[[110]]
CHAPTER VII
THE MOST VIOLENT OF THE CITIZENS
In this chapter we propose to take up the narrative where we left it after the
occupation of Pylos. We have reached the point where Cleon comes into the
story. We shall mark the circumstances of his entrance, and bring together the
other episodes in which Thucydides allows him to appear before us. The
hypothesis of `malignity' would not account for the peculiarities we noted in
the earlier narrative where Cleon was not concerned; but it is not finally
disposed of as an explanation of the story of Sphacteria, where Cleon is very
much concerned. And malignity against Athens as a whole still stands as a
theory alternative to the view we expressed in the last chapter. The occupation
of Pylos was not an exploit of Cleon's; but it was an exploit of the Athenians.
To represent it as a stroke of mere luck might be a means of detracting (at the
expense, by the way, of Demosthenes' reputation) from the glory of Athens.
These imputations, so damaging to Thucydides' character, so improbable as they
seem to us, are still not disproved. We resume the narrative, then, giving as
before an abbreviated summary, designed to preserve the points which seem
relevant to our problem. That problem is to discover, if we can, something in
Thucydides' thoughts about these transactions which will explain how he can
have been, as we suggested, positively predisposed to see the work of Fortune
in the early part of them. We shall find an influence at work in his mind, the
nature of which it will be fairer not to characterize until we have laid the
relevant facts before the reader's judgement.
The news came to Lacedaemon that the Peloponnesian fleet
[[111]]
was sunk or captured, and that four hundred and twenty Spartan citizens
with their attendant helots were cut off on the island, under close watch from
the Athenian ships cruising perpetually round it. (note 1) The magistrates were
sent to the scene of action, that no time might be lost. They found that a
rescue was impossible. Even if no attack were made, starvation would speedily
reduce the garrison of a desert island, strewn with rocks and overgrown through
most of its extent with forest. They obtained a truce from the enemy, and sent
envoys to Athens with overtures of peace.The envoys addressed
the Athenian assembly to the following effect: (note 2)
`Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to treat about our men on the
island, and to persuade you to such terms as may at once be advantageous to you
and, so far as the case allows, save our honour in this reverse. If we speak at
some length, this will be no breach of our national custom. For though it is
not our way to use many words when a few will suffice, we can use more when
there is an opportunity to effect what is wanted, by setting forth some matters
that are pertinent. You must not take them in an unfriendly way, or as if we
were schooling your dullness; but think of us as putting you in mind of what
you know already to be good counsel.
`You have the opportunity of disposing well of the good fortune which now is
with you, keeping the advantage you have won, and gaining as well respect and
high fame. You may escape what happens to men when they obtain some good which
is out of the ordinary: they are always coveting more in hope, because their
present good fortune likewise was unexpected. (note 3) But those who have
oftenest come in for the ups and downs have good reason to be above all
mistrustful of their successes. Your city, no less than ours, may very
[1. iv. 14.5 ff. [2. iv. 17 ff. The first half of the speech is
translated verbatim.
[3 iv. 17. 4 afie< går toË pldeg.onow
[[section]]lp[[currency]]di Ùrdeg.gontai diå tÚ ka<
tå parÒnta édokÆtaw
eÈtux[[infinity]]sai.]
[[112]]
well have learnt this by experience. You may read the lesson again by
looking closely at our present misfortunes, when we who have the highest repute
among the Hellenes come before you and here make requests which formerly we
thought ourselves more in the position to grant. But note that we have not come
to this from want of power nor yet from the pride that comes then power is
unduly increased; but, without any change in our position, we failed in
judgement (gn~m[[dotaccent]])--a point in which the position of all men is
alike. Therefore you too have no reason to think; because your city is now
strong in itself and in its new acquisitions, that the hand of Fortune
(tÚ t[[infinity]]w TÊxhw) also will always be on your side. Wise
men find safety in setting down their gains to uncertainty--it is they who will
meet misfortunes too with sober foresight--and know that war does not wait upon
a man's choice of this or that enterpnse to take in hand, but goes as the
chances (afl tÊxai), here or there, may lead. Such men are least of all
likely to trip; and not being elated by confidence that their footing in the
struggle is sure, they will be most disposed to end it in the hour of their
good fortune. And this is how you, Athenians, would do well to deal with us, to
prevent its being thought at some future day, if ever you should reject us and
fall into one of the many possible disasters, that your advantage now, when all
has gone well with you, was due to fortune (tÊx[[dotaccent]]); whereas
you may, if you choose, leave to later times a reputation for strength combined
with prudence, beyond the reach of risk.'The envoys go on still
further to dwell on the prudence of reasonable terms as the best security for a
lasting peace, and to recommend again the moderate use of unexpected victory.
An adversary who will only be exasperated by violence (biasye[[currency]]w) and
overbearing extortion will feel in bonour the obligation laid upon him by
conciliatory sacrifices. `If you decide for peace, you have the opportunity of
be- coming firm friends with the Sacedaemonians, upon their own invitation, and
by way of concession instead of violence (biasamdeg.noiw).'
[[113]]
The narrative continues. `The Lacedaemonians said all this with the idea
that the Athenians had formerly been desiroug to make terms and had only been
prevented by their own opposition, but that now peace was offered they would
welcome it and restore the prisoners. But the Athenians thought that, now they
held the men on the island, it wag always in their power to make terms whenever
they chose and they coveted something more. (note 1) They were urged on
above all by Cleon, the son of Cleainetos, who was the popular leader in those
days and stood highest in the confidence of the multitude. He persuaded them to
answer that first of all the men on the island must surrender themselves and
their arms and be conveyed to Athens; when that was done, the kcedaemonians
were to restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea. On these conditions they
could recover their men and make a peace of such duration as both parties
should approve. The places mentioned had not been taken in war, but had been
surrendered under the former treaty by the Athenians in a time of reverse. Then
it had been Athens that was suing for terms. (note 2)
`The envoys made no reply, beyond requesting the appoint ment of a commission
to hear both sides and quietly come to any understanding they could about
details. Cleon fell upon this proposal with all his vehemence. (note 3) He had
always known, he said, that tbey had no fair intentions, and now it was clear.
They would not say a word before the people, but
[1. iv. 21. 2 toË de pldeg.onow >>rdeg.gonto. Compare the
envoys' use of this phrase above (p. 111, note 3). [2. The places had been
evacuated when a `thirty years' peace' was concluded at the end of the eariier
Peloponnesian war, in which Athens had at first been brilliantly sucessful and
later lost all, or nearly all, she had gained. In the course of the present war
they had never been in Athenian hands, and the demand for their `restoration'
(épodÒntaw) was impudent as well as extortionate. We have already
explained why Cleon stood out for the two Megarian ports; but we must remember
that this demand was to Thucydides as inexplicable as Pericles' obstinacy about
the Megarian decrees. The demand for Achaea was also part of the western
policy. That for Troezen may have been a blind.
[3. 29 2 Kldeg.vn dcents
[[section]]ntaËya dØ polÁw [[section]]kdeg.keito. The
particle hints that such a reasonable proposal was just the thing to unchain
all his violence.]
[[114]]
wanted to be closeted with a select few. No! if they had any honest
meaning, let them declare it to all! But the Lacedaemonians saw that even if
they were disposed to make some concessions in their distress, it was
impossible to speak before a multitude, for fear lest, if their proposals
failed, they should be misrepresented to their allies. They saw too that the
Athenians were not going to do as they were invited on reasonable conditions.
they went home unsuccessful.'
We shall return later to the sentences in which Cleon first appears upon
the scene in this episode. He is introduced as as if we had never heard of him.
(note 1) In point of fact he has come before us once already--though only
once--namely, in the debate at which the assembly revoked its first ferocious
order for a general massacre of innocent and guilty in the revolted city of
Mytilene. The opponent of that generous impulse of remorse, the insistent
advocate of cruelty and revenge, was Cleon. As soon as the change of feeling
became known, `the assembly was immediately summoned and various opinions were
put forward. Cleon, the son of Cleainetos, who had carried the previous
proposal to put the Mytileneans to death, came forward again to speak. He was
at all times the most violent of the citizens, (note 2) and just now stood by
far the highest in the confidence of the people.' Then follows the speech,
which, for characterization, is a masterpiece. There is not a touch of the
gross or cringing flatterer; it is not the Cleon of Aristophanes. He breaks out
at once in violent denunciation of the sovereign people. A democracy is
incapable of empire. They are fooled by the fine speeches of hireling orators;
they weakly vacillate before appeals to pity and the generosity of strength.
They are ready to forfeit the legitimate satisfaction of revenge, and thereby
to hasten the dissolution of their power, whose only bonds are force and fear.
The
[1. The hypothesis of interpolation here from iii. 36. 6 may be
dismissed. The phrase here is similar, but differs in that Cleon is here
correctly called dhmagvgÒw (i.e. prostãthw toË dÆmou).
Ho had become so since the Mytilenean affair, by the death of Lysicles. [2.
iii. 36. 6 biaiÒtatow t<<n polit<<n.]
[[115]]
allies need a bloody example to teach them submission. Otherwise, let
the Athenians resign their empire and stop at home to play at their arm-chair
morality! Every sentence rings with the tone of insolent violence, the strength
which treads down pity and `in its haste for vengeance upon others thinks fit
to abrogate those common laws of humanity wherein had lain its own hope of
mercy in the hour of defeat'. (note 1)After this one appearance,
which leaves an indelible impression of unrestrained force and cruelty, Cleon
drops out of the story till the present passage. The counsellor of violent
revenge is now the counsellor of grasping extortion. `The Athenians coveted
more'; and the man above all who urges them on is Cleon. (note 2) It is he
who persuades them to formulate an extravagant demand which amounts to breaking
off the negotiations. As in the case of the Mytilenean decree, the Athenians
are offered a chance for reconsideration; the envoys propose a commission to go
quietly into the details and come to a reasonable understanding. Again, as in
the former case, Cleon intervenes, and `falls upon the proposal with all his
vehemence' in slanderous accusation. The parallel is striking; but here it
ends. The Mytilenean decision was revoked in spite of him, and Athens was just,
and only just, saved from an awful act of insolent cruelty; but this time Cleon
prevails. `Confident in the hope of their strength,' (note 3) certain of being
able to make terms when they choose, the assembly dismisses the ambassadors
return home empty-handed. Cleon has had his way: we shall see whither it will
lead him.
It would take too long to follow the subsequent story in detail: we will
rapidly resume it. (note 4)
Winter was coming on, and the Spartans on the island
[1. iii. 84. 3 (not referring to Cleon). [2. iv. 21. 2 toË
dcents pldeg.onow >>rdeg.gonto. mãlista dcents
aÈtoÁw [[section]]n[[infinity]]ge Kldeg.vn. toË pldeg.onow
Ùrdeg.gesyai is the verb corresponding to the noun pleonej[[currency]]a,
`covetous desire to get the better.'
[3. v. 14. 1 [[paragraph]]xontew
tØn [[section]]lp[[currency]]da t[[infinity]]w =~mhw pistÆn
(referring to this occasion).
[4. iv. 26 ff.]
[[116]]
were still uncaptured; they were kept alive by venturous
blockade-running. The stormy season would soon make it difficult to provision
the Athenian fleet. The Athenians at home began to repent of their refusal to
make terms, (note 1) and dark looks were turned on Cleon. Repentance was no
more to his mind now than it had been in the Mytilenean affair; for, personally
committed to the rejection of peace, he had gone too far to retreat without
blasting his career. The dramatic story of his challenge to the generals is
well known. `He came forward and said he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians.'
He would sail himself with only a small force of light-armed auxiliaries, (note 2) and with these and the soldiers already at Pylos in twenty days he would
either bring the Lacedaemonians home alive or kill them on the spot. He chose
Demosthenes, already on the scene of action, for his colleague. `Laughter
seized the Athenians at his wild words; (note 3) but they were welcome to
moderate men who reflected that they would gain one or other of two goods:
either they would be rid of Cleon, which they would have greatly preferred, or
if they were disappointed, he would put the Lacedaemonians in their
hands.'Cleon's stroke was brilliantly successful; but all the
credit, in Thucydides' narrative, falls not to him, but to Demosthenes, who
again receives the timely aid of Fortune. (note 4) Demosthenes, we are told,
had already, before Cleon left Athens, planned an attack upon Sphacteria, (note 5) and he was encouraged by a fire which burnt the woods on the island and so
exposed the enemy. The fire had been `unintentionally' kindled by an Athenian
soldier, one of a party who had landed on the shore to cook their midday meal.
`A wind sprang up and the greater part of the woods were burnt before they knew
what
[1. iv. 27. 2. [2. 28. 4. It has been observed that the choice of
light-armed troops is put as if it were a further piece of rashness. The sequel
proved that it was prudent.
[3. iv. 28. 5 koufolog[[currency]]&.
[4.
Plut. Nic. viii sPeaks of Cleon on this occasion as tÊx[[dotaccent]]
xrhsãmenow égay[[ordfeminine]] ka< strathgÆsaw êrista
metå Dhmosydeg.nouw.
[5. 29. 2.]
[[117]]
was happening.' (note 1) But for this lucky accident, the attack upon so
strong a body of the best fighting-men in Greece, sheltered by thick
undergrowth, would have been almost a forlorn hope. Really, the gales might be
in league with Athens! The storm which first drove the Beet into Pylos is
seconded by the wind which sweeps the forest fire over Sphacteria. When the
troops landed for the attack, `the dispositions were made by Demosthenes who
had originally planned the assault.' (note 2) The Spartans were driven slowly
to their last stand, and the two hundred and ninety-two who were left alive
surrendered.`So the promise of Cleon, mad as it was,
resulted in success: for he brought the men within twenty days, just as he had
undertaken.' (note 3)
Much ink has been expended on the phrase: `mad as it was.' How can Thucydides
call the promise mad, at the very moment when he is recording its fulfilment?
The best comment is a sentence from Herodotus, where Artabanus is wa1g Xerxes
against rash haste in taking up so great an enterprise as the conquest of
Greece. `I know not,' he says, `aught in the world that so profits a man as
taking good counsel with himself; for even if things fall out against one's
hopes, still one has counselled well, though fortune has made the counsel of
none effect: whereas if a man counsels ill and luck follows, he has gotten a
windfall, but his counsel is none the less silly.' (note 4)
What use will Cleon make of his windfall? Surely, now, the Athenians will tempt
fortune no further. They resolve to keep the captives in chains `till some
agreement shall be reached'. Meanwhile the Messenians from Naupactos are
established at Pylos, from whence they make descents; deserting helots begin to
come in and join them. This was
[1. 30. 2 [[section]]mprÆsantÒw tinow katå
mikrÚn t[[infinity]]w Ïlhw êkontow ka< épÚ
toÊtou pneÊmatow [[section]]pigenomdeg.nou tÚ polÁ
aÈt[[infinity]]w [[paragraph]]laye katakauydeg.n. [2. 32. 4.
Thucydides seems to emphasize the skill of Pemosthenes, as if he were half
aware that the Pylos narrative hardly did him justice.
[3. iv. 39. 3 ka<
toË Kldeg.vnow ka[[currency]]per mani~dhw oÔsa <=
<=pÒsxesiw épdeg.bh.
[4. Hdt. vii. 10 (dÉ)
Rawlinson's trans.]
[[118]]
the only danger which could touch the Lacedaemonians at home, and they
sent a second embassy for peace. Here is another opening for moderation in
victory. But no! `The Athenians were coveting greater things' (note 1)--again that ominous phrase--`and though the Spartans sent again and again,
they kept on dismissing the envoys unsuccessful. Thus ended the affair of
Pylos.'
We lose sight of Cleon till the scene of war is shifted to Chalcidice.
The combatants had actually concluded a truce with provisions for the
discussion of a permanent peace; but the negotiations broke down through
Brasidas' refusal to surrender Skione, which bad revolted from Athens just two
days after the truce had been declared The Athenians in a rage carried a
resolution for the destruction of Skione and the massacre of its inhabitants.
(note 2) Another act of force and fury--once more the entrance-cue for `the
most violent of the citizens'. `They were induced to carry the decree by the
advice of Cleon.' This, however, is but a passing glimpse. The last scene opens
at the beginning of Book V.
Cleon himself sails with an expedition to Chalcidice, where he is to meet with
more than his match. Brasidas, ensconced in Ampbipolis, lays a trap into which
Cleon is driven by the impatience of his own men and the rashness of his
disposition. `He behaved as he had done at Pylos, where his good luck had given
him confidence in his own wisdom. (note 3) He never so much as expected that
any one would come out to fight him.... He imagined he could go and come,
without a battle, whenever be chose.... Heeven thought be had made a mistake in
coming without siege-engines; for, bad he brought them, he could have taken the
place in its undefended state.' Brasidas knew how to turn to advantage the
contempt of an enemy. A sudden sally from the town; and the Athenians'
disorderly retreat breaks into a rout. `The Athenian right made a
[1. iv. 41. 3 meizÒnvn te >>rdeg.gonto. [2. iv. 122.
6.
[3. v. 7. 3 [[section]]xrÆsato t" prÒp[[florin]]
[[Ydieresis]]per ka< [[section]]w tØn PÊlon eÈtuxÆsaw
[[section]]pisteusdeg. ti frone>n.]
[[119]]
better stand, and though Cleon, who indeed bad never thought of holding
his ground, fled immediately and was overtaken by a Myrkinian targeteer and
slain, the rest rallied on the crest of the hill and repulsed Clearidas two or
three times, and they did not give in until the Myrkinian and Cbalcidian horse
and the targeteers hemmed them round and broke them with a shower of darts.'
(note 1) Thus contemptuously is Cleon's end recorded: the victor of Sphacteria
is spurned out of the history in a parenthesis. Mad elation and
self-confidence, born of unexpected luck, have brought him to the ignominious
death of a coward.
The first of these incidents which calls for remark is the speech of the
Spartan envoys in the abortive negotiats1ons for peace which came between the
occupation of Pylos and the capture of Sphacteria. This speech, half of which
we translated, is a curious document. We remember that Thucydides in the
introduction to the History (note 2) remarked with regret on the difficulty of
remembering or learning by report the exact words used by statesmen and envoys.
The speeches set down represent, he told us, `what seemed to me to be just what
would have been necessary for each speaker to say on the occasion, and I have
kept as closely as possible to the general sense of the actual words.' In the
present instance it is obvious that in a way the `general sense' of the envoys'
plea has been preserved. They must have formulated the Spartans' request for
peace, asked for the release of the prisoners, and hinted--they could do no
more till they had some certainty of success--that the `friendship of Sparta',
the only quid pro quo openly named, would turn out to cover some more tangible
return. From our knowledge of Laconian eloquence and from examples of it
elsewhere in Thucydides, (note 3) we should expect
[1. v. 10. 9. [2. i. 22.
[3. The following are the other
speeches made by Spartans in the first part of the history: (1) Archidainus
advises delay in going to war, i. 80-5 (strictly to the point; short eulogy of
Spartan institutions, 84); (2) Sthenelaidas, i. 88 (extremely curt); (3)
Archidamus to Peloponnesian generals, ii 11 (short and businesslike); (4)
Archidamus to Plataeans, ii. 72 (a few sentences); (s) Brasidas at Acanthus,
iv. 85 (length apologized for by Thucydides: `for a Lacedaemonian, he was not
an incapable speaker,' 84. 2); (6) Brasidas to his men, iv. 126 (short and
pointed); (7) Brasidas to his men, 7. 9 (similar to the last). None of them
presents a parallel to that of the envoys on this oocasion.]
[[120]]
further a few crisp, dry aphorisms about luck: `To-day to me, to-morrow
to thee.' The situation. itself, as we are later told, precluded any definite
statement about the only question of practical business: what substantial
equivalent the Spartans bad to offer in exchange for the prisoners. In such
circumstances, the whole case might be put in three minutes; we do not expect a
homily, five-sixths of which are devoted to a general disquisition on the theme
of moderation in prosperity. Nothing could be less `laconic' than the speech
Thucydides has given us. Further, he was quite aware of this, and knew that his
readers would remark it. The exordium apologizes for what may seem a departure
from national custom: `It is not our way to use many words when few will
suffice'; but the justification offered: `we can use more when there is an
opportunity to effect what is wanted by setting forth some matters that are
pertinent,' sounds vague and indeed (to be candid) all but meaningless in the
mouths of the speakers. We suspect that the matters to be set forth are more to
the point in explaining what Thucydides has in his mind than in influencing the
Athenians to abandon the fruits of victory. There is obviously some connexion
between the sacrifice of dramatic probability here and the sacrifice of
historic probability in the Pylos episode. In the handling of `what was done'
Thucydides has presented the action as undesigned and fortuitous. In the speech
we have a dissertation on luck in war and moderation in unlookedfor
success.
The Lacedaemonians, we shall be told, are `moralizing'. A sudden reversal of
fortune was in itself a phenomenon peculiarly interesting to the Greek mind,
and the theme of moderation in prosperity was the standing moral which they
drew from such occurrences--a most venerable commonplace.
[[121]]
That, of course, is true; but it does not explain the problem of the
Pylos narrative. If that were all, we should have to suppose that Thucydides
distorted his facts there for the purpose of moralizing--a supposition we have
proved incredible.Let us say, then, that Thucydides is using the
device of speech-writing to convey his own opinion that Athens ought to have
made peace after Sphacteria, and that Cleon's exorbitant demands were a mistake
in policy. This certainly was Thucydides' opinion; but again it gives no answer
to our problem. The policy was just as bad, whether the occupation of Pylos was
casual or carefully designed in every detail.
It is evident that the moral of the speech was, to Thucydides' view,
illustrated by the subsequent career of Cleon. He behaved at Amphipolis `as he
had done at Pylos, where his good luck had given him confidence in his own
wisdom'. `He never so much as expected that any one would come out to fight
him', and so on. We are to understand that Cleon's head was turned by the
success of his `mad' undertaking. Elated and over-confident, he rushes into a
still more difficult enterprise. That is how we put it in our histories; but
the Greeks used a somewhat different language, and put a somewhat different
construction on such a sequence of events as this. They interpreted it
according to a certain philosophy of human nature which it will concern us to
take account of.
If we turn back to the episode in which Cleon makes his first appearance in the
History, we find this philosophy set forth in remarkable terms by Diodotus in
the Mytilenean debate. Diodotus is replying to the great speech of Cleon which
we referred to above; he explains how futile is Cleon's policy of inflicting
exemplary punishment on revolted allies. The question of the purpose and true
nature of punitive justice was much in the air at this time, and the speech of
Diodotus is Thucydides' contribution to the controversy. The passage is so
interesting, and so important for our purpose, that we will give it in full.
`In the cities of Greece the death penalty has been affixed to many offences
actually less than this; yet still, intoxicated
[[122]]
by their hopes, men take the risk. (note 1) No man ever, before
embarking on a dangerous course, passed sentence on himself that he would not
succeed in his design; and no city entering on revolt ever set about doing so
with the conviction that her resources--whether her own or obtained from her
allies--were inadequate. All men are born to error in public, as in private,
conduct; and there is no law that will hinder them; for mankind has exhausted
the whole catalogue of penalties, continually adding fresh ones, to find some
means of lessening the wrongs they suffer from eviloers. Probably in early ages
the punishments affixed to the worst offences were milder; but as
transgressions went on, in time they seldom stopped short of death; yet still,
even so, there are transgressors.`Either then some greater
terror than death must be discovered, or at any rate death is no deterrent. No;
poverty inspires daring by the stress of necessity; the licence of prosperity
inspires covetous ambition by insolence and pride; and the other conditions of
human life, as each is possessed by some irremediable and mastering power, by
passion lead men on to perilous issues.
`Desire and Hope are never wanting--the one leading the way, the other busy in
attendance. Desire devising the attempt, and Hope flattering with suggestions
of the riches in Fortune's store, very often lead to ruin, and, invisible as
they are, prevail over the dangers that are seen.
`And besides these Fortune contributes no less to intoxication; for sometimes
she presents herself unexpectedly at a man's side and leads him forward to face
danger at a disadvantage; and cities even more than individuals, in proportion
as their stake is the greatest of all--freedom or empire--and each, when all
are with him, unthinkingly rates himself the higher. (note 2)
[1. iii. 45. 1 t[[ordfeminine]] [[section]]lp[[currency]]di
[[section]]pairÒmenoi kinduneÊousi. [2 iii. 45. 4
éllÉ <= mcentsn pen[[currency]]a
énãgk[[dotaccent]] tØn tÒlman pardeg.xousa, <=
dcents [[section]]jous[[currency]]a Ïbrei tØn pleonej[[currency]]an
ka< fronÆmati, afl dÉ êllai juntux[[currency]]ai
Ùrg[[ordfeminine]] t<<n ényr~pvn ...w *kãsth tiw
katdeg.xetai ÍpÉ énhkdeg.stou tinÚw
kre[[currency]]ssonow [[section]]jãgousin [[section]]w toÁw
kindÊnouw.[[yen]] te ÉElpsa,
ple>sta Blãptousi, ka< ^nta éfan[[infinity]] kre[[currency]]ssv
[[section]]st< t<<n irvmdeg.nvn dein<<n.ka< <= TÊxh
[[section]]pÉ aÈto>w oÈdcentsn [[paragraph]]lasson
jumbãlletai [[section]]w tÚ [[section]]pa[[currency]]rein:
édokÆvw går [[paragraph]]stin ~te paristamdeg.nh ka<
[[section]]k t<<n Ípodeestdeg.rvn kinduneÊein tinå
proãgei: ka< oÈk [[Sigma]]sson tåw pÒleiw,
~s[[florin]] per< t<<n meg[[currency]]stvn te,
[[section]]leuyer[[currency]]aw [[partialdiff]] êllvn
érx[[infinity]]w, ka< metå pãntvn ßkastow
élog[[currency]]stvw [[section]]p< pldeg.on ti aÍtÚn
[[section]]dÒjasen . The meaning of the last clause seems to be that
intoxication is infectious: each man in a crowd is more carried away than he
would be if he were alone. For the construction aÍtÚn
[[section]]dÒjasen compare Plato, Philebus, 48 E.]
[[123]]
`In a word, it is impossible--and only a simpleton would suppose the
contrary--that human nature, when it is passionately bent upon some act, should
be averted from its purpose by force of laws or any other terror.'
We shall have something to say later of the extraordinary and highly poetical
language in which this theory of human nature is set forth; here we shall note
the main features of the theory itself, the far-reaching significance of which
will become apparent in the sequel. We observe that human nature is subject to
two sorts of influences, which correspond to the two general names gn~mh (in
the widest sense) and TÊxh. (1) There are, first, the man's own vices of
character--`daring, covetousness, pride' and the other `irremediable and
mastering powers' which `possess' him. (2) These vices, in the second place,
are `supplied' or inspired by the external circumstances of his
condition (juvtux[[currency]]a) especially by the two extreme conditions
of grinding poverty and licentious prosperity.
Next, in these conditions man is peculiarly liable to temptation, which
comes to him in two ways. (1) One of two violent passions may seize on
him. Hope is busy in attendance flattering him with suggestions of the wealth
in Fortune's store; unrestrained Desire leads him on to lay plans for yet
further gain. (2) Fortune, herself, intervenes to complete his
intoxication. Appearing at his side unexpectedly, she encourages him by giving
success which, though he has not designed it, he is apt to credit to his own
ability. So he comes to overrate his strength, and face dangers which are
beyond it.
In this scheme the two factors, human character and
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external Fortune, appear twice over, in different aspects. First, we are
thinking of comparatively permanent conditions, such as extreme poverty or
wealth, and of the comparatively permanent vices which gain upon a man slowly
in such circumstances. Second, we have the sudden access, at critical moments,
of temptation under the two forms of a violent passion, Hope or Desire, and of
Fortune appearing in unexpected successes. These besetting agencies take
advantage of the faults of character already produced by Prosperity and Penury,
and they bring about a condition of blind intoxication, the eclipse of rational
foresight. When this state is reached the man is marked for his doom; neither
the force of laws nor any other terror will `avert' his fatal
course.The point which now concerns us is that the train of
thought in these few sentences of Diodotus' speech contains the motive and the
moral of the whole of Cleon's career as Thucydides has chosen to present
it. We know, from other sources, that Cleon was prominent in politics
before the war broke out. After Pericles' death he soon became the leading
Athenian statesman and remained so to the end of his life. During all this time
he appears to have led the policy of the war-party, and in a history of the war
we should expect to bear of him constantly. But out of all his public actions
Thucydides has selected three, and only three, (note 1) to put before us. These
are the Mytilenean debate; the capture of Sphacteria and the negotiations
preceding it; his last campaign at Amphipolis. On the first of these occasions
Thucydides puts in his mouth a speech which is evidently meant to reveal the
character of the `most violent of the citizens'; one of the vices of
prosperity, ruthless `insolence' (Ïbriw), might be taken as its keynote.
On the second occasion, at Sphacteria, we see him at a moment when Fortune, the
temptress, unexpectedly stands at his side. His promise was `mad' for he was
intoxicated with ambitious passion, and he had just betrayed another vice of
prosperity, `covetousness' (pleonej[[currency]]a). Thucydides
[1. Except the glimpse at iv. 122. 6 where Cleon advocates the massacre
of the Skioneans. This repeats and renews the impression of the Mytilenean
debate.]
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reiterates in the envoys' un-laconic speech just that part of his theory
of human nature which is relevant--the danger of covetousness in the flush of
success. In the third and last episode, at Amphipolis, Thucydides in his own
poison points out that his train of causes has led to its inevitable
end. Infatuate pride (frÒnhma), the third vice of prosperity, brings
ruin.The three episodes, put together, form the complete outline
of a drama, conforming to a well-known type which we shall study in the
next chapter. The first act reveals the hero's character; the second contains
the crisis; the third, the catastrophe. But though complete in outline, the
drama is obviously defective in other respects. The reason is that, while the
plot is tragic, Cleon is not a tragic figure. It is true that at his first
appearance, in the Mytilenean speech, he does attain tragic proportions, for
the character is treated with perfect seriousness and expressed with
astonishing force. But to allow Cleon to remain on this level would have been
fatal to Thucydides' larger design, which we shall study later; it would never
do to let him become the hero of this part of the war. Besides, Thucydides
could not conceal his contempt, and probably saw no reason to conceal it. On
both these grounds he does not allow Cleon a second full-length speech. Modern
historians complain that Thucydides ought to have given his reply to the
Spartan envoys before Sphacteria; that he has missed an obvious opportunity of
stating the policy of the war-party; and that there is some unfairness in not
doing so. But artistic considerations were decisive. A long speech from Cleon
at this point, if it even approached the force and impressiveness of the
Mytilenean speech, would have established him as a hero, or a villain on the
heroic scale; he would have bulked much too largely for a minor character.
Hence Cleon's little personal drama, though its plot is kept complete, is
deliberately spoilt;--`laughter seized the Athenians at his wild words.' From
that moment he is degraded from the tragic rank; and his story runs out
pitiably to its contemptible close--in a parenthesis.
What immediately concerns us now is the difference that
[[126]]
this dramatizing of Cleon must make to our view of Thucydides' treatment
of him. It is evident that the historian saw him not purely, or even primarily,
as an historic person, but as a type of character. His career is seen through
the medium of a preconceived theory of human nature, and only that part of the
career is presented which conforms to the theory and illustrates a certain part
of it. The principle of this selection has no place in historic method; it has
no place in Thucydides' original design of a detailed journal of the war. The
Mytilenean episode, for instance, shows us Cleon at a moment when his action
had no effect on the course of the war, since his advice was rejected. The
principle is artistic, idealizing, dramatic. Thucydides has stripped away all
the accidents and particulars of the historic individual; he has even stripped
away his personality, leaving only an abstract, generalized type. Now, we do
not deny that Thucydides both hated and despised the man Cleon; or that these
feelings operated as a psychological cause to facilitate the erection of their
object into an impersonation of insolent Violence and Covetousness. But when
this result was effected, the attitude of feeling must have undergone a
simultaneous change. To idealize is an act of imaginative creation, and the
creator cannot feel towards the creature as one man feels towards another. He
is a spectator, not an actor in the drama revealed to his larger vision. We
need talk no longer of `a personal grudge against an able, but coarse, noisy,
ill-bred, audacious man'; for none of these epithets, except `able', quite fits
the impression we get from the Mytilenean speech. Nor is it even a man, a
complete concrete personality, that is there presented; it is rather a symbol,
an idea. The personality is contemned and thrust out, and with its banishment
personal antipathy gives place to a noble indignation against Violence
itself--aÈto tÚ b[[currency]]aion, as Plato might call it. We
have left the plane of pedestrian history for the `more serious and
philosophic' plane of poetry.
We have here reached a broad distinction of type between
[[127]]
Thucydides' work and history as it was written in the niueteenth
century. The latter can be described generally as realistic, if we
stretch this term to cover both the scientific (and sometimes dull) school and
their graphic (and sometimes inaccurate) rivals. The scientific principle is
realistic in the sense that it tends to regard any ascertainable fact as worth
ascertaining, and even as neither more nor less valuable than any other. The
graphic principle is realistic in that it attempts to visualize the past, and
is as careful to tell us that Robespierre was sea-green as it is to tell us
that he was incorruptible. The realism which has grown upon the novel and the
drama has taught us that to see a man's exterior is halfway to understanding
his character. Hence the graphic school delight in personal, biographical
touches; and in delineating an age they find a broadside or a folk-song more
illuminating than the contents of a minister's dispatch-box.Now
Thucydides belongs to neither of these schools; or rather be tried to be
scientific and hoped to be dull, but he failcd. As his work goes on the
principle that governs his selection and his presentation of events is less and
less scientific. He originally meant to choose the facts which would be useful
in the vulgar practical sense; be projected a descriptive textbook in strategy.
But he ended by choosing those which were useful for a very different end--a
lesson in morality; and he comes, as we shall see, to treat events out of all
proportion to their significance as moments in a war between Athens and Sparta.
The graphic method he keeps strictly for events, not for persons. The
fortification of Pylos, for instance, is vividly pictured in a single sentence
describing the mudlarks. Imagination, with this sharply defined glimpse of the
thing seen to work from, can fill in all the rest. But the characters are never
treated graphically; he does not tell us that Cleon was a tanner with a voice
like Kykloboros, or that Pericles was called `squill-head' from the shape of
his skull. Me tells us that the former was the `most violent', the latter the
`most powerful' of the citizens. The characters throughout are idealized to a
very high degree of abstraction--a method which is not practised by either
school of moderns.
[[128]]
Our attention in the next chapter will be directed to a closer analysis
of this idealistic treatment. We shall study the method still as exemplified in
the story of Cleon; but, as we have said, Cleon is not the hero of the history
as a whole, or even of this part of it; the cycle of his fortunes is only an
epicycle on a larger orbit. But orbit and epicycle exhibit the same type of
curve. We have to trace this curve in both and also to study the relation of
the smaller body to the greater. Cleon, in other words, has two aspects: he is
quasi-hero of his own little tragi-comedy and also a minor character in the
tragedy of Athens.