in which Pericles lays down his plan of
campaign (note 1): Harass the Peloponnesian coasts; abandon the country and
move into town, so as to turn Athens into an island. `I have many reasons for
expecting victory, if you will not extend your empire during the war, or
go out of your way to encounter unnecessary risks. I am more afraid of our own
mistakes than of the enemy's strategy.' (note 2) Why was this warning needed,
unless some extension of empire was already in contemplation? The acquisition
of Megara alone can hardly be meant, since Pericles himself had moved
the second Megarian decree.
Thus, when we take enough trouble to collect and analyse the indications
which Thucydides' accuracy has preserved, we can extract from the historian
himself a confirmation of our other authorities. Diodorus supports our
conclusion. Speaking of the Leontine embassy of 427 he says (note 3): `The
Athenians had long before (ka< pãlai) been coveting Sicily for
the excellence of the country, and they now concluded an alliance with Leontini
because they really desired to conquer the island. For, some years before, when
Corinth was fighting Corcyra, the demos preferred the alliance with Corcyra
because it was conveniently situated for the voyage of Sicily. (note 4)
The Athenians had command of the sea, many allies, and much treasure; and they
hoped to conquer the Lacedaemonians, and, after becoming leaders of all Greece,
to gain possession of Sicily.' That is how a later historian,
[1.
Thuc. i. 140 ff. [2. i. 144.
[3. Diod. xii. 54.
[4. diå
tÚ tØn Kdeg.rkuran eÈfu<<w ke>syai prÚw
tÚn efiw Sikel[[currency]]an ploËn.]
[[44]]
who, though little more than a compiler, bad sources of information
closed to us, read the story of the Corcyrean negotiation. His reading agrees
exactly with ours.Plutarch's witness is on the same side.
Speaking of the moment after the Egyptian disaster of 449 and before the
`Sacred War' of 448 he says, (note 1) `many were already possessed by
that fatal Passion for Sicily which later was inflamed by Alcibiades and his
friends. Some dreamed even of Carthage and Etruria.' Here Plutarch dates these
designs from seventeen or eighteen years before the war. Again, he says `the
Athenians were coveting Sicily while Perikles was still alive, and after
his death they attacked her and sent their so-called relief expeditions to
prepare the way for the great expedition against Syracuse'.
The only reason which modern historians have for refusing to accept these
statements is the silence of Thucydides, whose hints escape them. But with
reference to the further stage of this policy--the attack on Carthage can
estimate the value of an argument based on his reticence. In this case we have
not the mere opinion of a late writer but the indisputable evidence of a
contemporary.
Thucydides does not mention Carthage till he comes to the year 415, when he
says that Alcibiades hoped to be the conqueror of Sicily and Carthage. (note 3)
In his speech at Sparta, (note 4) Alcibiades asserts that the Athenians meant
to attack Sicily first, then the Greeks in Italy, and finally Carthage herself.
Hermocrates, addressing the Sicilians in conference, advises them to send for
help to the Carthaginians. `An Athenian attack on their city is nothing more
than they expect; they live in constant apprehension of it.' (note 5)
Here, once more, Thucydides preserves just one indication that his story is
incomplete. But fur this sentence, be would have left us to suppose that the
designs on Carthage originated in the wild brain of Alcibiades. This
impression has already been conveyed, and
[1. vit. Per. 20.
[2. vit. Alkib. 17.
[3. vi. 15.
[4. vi. 90.
[5. vi. 34 oÈ
går éndeg.lpiston aÈto>w, éllÉ afie<
diå fÒbou efis< mÆ pote ÉAyhna>oi aÈto>w
[[section]]p< tØn pÒlin [[paragraph]]lyvsi.]
[[45]]
the language here is not explicit or striking enough to dispel
it.We happen to know, however, that an attack on Carthage was
not first conceived in 415. In the Knights of Aristophanes (note 1) the
elderly trireme addresses her sisters--Ladies, have you heard
the news? In the town it passed for truth
That a certain low-bred upstart, one Hyperbolus forsooth,
Asks a hundred of our number, with a further proposition
That we should sail with him to Carthage on a secret
expedition.
The date of this play is 424--nine years earlier
than Thucydides' first mention of Carthage. The question at the moment was
between the recall and the reinforcement of the fleet in Sicilian waters, which
had been sent out in 427 and was actually recalled in the summer of this year
494-493. The above passage makes it clear that Hyperbolus had demanded a
strong reinforcement, and further that designs against Carthage were already in
the air. Thucydides never mentions Hyperbolus till viii. 78, where he records
his assassination, and he says nothing of the proposal mentioned in the
Knights. He has, in fact, done as much to connect the larger plans of
Western conquest with Alcibiades as he has done to disconnect them from
Pericles. We shall try to show later how it comes about that the conquest of
Sicily is kept out of sight so long as Pericles lives, kept in the background
while Cleon holds the stage, and brought to the front with Alcibiades. We do
not deny that this project did come more and more to the front as the war
proceeded; all that we have argued is that it was in the background before
Thucydides allows us to see it at all.
The objection may be made: If the conquest of Sicily was in view from the
first, why did not the great expedition take place earlier than 415?
There are several answers. At first Pericles was there to prevent it. He could
not avoid adopting the policy of war with Corinth and the Peloponnesian league;
but, by adopting it, he triumphantly secured his own position, and so long as
his
[1. 1303. Frere.]
[[46]]
influence lasted he could restrict the Athenians to his own defensive
scheme and make them listen to his warning: `do not extend your empire during
the war.' Then came the plague, upsetting all calculations and decimating
Athens. The revolt of Lesbos soon followed and diverted attention to dangers
within the empire. Yet even so, in the very year of this revolt (407), with
the treasure running out, the rich burdened by the war-tax, the peasantry
ruined by invasion, the crowded city ravaged by plague--in the midst of all
this, an advanced squadron of twenty ships was sent to stir up discord ill the
Sicilian states. `Athens,' says Grote, (note 1) `began operations on a small
scale in Sicily, probably contrary to the advice of both Nikias and Kleon,
neither of them seemingly favourable to these distant undertakings.' On whose
advice, then? Grote does not say. `Athens,' writes a more recent historian,
(note 2) `again takes the maritime offensive, but the operations lack any
connexion and design, in the absence of a simple and conscious purpose.' Is
there a lack of purpose and design? Let us glance at the main course of the
war.On Pericles' plan, the war, but for accidents, might have
gone on for ever. The Spartans invade Attica for two or three weeks every year,
ravage the country unchecked, and retire. The Athenians conduct biennial
invasions of the Megarid, ravage the country unchecked, and retire. The fleet,
in the sailing season, is sent round the coast of the Peloponnese, makes
descents unchecked, and retires. The two combatants are like blindfolded
boxers delivering in the dark blows which neither hurt nor can be parried.
This was what Pericles and his Spartan friend Archidamus intended; they both
hoped that the combatants would get tired of these annual picnics.
But as soon as Pericles is out of the way things take a different turn.
Vigorous offensive action at the mouth of the Corinthian gulf is crowned
by the brilliant victory of Pllormio. These naval operations are connected
with an attempt to detach the whole of Acarnania from the Athenian
alliance. Observe how, at once, the centre of interest is shifted to the
second stage in `the coasting voyage to Italy
[1. History of
Greece, v. 210. [2. Busolt, Griech. Gesch., iii. 2, p. 1053.]
[[47]]
and Sicily' in which Megara was the first stage and Corcyra the third.
Then the revolt of Lesbos creates an unforeseen diversion. But when that is
disposed of, we read of the establishment of the democracy and of Athenian
influence in Corcyra; the capture of Minoa--a substantial step in the
coercion of Megara, which is still invaded twice yearly; a preliminary
expedition to Sicily; Demosthenes' campaigns in Leucas and
Aetolia; a second expedition to Sicily with instructions to settle
affairs at Corcyra on the way. Then comes a second diversion--the Pylos
episode. The negotiations which follow break down because Cleon demands the
cession of Nisaea and Pegae (the Megarian ports),Troezen and
Achaea. An invasion of Corinthian territory is followed by the
capture of the long walls of Megara and Nisaea. There is an
intrigue with the Boeotian demos, by which Athens is to secure Siphae, the port
on the Corinthian gulf. More operations follow in Acarnania, including
the capture of Oeniadae. The third and most serious diversion is effected by
Brasidas' unprecedented winter-march to Amphipolis, the loss of which brings
the Ten Years' War to a close.Is there no design in this series
of attacks at various points along the route across Megara, down the Corinthian
gulf, round the comer of Acarnania to Corcyra, on to Italy and Sicily? Or are
we right in thinking that as soon as the people interested in the establishment
of commercial connexions along this route have a free hand, there is plenty of
evidence in their plan of war for a simple and conscious purpose?
Our main contention is simply that this scheme dates from before the beginning
of the war, and was only temporarily delayed by Pericles, who always
disapproved of it.
There is one more passage (note 1) to which, in concluding, we ought to call
attention. It is the chapter where Thucydides reviews the career of Pericles
and contrasts him with his successors. Written after the fall of Athens, it is
one of the latest additions to the early part of the history.
[1.
ii. 65. The Sicilian disaster and the fall of Athens are mentioned in section
6.]
[[48]]
`So long as Pericles ruled Athens in the times of peace, he led her
wisely and brought her safely through, and in his days she reached the height
of her greatness. When the war broke out, it is clear that, here again, he was
right in his estimate of her power. He survived the declaration of war two
years and six months; and after his death his foresight with respect to the war
was still more clearly apparent. He had told the Athenians that all would be
well if they would be quiet, keep up their navy, and not try to add to their
empire during the war or run their city into danger. But the Athenians did
everything he told them not to do: they engaged in a policy which seemed to
have nothing to do with the war from motives of private ambition or private
gain, (note 1) with disastrous consequences to themselves and their allies.
Success would only have meant glory or profit to individuals; failure meant
ruin to Athens. The reason was that Pericles, since his position was assured
by his acknowledged worth and wisdom, and he was proved transparently clear of
corruption, controlled the multitude in a free spirit. Instead of being led by
them, he led them; he was not seeking to acquire power by ignoble arts, for, on
the strength of his known high character, he already possessed it;
consequently, he did not speak to please the multitude, but was able to oppose
and even to anger them. Accordingly, whenever he saw that they were elated
with unmeasured arrogance, (note 2) he spoke and cast them down into fear; and
again, when they were unreasonably afraid, he tried to restore their
confidence. So came about what was nominally a democracy, but really a reign
of the first citizen.
`His successors, however, were more on an equality with one another, each
struggling to be first; and they were inclined to flatter the people and to
sacrifice the public interests. Hence came many errors--errors for a great city
with an empire; above all, the Sicilian expedition, though in
this
[1. êlla [[paragraph]]jv toË poldeg.mou
dokoËnta e[[perthousand]]nai...[[section]]pol[[currency]]teusan--the
Sicilian expedition. `Private ambition' was Alcibiades' motive; `private gain'
that of the commercial party. [2. parå kairÚn Ïbrei
yarsoËntaw.]
[[49]]
instance it was not so much that they made a mistake of judgement in
estimating the strength of those whom they assailed, (note 1) as that the men
who sent out the expedition, instead of taking thought for the needs of a
distant army, were engaged in private quarrels for the leadership of the
people. So they kept no vigilant eye on the fortunes of the fleet, and at home
for the first time introduced civil commotion.'
We do not wish to minimize or brush away the words: `instead of being led by
them, he led them'--words which seem to contradict the hypothesis we have put
forward. But it is fair to point out that Thucydides is reviewing the whole of
Pericles' career, not speaking only of the last five years of it. He
ends with the words, `So came about what was nominally a democracy, but
really a reign of the first citizen.' The reign of Pericles was established
ten years before the war, when his last opponent, Thucydides, son of Melesias,
was ostracized. The historian is contrasting the career as a whole with the
thirty years that followed. It is fair also to remark that a statesman who is
described as `not saying pleasant things', `opposing the people even to
angering them,' `casting them down when they were elated by unmeasured
arrogance,' was certainly one whose aims and policy were likely to differ from
those of his supporters. The hypothesis which we have put forward merely
involves that, although all that Thucydides says is true of Pericles while his
position was undisputed, in the last few years of his life he chose to lead
the people rather than be led by them.
The main point of the contrast, what seemed to Thucydides the great difference
between Pericles and his successors, is that Pericles had no private ends to
serve. His position was assured; he was indifferent to money. The later
leaders-- especially Alcibiades--had to win a position; they
sought
[1. This remarkable sentence has the air of a cool
revision of the judgement expressed in vi.1 : `Most of the Athenians had no
idea of the size of Sicily and the numbers of its inhabitants, and did not know
they were undertaking a war not much less serious than the Peloponnesian war.'
That was written when Thucydides' mind was full of conceptions hereafter to be
analysed.]
[[50]]
glory and power. Others--especially the dynasty of tradesmen--sought
profit. Hence, where they flattered, Pericles ruled; while they were ambitious
or sordid, he was `free' ([[section]]leÊyerow), above ambition and above
gain. That this is a true picture there is no reason to doubt; we only
question whether it is quite complete.Thucydides, contrary to
his custom, anticipates the death of Pericles in his narrative by more than a
year. (note 1) He has just before given us a glimpse of his behaviour when the
tide of popular indignation had risen against him, and in the last speech he
shows us the stately figure erect and calm above the storm. Then, as if he
could not bear to let any later troubles or even death itself come between us
and this impression, he drops the curtain on the close of Pericles' life.
Whatever stood here in his original draft, he has substituted for it the sober
and final tribute of a reverent admiration.
The historian, when he watched the opening events of the war and set
about his task, could not foresee the Sicilian expedition. He was not in the
confidence either of Pericles or of Cleon and the other, more obscure, captains
of the commercial party, who formulated, in their secret conclaves, the policy
of the Piraeus. They were clever enough not to show their full hand to any
outside observer. The first move in the game was the decree against Megara, the
significance of which was seen by Pericles but by no one else. What made it
finally impossible for any one eke to see it, was Pericles' action in taking
the anti-Megarian policy out of the hands of its originators, and adopting it
as his own. Thucydides knew that he could not be acting from personal spite;
but the decrees and the sustained attacks by which year by year they were
followed up could only be interpreted by one who took them in connexion with
the whole series of operations along the route to the West. At the
outset,
[1. ii. 65. The death of Pericles occurred in September
429, and its proper place in chronological order would be at ii 95.]
[[51]]
the only people who had an inkling of the larger scheme were: the
leaders of the commercial party, who originated it Pericles, who adopted the
first manoeuvre in order to thwart, if possible, the rest of the plan; and
(probably) the democratic leaders at Corcyra, the men whose arguments and
pretexts will be found in the Corcyrean envoys' speech. (note 1) These envoys,
not realizing, perhaps, how delicate the situation was at Athens, had
tactlessly dropped a phrase which stuck in Thucydides' head because it puzzled
him. They had said something about Corcyra being a convenient station on the
voyage to Sicily and Italy. What could this have to do with a war between
Athens and Sparta? Yet Thucydides vaguely felt that this consideration weighed
with the majority `who voted for alliance with Corcyra; and so with his
punctilious fidelity he puts down exactly what he knew: `And further it seemed
to them that the island was conveniently situated on the coasting-route to
Italy and Sicily.'The policy of the Piraeus came to the surface
only after Pericles' death; it did not finally and fully emerge till the great
expedition of 415, and by that time Thucydides' opinion about the origin of the
war was already formed, and much of his First Part was written. In the lapse
of eighteen years the memory of the outbreak had faded. Looking back, he sees
the figure of Pericles, exalted by distance and consecrated by time. How great
was that free and generous, spirit, in contrast with the selfish ambition or
low covetousness of the men who had taken his place! The Sicilian expedition
was their work; seeking glory or private gain, they involved Athens in `a
policy which seemed to have nothing to do with the war'. To Thucydides, from
first to last, the Sicilian enterprise was an irrelevant diversion imported
into the war between Athens and Sparta--the war as designed by Pericles; and he
attributed it to motives which, as he rightly insists, Pericles could not have
entertained. Hence he never saw its connexion with the Megarian decrees--a
link without which the origin of the Peloponnesian War was an insoluble
enigma.
[1. i. 32-6.]