while in charge of the military defences of Louisiana, and of the construction of the New Orleans custom-house, in the fall of 1860, General Beauregard, then brevet Major of United States Engineers, received the following order from Washington:

Special order, no. 238. War Department, Adjutant-General's office, Washington, November 8th, 1860.

By direction of the President, brevet Major Peter G. T. Beauregard, Corps of Engineers, is appointed superintendent of the Military Academy, and will relieve the present superintendent at the close of the approaching semi-annual examination of cadets.

By order of the Secretary of War.

This was not only an honorable position, much coveted, and justly so, in the army, but it was also a highly responsible one, to which none but officers of the Engineer Corps of acknowledged merit had, up to that time, been appointed. Yet, under existing circumstances, to Major Beauregard it had more than one objection. Mr. Lincoln had just been elected President of the United States, and would, four months later, be duly inaugurated as such. Rumors and speculations as to the inevitable disruption of the Union and its probable consequences prevailed everywhere, and kept the public mind in a state of feverish suspense and anxiety. Flattering, therefore, as was to Major Beauregard the appointment thus tendered him by the War Department, it was with no feigned reluctance that he began closing his official accounts, preparatory to transferring the works under him to his successor in office. Though never taking a very active part in politics, he was strongly imbued with the constitutional doctrine of States' Rights and State Sovereignty, and considered, as did the great mass of his Southern countrymen, that his allegiance was primarily due to his own State. With these views, and under such circumstances, it was but natural he should feel anxious in leaving Louisiana, while public opinion had not yet established its level, and the South was still uncertain as to the proper step to pursue in vindication of its imperilled rights. However—and happen what might—there was but one course open to him, and his determination was taken at once: to stand by his State, and share its destiny, for weal or woe.

Towards the latter part of December of that year he left New Orleans for West Point, stopping on his way in Washington, to ascertain, if he could, what shape future events would probably assume,

Several Southern States had already called their people in conventions, to determine what measures should be adopted in view of the exigencies of the hour. South Carolina had passed her Ordinance of Secession. Mississippi soon followed. So did Florida and Alabama. Louisiana, it was thought by her congressional delegation, would not hesitate much longer. Deeply convinced that such would be the result, Major Beauregard made it a point at once to apprise General Totten, chief of the Engineer Corps at Washington, of his resolution to resign his commission in the United States army should his State retire from the Union, thus giving the department full opportunity to rescind the order assigning him to West Point, and to take such other step in the matter as might be thought proper. He repaired to General Totten's office, and, by a strange coincidence, found him busily engaged in examining fortification drawings, which were no other than those of the defences of Charleston. He was studying and endeavoring to describe the circles of fire of Forts Sumter and Moultrie. At Major Beauregard's avowal, General Totten expressed both surprise and pain, and used every endeavor to dissuade him—we need not add, without success. Major Beauregard then went to the headquarters of General Scott, to inform him also of his intended resignation; but failed to find the general, as he was temporarily absent from Washington.

Major Beauregard had been authorized by General Totten, so anxious was the latter to retain him in the service, to defer assuming command at West Point until after the close of the January examinations; and, in the meantime, having nothing to detain him in Washington, he left for New York, to await further developments.

In New York he met several army friends, among others, Captain G. W. Smith, ex-officer of Engineers, then acting as Street Commissioner of the great northern metropolis, and Captain Mansfield Lovell. The absorbing topic of the day was necessarily brought forward and earnestly discussed. Major Beauregard informed them of his intention to follow his State should it secede. They approved of his proposed course, and declared that they would act in the same manner, were they similarly situated.

Major Beauregard had been only a few days in command at West Point, when the new Secretary of War, Mr. Holt, through animosity to Mr. Slidell, it was said, and perhaps because he had no faith in Major Beauregard's Union sympathies, peremptorily remanded him to his former station in New Orleans. No order could have been more acceptable to him, and he hastened to obey it.

Passing through the city of New York, on his way South, he received a telegram from Governor Moore, of Louisiana, informing him of the withdrawal of the State from the Union, and requesting his immediate return. He readily complied, and took passage on a steamer leaving the next day for New Orleans. Upon reaching her wharf he found it crowded with people, very much excited, who had collected there to see the steamer Star of the West, just returned from off Charleston, with two or three shotholes in her hull and chimney-stack. He went on board and was entertained by her captain with a graphic account of the hot reception the South Carolina authorities had given him. Major Beauregard had little idea, then, that in less than two months he would be constructing additional batteries in the harbor of Charleston, to protect it more effectually from access by vessels attempting to carry reinforcements and supplies to Fort Sumter.

Upon his arrival at New Orleans, Governor Moore furnished him with a copy of the Ordinance of Secession, and informed him that his services were required to complete the defences to the approaches of the city, which were already in full possession of the State authorities. His answer was that he could not do so until he had formally resigned his commission in the United States service. This he did that day, and then joined, as a private, the battalion of Orleans Guards, composed of the élite of the Creole population of the city of New Orleans. This command had just been organized by Colonel Numa Augustin, than whom no better citizen soldier was known, in the volunteer service of the State.

The excitement and enthusiasm of the people of Louisiana and of New Orleans, especially, were intense. The shrill sound of the fife, the beating of drums, squad drills at street corners and in public avenues, and an ever-increasing military spirit greeted one at every step. New Orleans had been transformed into a garrison town.

All who met Major Beauregard on the streets, friends and even strangers, would shake him warmly by the hand, expressing the hope that he would be with them in the hour of trial, should such hour ever come.

The general impression appeared to be that the ruling party of the Northern States would not oppose the peaceable withdrawal of the Southern States from the Union, by making war on them. During his short sojourn at the North Major Beauregard had seen and heard enough to make him doubt that such would be the result, and it became a matter of conscience for him to dispel the illusions of his too-hopeful fellow-citizens.

The people of the State of Louisiana, in convention assembled, after full discussion by their ablest and best men, reached the conclusion that secession had become a necessity and was the only course to be pursued. The State called upon her sons for assistance, and, as one of them, Major Beauregard responded; though, after having been twenty-two years in the United States army, two of these spent in a short but glorious foreign war, where friendships had been created and cemented with blood, it was not to be expected that he should, without reluctance, dissever ties that had thus lasted through youth to mature manhood.

Shortly after his return to New Orleans, the General Assembly passed a law organizing the Louisiana State forces. General Braxton Bragg was appointed Brigadier-General, and Major Beauregard was offered the position of Colonel of Engineers and Artillery. This he declined, notwithstanding urgent appeals from many friends. He felt—and rightly so—that some injustice had been done him in assigning him to a secondary position. He was a native of the State, who had just resigned an important position in the United States army, while General Bragg had been out of the service for several years, and had but recently become a resident of Louisiana. His object, however, being to aid in the defence of his country, he openly declared his readiness to serve with or under General Bragg, and to put at his disposal whatever of professional knowledge and experience he might possess. But he refused all military rank in the State army.

Major Beauregard was convinced that the most important of all the avenues of approach to New Orleans was the Mississippi River; and that, to guard it properly against invasion, must be the one grand object in view on the part of the State authorities. He therefore advised Governor Moore and the Military Board to arm Forts Jackson and St. Philip with the heaviest guns procurable, and suggested the following plan for so doing: 1st, to remove the largest pieces already there, from the rear to the front or river faces of the forts; 2d, to transfer to them the heavy guns of both Fort Pike, on the Rigolets, and Fort Macomb, on the Chef Menteur—which were works of inferior order, not likely to be put in action at all against a fleet threatening the city.

Major Beauregard also drew up, and furnished to the State authorities, the plans and estimates for two distinct river obstructions, to be placed between Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and to be there used, together or separately, according to the exigency of the case. The first was a floating boom consisting of two parts, formed of long timbers twelve inches square, solidly bound together in sections of four timbers, each section to be connected with another by means of strong iron chains. One half of the boom was to be well anchored in the river, from the shore at Fort Jackson, and inclined downward as it reached the middle of the stream. The other half was to be anchored from the opposite bank of the river near Fort St. Philip, and in such a manner as to have its shore extremity made fast. To its outer and movable end was to be attached a strong wire rope connected with a steam-engine, rendered secure by a bombproof, on the Fort Jackson side. The rope worked by the engine, would close or open the boom, as circumstances might require, for the passage of friendly vessels or of accumulated drift-wood.

The second boom was to consist of about five barges or flatboats, properly constructed so as to support one or more heavy chains or wire-ropes, stretched from shore to shore, between the two forts, and above the floating boom. The estimate for this obstruction was about $90,000, and for the other about one half less. Both were to be illuminated at night with Drummond lights, placed in bombproofs on each side of the river, and the stream was to be patrolled by boats as far down as prudence would permit.

Had these floating booms been constructed and kept in working order until required for effectual use it is beyond all doubt that they would have obstructed the passage of the Federal fleet in April, 1862. Detaining the vessels under the fire of the forts, they would have afforded sufficient time to them to do their work, and to the city to prepare for a vigorous defence, if not for a triumphant resistance.

Somewhat later, Major Beauregard had occasion to offer a few suggestions to the Military Board, in a short memoir, wherein, after giving his general views as to the defence of the different approaches to New Orleans, he again directed attention to the paramount necessity of the floating booms already spoken of. He received the thanks of Governor Moore for his valuable information, of the importance of which the governor was well aware, but the Military Board, to whom all such matters were specially referred, and on whose knowledge of them the State Executive so fully relied, failed to see the extent of the result aimed at, and, as was often the case during the war, the opportunity was allowed to slip by; and the consequences, which might have been averted, advanced unhindered to their calamitous end.

On the 22d of February, 1861, Major Beauregard received a despatch from the Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War of the Confederate government, informing him that his immediate presence at Montgomery was requested by President Davis. He made all possible haste to leave New Orleans, thinking he might be away for two or three weeks at the utmost—he was absent more than four years. The hope of Major Beauregard was, that he might be permanently stationed in Louisiana, with all the sea-coast of which, and the approaches to the city of New Orleans, he was known to be so thoroughly familiar; irrespective of his very natural wish to be able, in case of need, to fight in and for his native State.

It must be admitted, however, that, just at that time, few persons in either section of the country really believed that the issues would be settled by force of arms. The South will not be rash enough to attempt to retire from the Union, was the general opinion entertained at the North. The North will not make war to drag the Southern States unwillingly back, was the prevailing sentiment in the South.

This delusion is easily accounted for when we consider, not merely the principles set forth in the Declaration of Independence, and the voluntary formation of the Union, by the States, but also the views expressed by many of the most prominent men of the North. We do not allude to the extravagant expressions repeated for many years by leaders in the abolition phalanx, professing hatred of the Union; nor even to the sentiments of disregard for it, uttered, during the same period, by influential members in the Republican party, even on the floor of Congress; but to the immediate declarations of that time, such as the sober statement in the New York Tribune, then the principal organ of the dominant party at the North, that the revolution of the Colonies was a precedent for the secession of the States, and that both stood equally on the same principle of the right of a people to self-government. Even General Scott, as one of the alternatives of action, had counselled the mild measure of allowing the erring sisters to go in peace.

It was not surprising, therefore, that many persons could not be made to believe in such a war, until, after their eyes had seen the flashes and their ears had heard the sounds of the guns fired at Sumter, the United States government called for 75,000 troops with which to reduce the Southern people to obedience.

Major Beauregard arrived at Montgomery on the 26th of February, and on the same day called on the Secretary of War. Just in time, said the latter, while courteously extending his hand, to assist me out of a great dilemma. He was estimating the weight and cost of pieces of ordnance of different calibers, Major Beauregard cheerfully gave him what assistance he could, and took the liberty to suggest the advisability of procuring, as soon as possible, the different heads of bureaus whom the secretary needed, to relieve him of all such annoying details. Mr. Walker thereupon authorized Major Beauregard to telegraph at once to several of his friends of the old service, who in his opinion might be fitted for these positions. Thus it was that the assistance of Colonel Gorgas, as Chief of Ordnance, was eventually procured. Though a Northern man by birth, Colonel Gorgas had married in the South, and was entirely identified in feeling and interest with that section. He proved to be a meritorious officer, whose services were of value to the cause. Messages were also sent to Captains G. W. Smith and Mansfield Lovell, then in New York, advising them to repair immediately to Montgomery, where their presence was needed. Owing to circumstances beyond their control, those officers did not arrive and report for duty until after the battle of Manassas.

Major Beauregard then presented himself to Mr. Davis, who received him with great kindness, and asked him many questions as to the temper of the people and the condition of affairs, at New Orleans and Mobile. His answer was, that now that secession Was an accomplished fact on the part of Louisiana as well as of Alabama, their people were fast becoming unanimous as to the measure, which, at first, had been looked upon with hesitation and apprehension; that business was mostly suspended in the cities of New Orleans and Mobile, but that everybody seemed hopeful of the future, whether we should remain permanently separated, or should re-enter the Union with sufficient guarantees against further encroachments on our rights.

The President then asked him what knowledge he had of the defences around Charleston, and of the best mode of taking Fort Sumter, in the event of its being necessary to resort to force against it. He read to Major Beauregard a letter he had just received from Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, describing the condition of affairs there, and asking that an officer of experience should be sent to take charge of the operations then going on, and, if necessary, to assume command of the State troops there assembled. The president showed him also a communication from Major W. H. C. Whiting, an ex-officer of United States Engineers, then in the service of the State of Georgia, who had been sent to Charleston to inspect the works being constructed against Fort Sumter, and advise such changes and improvements as his professional experience might suggest. Major Whiting, in this paper, expressed his disapproval of almost all that had been done in the way of locating and constructing batteries, and gave an alarming description of the condition of affairs there.

Major Beauregard having with him a map of Charleston, given him that day by Major W. H. Chase, ex-officer of Engineers, explained to the President what should, in his opinion, be done to prevent assistance by sea to Fort Sumter, and to force its surrender, if necessary. The matter was thoroughly examined and discussed until a late hour in the night.

The next afternoon Major Beauregard was accosted by some members of the convention from South Carolina and Georgia, who informed him that he had just been appointed first Brigadier-General in the provisional army of the Confederate States; and that he would be sent to assume command at Charleston, and direct operations there against Fort Sumter. This news took Major Beauregard completely by surprise. He neither desired nor expected such an honor. He feared it might keep him away for an indefinite period from New Orleans, whither he was anxious to return, for private as well as public reasons. He knew little of the defences of Charleston, and was not familiar with its people; whereas he was thoroughly acquainted with those of New Orleans; and, although perfectly willing to serve the Confederacy to the utmost of his ability, wherever sent, he thought his services were first due to the defence and protection of his own State. There was another impediment, though, under the circumstances, of much less gravity. His resignation from the United States army, dated and forwarded February 8th, 1861, had not yet been, to his knowledge, accepted; and still regardful of the strict observance of rules and regulations to which he had been trained, he was disinclined to take up arms against the United States flag until officially relieved from his fealty to it. This he explained to President Davis, who, after urging his acceptance of the position offered, and promising that he should if necessary, be sent back to New Orleans, suggested that he should at once telegraph to the War Department in Washington, and be set at rest on this point. He did so—for communications between all sections of the country were still free—and the next day received formal information of the acceptance of his resignation by President Buchanan.

Upon his informing Mr. Davis of the fact, the latter instructed him to repair at once to Charleston, there to report to Governor Pickens, and to take command of the State troops, should the South Carolina authorities so desire — the troops then assembled at or near Charleston not having yet regularly entered the Confederate service.

Seven miles from the Atlantic Ocean, and looking out upon it to the southeast, stands the city of Charleston, built at the confluence of the Ashley and Cooper rivers. It is on a tongue of the mainland, consisting of gray sandy soil, and extends southward, tapering in width from two miles to half a mile. Here the Ashley turns from the west and sweeps around, to mingle its waters with those of the Cooper, whose principal current passes close along the east or sea-front of the city. A marshy mud-flat, called Shute's Folly Island, rises east of Charleston on the farther side of this branch of Cooper River, and beyond it is the sand-strip and beach of Sullivan's Island. The lesser stream of Cooper River, flowing to the north and east of Shute's Folly, passes the mainland at Haddrell's Point and Mount Pleasant, and off the western extremity of Sullivan's Island unites with the other waters of the bay. South of Charleston, across the water, lies James Island, with its uplands extending about two and a half miles down the harbor. It is separated by a marsh and creek from the low white sand-bank of Morris Island. On account of the flatness of the country, the waters ebb and flow many miles up the Ashley and Cooper rivers, with a mean tide of seven feet at the city. Thus constituted, the harbor of Charleston averages two miles in width, and forms a beautiful sheet of water.

Out in the bay, three miles from the city, stands Fort Sumter. It is built on a shoal just south of the main channel, which it is intended to command, and is a mile from Fort Moultrie, which lies to the northeast, across the entrance, on Sullivan's Island. It is thirteen hundred yards from Morris Island, which lies to the south-southeast; fifteen hundred yards from Fort Johnson, which stands to the southwest, on James Island, and two miles from Castle Pinckney, on Shute's Folly, which lies to the northwest. Fort Sumter is—or was, at the time of which we are writing—a pentagonal work of formidable strength, built for mounting one hundred and forty pieces. The height of its walls, from the water's edge to the parapets, is sixty feet; the fort is divided into three tiers, two of which—the lower ones—were casemated, and the upper en barbette. With its commodious officers' quarters, its barracks, mess-rooms, magazines, and hot-shot furnaces, it had been considered one of the best-built forts under the control of the United States government, and did honor to the ability of the engineers who designed and executed its construction.

Fort Moultrie was a low brick work, without casemates, but with terre-pleins for batteries en barbette, the principal of which were the sea battery, facing southeast, and the Sumter battery, facing southwest.

Fort Johnson was an antiquated and dilapidated work, that had been abandoned. Castle Pinckney, opposite the city, across Cooper River, was an old-fashioned, half-moon fortification of brick, with one row of casemates for small ordnance and a terre-plein above.

In 1860, Charleston contained about fifty thousand inhabitants. Besides its commercial importance, it was the residence of many intelligent and educated planters, cultivating rice in the malarial tide-swamps, and sea-island cotton along the rich coast region of the low country. It was the centre of the factorage business of the State, of the supply market, of banking and exchange. It was also headquarters in matters of church and school, society and politics. The town was old and respectable-looking, evidently built for personal convenience, not for show; and its people spent, their money in substantial good-living within doors, rather than in outward display. With many churches and public schools, no private palaces and few brown-stone fronts were visible; but its' separate dwellings of brick and of wood, with their enclosed gardens and luxuriant shrubbery, unique rows of rooms accessible to the sea breeze, with tiers of spacious piazzas, gave it an air of exclusive individuality and solid comfort.

General Beauregard arrived in Charleston on the 1st of March, 1861, and immediately repaired to Governor Pickens's headquarters, which were then established at the Charleston Hotel. Governor Pickens was found in earnest consultation with eminent citizens of the Palmetto State. A hearty welcome was extended to the Confederate commander, whose arrival from Montgomery had been announced in advance of time, and was anxiously awaited by all.

Governor Pickens proposed to put General Beauregard in command without delay, but his offer was declined; General Beauregard preferring first to acquaint himself thoroughly with the forces collected in and around Charleston, the sites of the various batteries then in course of erection, and the available resources in ordnance.

A retrospective glance over the causes which induced the course adopted by South Carolina and the Southern States, and a cursory sketch of the condition of the public mind at that juncture, cannot fail to be of interest to the reader.

The State of South Carolina was the first to dissever the ties that bound her to the Union. She was actuated, in so doing, not by motives of profit, of ambition, or love of strife, but by principle, and a sense of right to control her own destiny, and escape the ruin she foresaw in falling under the rule of a hostile sectional party, regardless of the limitations of the Constitution, which alone gave security to the minority in the South.

Time and again had the South, in a spirit of unwise conciliation, yielded to unconstitutional encroachments, knowing them to be such, but with no better result than to increase this aggression upon her rights.

The bond of union—namely, the Constitution—was virtually broken. The antagonistic relations of the two sections had culminated in the election of a President believed to be unfriendly to the States of the South. It was thought that, as a speedy sequel, the South would be excluded from the common territory; that the guarantees of the Constitution would no longer-exist; that the Southern States would lose the power of self-government, and Federal authority predominate over all.

To have acquiesced passively in such a new order of things, whereby the Government of the United States was no longer the government of confederated republics, but of a consolidated Democracy, would have been lending a hand to despotism. This, South Carolina would not do. By such an act she would have belied her past history, and condemned that noble struggle for liberty, as a result of which the American colonies had been acknowledged by Great Britain and the world to be free, sovereign, and independent States.

Whatever may have been the hopes of South Carolina, when, on the 20th of December, 1860, she dissolved her connection with the Union, she had no certainty that her Southern sister States would follow the course she had thought proper to adopt. She acted alone, impelled by her own sense of duty, of independence and self-respect, as a sovereign.

Her example, and the tone of her leading men, foremost among whom stood that profound statesman, the late Robert Barnwell Rhett——the friend and successor of John C. Calhoun—had no small influence in determining the subsequent withdrawal of the other States of the South. The weight of Northern hostility had been felt by each and all; and the decisive action of any one of them was more than sufficient to kindle the latent fires of selfpreserva-tion by disunion.

At the time of which we are now writing, and no matter what may have been the previous divergence of opinions among the leaders of that gallant State, there was but one feeling, one sentiment, and one resolve animating every South Carolina heart: to retake possession, at any cost, of the arsenals, forts, and other public property then in the hands of the Federal authorities, and to assume and exercise all the rights appertaining to a free and independent commonwealth.

The object of her Commissioners in Washington, as shown by their official correspondence with President Buchanan, was to obtain a just, honorable, and peaceable settlement of the question at issue between South Carolina and the Federal Government.

We have the honor to transmit to you, wrote these Commissioners to the President, a copy of the full powers from the convention of the people of South Carolina, under which we are authorized to treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate, with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and also for the apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other property held by the government of the United States as agent of the confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between this commonwealth and the government at Washington.

See letter dated Washington, Dec. 28th, 1860, of Messrs. R. W. Barnwell, J. H. Adams, and James L. Orr, South Carolina Commissioners, to President Buchanan.

These negotiations failed.

The removal of the United States garrison, on the 25th of December, 1860, from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter—the gun carriages of the former work having been fired and the guns injured by the retiring troops—whatever may have been its cause, or by whomsoever suggested, was the first overt act of war, and the real beginning of hostilities between the two sections. That it was due to the action of a United States officer and representative of the Federal government, is beyond doubt. The question, whether he obeyed orders or acted on his own responsibility, in nowise affects the fact.

All hesitation and all illusions, on the part of the South Carolina authorities, were, from that moment, swept aside; and, as a logical sequence, on the day following, the Palmetto State flag was raised over smoking Moultrie, and over the other defences of the harbor, Sumter excepted. The South Carolina Commissioners retired from Washington and returned home, having had the full assurance from President Buchanan that he would not remand Major Anderson to Fort Moultrie, withdraw the United States troops from Fort Sumter, or give up the latter to the State authorities.

Vigorous preparations for the coming struggle were now begun by the State of South Carolina, with entire unanimity and a most admirable spirit among her people. Works were thrown up, and batteries constructed, at various points of the harbor, where it was thought they could best defend the city, and cut off outside communications with Fort Sumter.

These precautionary measures were taken none too soon. At dawn on the 9th of January, the steamer Star of the West, with a reinforcement of several hundred men, and supplies of food and ammunition for Sumter, appeared off the bar of Charleston harbor. She entered Ship Channel, and was rapidly approaching when a shot was fired across her bow from a battery on Morris Island, as a signal to heave to. Disregarding this warning, she hoisted the United States flag and boldly continued her course. Five rounds were then fired at her in quick succession, two of which took effect. At the sixth discharge she rounded to, lowered her flag, and steamed out of the harbor. Fort Moultrie had also opened fire on her.

Events now followed one another in rapid succession. Major Anderson, demanding to know of Governor Pickens whether or not he had authorized the firing on a transport bearing the United States flag, was answered in the affirmative. Soon afterwards Governor Pickens formally summoned Major Anderson to surrender Fort Sumter to the State authorities. This Major Anderson refused to do, but offered to refer the matter to his government, at Washington.

As a proof of the conciliatory spirit still animating both the people and the authorities of South Carolina, Governor Pickens acceded to this request, and the Honorable Isaac W. Hayne was accordingly sent to Washington, with power to act in the premises. Protracted negotiations ensued, but brought about no satisfactory result, the answer of Mr. Holt, the new Secretary of War, leaving but little hope of an amicable settlement.

Thus, under these perplexing circumstances, with an earnest desire for peace, but with insufficient courage to avow and promote it, Mr. Buchanan's administration came to a close. Congress had been as irresolute as the President himself, and had taken no step to avoid the impending danger of collision.

In the meantime, other Southern States, to wit, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, had severed their connection with the Federal Government, and linking their destinies with that of South Carolina, had regularly organized, at Montgomery, the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America.

All eyes were now fixed upon the Palmetto State, the pivot around which turned the fortunes of the South, in this grand effort for constitutional liberty which was about to be made. To her honor be it said, she proved worthy of the leadership which fate had confided to her hands. Her State troops and volunteers answered with more than alacrity to the call of the constituted authorities, and poured in from every district, eager to be counted among the first to strike a blow in defence of the cause in which their lives—and more than their lives—were now enlisted. The difficulty among the officers was, not to elevate the morale of these patriotic freemen, or prepare them for the dangers they were about to encounter, but to restrain their ardor, and maintain them within the bounds of prudence and moderation.

Such was the condition of affairs in South Carolina, and such the tone of the public mind in the city of Charleston, when General Beauregard arrived there.

Having made a thorough inspection of all the works, he came to the conclusion that a great deal still remained to be done by way of preparation for active measures against Fort Sumter.

The system and plan of operations which had been adopted seemed to be to concentrate all the available guns and mortars at two points, namely: Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, and Gumming's Point, on Morris Island, where a few guns and about half a dozen mortars of heavy caliber were being put in position. Battery Star of the West—so called, from its repulse of the steamer of that name-contained four 24-pounders, which enfiladed the main south channel, known as the Morris Island Channel.

General Beauregard determined to alter that system, but gradually and cautiously, so as not to dampen the ardor, or touch the pride, of the gallant and sensitive gentlemen who had left their comfortable homes, at the call of their State, to vindicate its honor and assert its rights. They had endured, for weeks, the privations and exposures of a soldier's life, on bleak islands, where it was impossible, at times, to see objects at a greater distance than a few yards, because of the sand drifts created by the northers, prevalent on the coast at that season of the year.

General Beauregard noted, with feelings of admiration, an old gentleman, standing sentry at one of the camps on the island, who had organized, armed, and equipped a whole company of infantry at his own expense, and had placed it under the command of his youngest brother. This had been his contribution to his country's cause; and, deeming it insufficient, he had also offered his services and his life, as a private in his own company.

Among the privates there assembled for duty were planters and sons of planters, some of them the wealthiest men of South Carolina, diligently working, side by side with their slaves. Not a word of complaint from any of them did General Beauregard hear during his inspection tour, except, perhaps, against the long delay in attacking Fort Sumter. Numerous were the plans—each infallible—suggested by these high-spirited gentlemen, for taking the formidable work which loomed up majestic and defiant in the distance, like a mountain risen from the sea its barbette guns grimly crowning its summit.

The Confederate States Commissioners—Messrs. John Forsyth of Alabama, M. J. Crawford of Georgia, and A. B. Roman of Louisiana—with proposals from their government, were sent to Washington after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln as President. They were instructed to make to the government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring that government that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States earnestly desire a peaceful solution of these great questions, and that it is neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand that is not founded in strictest justice, nor to do any act to injure their late confederates.

See letter of Southern Commissioners to Mr. Lincoln, Rebellion Record, vol. i. p. 42.

It was hoped that these commissioners, representing an organized government, perfect in all its parts, and clothed with powers by seven sovereign States, would be deemed entitled to greater consideration, and might accomplish more than the commissioners sent by South Carolina alone had been able to do.

But Mr. Lincoln and his advisers assumed very formal ground, and declined all official intercourse with representatives of rebellious States. They would have nothing to do with irregular negotiations, having in view new and untried relations with agencies unknown to, and acting in derogation of, the Constitution and the laws.

Mr. Seward's reply to the Southern Commissioners.

The correspondence of the Southern Commissioners with Mr. Seward attests this. The interesting particulars added thereto by the Honorable John A. Campbell, late Associate-Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, show that not only were the conciliatory proposals tendered to the Federal government by the Confederate States treated with uncourteous disregard, but that a covert attempt at provisioning and reinforcing Fort Sumter, was being made, pending the delay to which our commissioners were subjected in Washington, while unofficial but positive assurances were given them of an early evacuation of that fort.

So many despatches and letters, public and private, had been forwarded to the South by influential Southern statesmen then in Washington, to the effect that, despite heavy outside pressure, the President could be induced to settle the question at issue without a resort to arms, if sufficient time were allowed him, that up to the very last hour the Confederate authorities at Montgomery, and many high officials in Charleston, really hoped that the Federal troops would yet be withdrawn from Sumter, and the impending danger of war be averted. General Crawford, United States Army, in his essay, The First Shot Against the Flag, speaking of this impression, says distinctly, and they had at one time reason for the belief. Annals of the War, p. 324. General Doubleday expresses himself with no less certainty when he states that Anderson now had no doubt that we would be withdrawn, and the papers all gave out the same idea.

General Doubleday's Reminiscences of Sumter and Moultrie, p. 133.

Not until Captain G. V. Fox, of the United States Navy, had obtained introduction into Sumter, under the plea of pacific purposes, though in reality to concert a plan for its reinforcement; not until Colonel Lamon, representing himself as a confidential agent of President Lincoln, had gained access to the fort, under the pretence of arranging matters for the removal of the troops, but in reality to confer with Major Anderson, and ascertain the amount of provisions on hand;

Ibid. p. 134.

On assuming command of Charleston, General Beauregard made no material change in the distribution and location of the forces he found there, and maintained the organization previously adopted by the South Carolina State authorities.

Brigadier-General James Simons was therefore left in command of Morris Island, all the batteries of which had been placed under the immediate charge of Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. De Saussure of the Second Artillery Battalion. He was assisted, at the Trapier Battery, by Captain King, of the Marion Artillery, and, later, by Captain Russell, of the Sumter Guards. Next to the Trapier Battery, and closer to Sumter, was the Stevens or Iron Battery, of which special mention has already been made. Then came the Cummings's Point battery, at a distance of only thirteen hundred yards from Fort Sumter. To it had been attached the rifled Blakely gun, just received from England. Both of these were held by the Palmetto Guard, and commanded by Major Stevens, of the Citadel Academy; Captain Cuthbert having special charge of the Iron Battery, and Captain Thomas of the Blakely gun. Besides the above-mentioned works, there could also be seen a long line of detached batteries, guarding the entrance of Ship Channel, and extending along the whole Morris Island beach. They were manned by detachments taken from Gregg's regiment, and from both the German and the Columbia Artillery, under Colonel Lamar, Major Warley, and Captains Huger, Nohrden, and Green.

Sullivan's Island was under Brigadier-General R. G. M. Dunovant; and the command of all its batteries had been assigned to Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley, of the First Artillery Battalion. Captain Ransom Calhoun was stationed at Fort Moultrie, and Captain Hallonquist at the Enfilade or masked battery. They were assisted by Lieutenants Wagner, Rhett, Yates, Valentine, Mitchel, and Parker. Captain Butler was on duty at the mortar battery, east of Fort Moultrie. Captain J. R. Hamilton commanded his own floating battery and the Dahlgren gun. Captain Martin was at the Mount Pleasant mortars; Captain George S. Thomas at Fort Johnson; and Castle Pinckney had been placed under the charge of an officer whose name we have not been able to procure.

A few days previous to the bombardment, the general commanding had announced, in general orders, the names of the officers composing his staff. They were Major D. R. Jones, Assistant-Adjutant-General, Captain S. D. Lee, Captain S. Ferguson, Lieutenant Sydney Legare—of the Regular staff; Messrs. John L. Manning, James Chestnut, Jr., William Porcher Miles, A. J. Gonzales, and A. R. Chisolm, and Colonels L. T. Wigfall, of Texas, and Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia—of the Volunteer staff.

Though the opening of hostilities had, for the last two days, been almost hourly expected by officers and men of the various commands, and by the whole population of the city of Charleston, still, so good was the tone of the troops, so confident of the result were the non-combatants, that when the last message of the commanding general had been delivered, notifying Major Anderson that fire would open on him in an hour's time, quiet, order, and discipline reigned throughout the city and harbor.

The peaceful stillness of the night was suddenly broken just before dawn. From Fort Johnson's mortar battery, at 4.30 A. M., April 12th, 1861, issued the first-and, as many thought, the toolong-deferred-signal shell of the war. It was fired, not by Mr. Edmund Ruffin, of Virginia, as has been erroneously believed, but by Captain George S. James, of South Carolina, to whom Lieutenant Stephen D. Lee issued the order. It sped aloft, describing its peculiar arc of fire, and, bursting over Fort Sumter, fell, with crashing noise, in the very centre of the parade.

Thus was Reveille sounded in Charleston and its harbor on this eventful morning. In an instant all was bustle and activity. Not an absentee was reported at roll-call. The citizens poured down to the battery and the wharves, and women and children crowded each window of the houses overlooking the sea-rapt spectators of the scene. At ten minutes before five o'clock, all the batteries and mortars which encircled the grim fortress were in full play against it.

Round after round had already been fired; and yet, for nearly two hours, not a shot in response had come from Fort Sumter Had Major Anderson been taken by surprise? Or was it that, certain of his ability to pass unscathed through the onslaught thus made upon him, it mattered not how soon or how late he committed his flag in the war in which his heart was not? At last, however, near seven o'clock, the United States flag having previously been raised, the sound of a gun, not ours, was distinctly heard. Sumter had taken up the gage of battle, and Cummings's Point had first attracted its attention. It was almost a relief to our troops — for gallantry ever admires gallantry, and a worthy foe disdains one who makes no resistance.

The action was now general, and was so maintained throughout the day, with vigor on both sides. Our guns were served with admirable spirit, and the accuracy of our range was made evident by the clouds of dust that flew as our balls struck the fort, and by the indentations hollowed in its walls. The precision with which solid shot and shells were thrown from our batteries, mainly Fort Moultrie, was such that the enemy was soon compelled to abandon the use of his barbette guns, several of which had been dismounted in the early part of the bombardment.

The iron-clad battery at Cummings's Point, Fort; Moultrie proper, and that end of Sullivan's Island where the floating battery, the Dahlgren gun, and the enfilade or masked battery had been placed, were the points which attracted Major Anderson's heaviest firing. No better proof could he have given us of the effects of our fire on his fort. An occasional shot only was aimed at Fort Johnson, as if to remind the battery there that the explosion of its first shell was not yet forgiven. Captain Butler's mortar battery, east of Moultrie, had also a share of the enemy's wrath.

The engagement was continued with unceasing vigor until nightfall, although Sumter's fire had evidently slackened before that time, and was then confined to its casemated guns. General Doubleday, U. S. A., in his Reminiscences, p. 154, speaking of the first day's bombardment, says: They had a great advantage over us, as their fire was concentrated on the fort, which was in the centre of the circle, while ours was diffused over the circumference. Their missiles were exceedingly destructive to the upper exposed portion of the work, but no essential injury was done to the lower casemates which sheltered us.

Noted among our mortar batteries—all so well served—was the Trapier Battery, whose skilful firing had become the subject of much admiration among officers and men. Almost every shell it threw, from the first to the last, reached its aim with relentless effect. The Stevens Iron Battery, the destruction of which the guns of Sumter sought to accomplish, paid but little attention to the fierce opening attack made upon it, and received no serious impression on its iron-coated surface; while the south and southwest faces of Sumter bore visible signs of its own effectiveness. The floating battery was not far behind in destructive usefulness. It proved of equal invulnerability, and left telling marks of its battering powers.

During the whole night which followed, in spite of rain and darkness, our batteries continued playing upon the fort with unvarying effect, but the shots were fired at longer intervals, in obedience to orders. No response was made. General Doubleday, in his work already quoted, admits the fact. He says: We did not return the fire, having no ammunition to waste. And General Crawford, in his First Shot against the Flag, Annals of the War, p. 328. makes the following statement: During the night of the 12th, the accurate range of the mortars lodged a shell in the parade, or about the work, at intervals of fifteen minutes. It was estimated that over twenty-five hundred shot and shell struck the fort during the first twenty-four hours.

It was expected that the Federal fleet, alluded to by Mr. Lincoln's special messenger to Governor Pickens and General Beauregard, would arrive that night, and might attempt to throw troops, ammunition, and supplies into Fort Sumter. To guard against such an untoward event, the keenest watchfulness was observed at our beach batteries and by the forces on Morris and Sullivan's islands. The details of men at the Drummond lights were also on the alert, and ready at a moment's notice to illuminate the channels; while Captain Hartstein, with his cruising vessels, actively patrolled the outer harbor. The fleet arrived on the morning of the 13th, an hour or two after the action had been renewed, and remained spectators off the bar.

Very early on that morning all our batteries re-opened on the enemy, who responded with vigor for a while, concentrating his fire almost exclusively on Fort Moultrie. The presence of the fleet outside the bar, now visible to all, no doubt inspired both officers and men of the garrison with additional courage and a renewed spirit of endurance.

General Crawford, in his above-quoted essay, says: Major Anderson was directed, if possible, to hold out until the 12th of April, when the expedition would go forward, and, finding his flag flying, an effort would be made to provision him, and to reinforce him, if resisted. Annals of the War, p. 325.

Major Anderson, with his officers and men, followed the instructions received. They did hold out; their flag was flying on the 12th of April, and again on the 13th; and they were fighting in all earnest. The fleet outside thought proper, nevertheless, to abstain from all participation in the engagement.

By morning, says General Crawford, the fleet sent to our assistance appeared off the bar, but did not enter.

Ibid. p. 329.

What with the burning of its quarters, the injury inflicted on its walls, and the shattered condition of its parade and parapets, where dismounted guns, broken carriages and chassis, fragments of shell and shot, lay scattered on all sides—Fort Sumter, when our troops marched into it, presented a picture of desolation and ruin. One could well understand, upon viewing it then, how impossible it would have been for Major Anderson and his command to hold out more than a few hours longer. Suffocation and an endangered magazine, if not starvation, and, above all, the firing from Moultrie and other batteries, must soon have destroyed the entire garrison. With or without the assistance of the fleet, a surrender was a foregone conclusion.

The triumph of our arms, so complete and—through the kindly protection of Providence—so bloodless, was solemnly celebrated in several of the ancient churches of Charleston; and a Te Deum was sung, with great pomp, in the beautiful cathedral, on the Sunday next following this opening scene of the war.

General Beauregard, in orders issued on the day after the surrender, congratulated his troops on the brilliant success which had crowned their gallantry. Commenting upon the terms granted to Major Anderson and his command, he said: And to show our magnanimity to the gallant defenders, who were only executing the orders of their government, they will be allowed to evacuate upon the same terms which were offered to them before the bombardment commenced. He concluded as follows: The general is highly gratified to state that the troops, by their labor, privations, and endurance at the batteries and at other posts, have exhibited the highest characteristics of tried soldiers.

And now began in earnest, without the loss of a day, the repairs, which amounted almost to the rebuilding of Fort Sumter. With zeal and energy this work was done; and in less than three weeks no vestige of the former injuries remained. The broken chassis and carriages had been replaced, the barracks rebuilt—one story in height instead of two, as formerly—and the walls restored to their previous condition.

Meanwhile General Beauregard went on with the organization and discipline of the troops called by South Carolina, which were gradually mustered into the Provisional Army of the Confederate States.

Early in May, a brigade of four regiments of South Carolina volunteers was organized, under Brigadier-General Bonham. It consisted of the 1st South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Gregg; the 2d South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Kershaw; the 3d South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Williams; and the 8th South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Cash. That brigade, made up of the flower of Carolina's chivalry, was sent to Virginia, by order of the War Department, the Old Dominion having, on the 17th of April—four days after the fall of Sumter—joined her fate to that of the Southern Confederacy.

One of the regiments of Bonham's brigade (Gregg's) had been sent in advance to Norfolk. Its mission was to take possession of the navy-yard and protect all public property there. This was a judicious movement. The many cannon and mortars, and the ammunition stored at Norfolk, were of the greatest value to the Confederacy, then almost entirely destitute of such important supplies. The whole brigade was soon afterwards concentrated at Manassas Junction, in the Department of Alexandria, or the Alexandria line, as it was also called, the command of which devolved upon General Bonham. He remained there until relieved, on the 1st of June, by General Beauregard.

As soon as he could be spared from Charleston, General Beauregard made a thorough reconnoissance of the South Carolina coast, from Charleston to Port Royal. This he did at the special request of Governor Pickens, the object being the adoption of a system of defence to be carried out at the earliest moment practicable.

On his return he prepared a memoir, wherein he recommended the erection of several important works at the mouths of the Stono and the two Edistos, and at Georgetown; but declined advising any for the entrance of Port Royal harbor. He was of opinion that field-works located on the ends of the islands which closed the harbor could not protect it, for the reason that the distance between the islands was too great. Some light works he did recommend, however, at the inner end of Port Royal, to guard that part of the coast and prevent a landing of the enemy, which might result in the destruction of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. But upon the earnest and reiterated request of Governor Pickens, and other eminent citizens, whose zeal and efforts were untiring, General Beauregard finally yielded, and drew out a plan for the defence of Port Royal, with the distinct requirement, however, that the field-works proposed in the plan should be armed with the heaviest ordnance, chiefly 10-inch and rifled guns, and that a steel-clad floating battery, with a similar armament, should be moored midway between the two field-works. His explanation was, that while the harbors of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans—the entrances to which are from half a mile to one and a quarter miles broad—require strongly casemated forts, armed with several hundred guns of heavy caliber, it could not be expected that Port Royal harbor, with an entrance nearly three miles wide and twenty-six feet deep, could be effectively protected by small, hastily constructed fieldworks, inadequately armed.

What General Beauregard had predicted was unfortunately realized. In the autumn of that year the enemy's powerful fleet, the acquisition and fitting-out of which had cost, according to Northern accounts, more than four millions of dollars, entered Port Royal harbor and reduced its isolated works, after a short but gallant resistance on the part of their overpowered garrisons. This event cast a gloom, for a while, over the new-born Southern Confederacy.

General Beauregard, now thoroughly familiar with the topography of Charleston and the surrounding country, understood how important it was to guard the Stono. He saw at a glance that, should the enemy land a sufficient force on James Island, the city of Charleston could easily be turned by way of that river. To avert such a danger, he had a strong field-work erected on Battery Island, that being the lowest point of dry land before reaching the salt marshes which extend in an unbroken field on each side of the stream. This work, although small, occupied a commanding position, which no hostile craft could approach unseen. Towards the latter part of May it was completed and ready for service.

From various quarters messages of congratulation poured in to General Beauregard, upon the brilliant success he had achieved. The first in date was a telegram from President Davis, which read as follows:

Montgomery, April 13th, 1861. To General G. T. Beauregard:

Thanks for your achievement and for your courtesy to the garrison of Sumter. If occasion offers, tender my friendly remembrance to Major Anderson.

Then, from the Secretary of War:

Montgomery, April 13th, 1861. To General Beauregard:

Accept my congratulations. You have won your spurs. How many guns can you spare for Pensacola?

The next communication was from one whose attitude towards the administration already indicated the influence he would soon exercise over it:

Montgomery, April 16th, 1861.

My dear General,—In the midst of the eclat of your glorious triumph you will, no doubt, value but little the tribute of a poor civilian who knows nothing of war; but I cannot refrain from joining in the general voice of your fellow-citizens, and congratulating you on the signal success which has crowned the first blow stricken in defence of our rights. Louisiana is proud of her son, and I am Louisianian, heart and soul.

* * * * * * * *

Renewing my cordial greetings, and envying your delight at accomplishing such a result as you have, without the loss of one man,

I am your friend and servant,

Not until Fort Sumter had surrendered to the South Carolina troops under General Beauregard; not until Mr. Lincoln, misapprehending the attitude of those Southern States still nominally belonging to the Union, had made his requisition on them for their quota of men to aid in suppressing the Rebellion, did Virginia, faithful to her old-time traditions, openly proclaim her adhesion to the Southern cause, and assume her rightful place among the seceded States. Hers was a disinterested step; one taken with a full appreciation of the inevitable dangers and devastation in store for her, owing to her geographical position. Her hesitation was but another instance of the historic firmness and deliberation which had always characterized her official acts, and it was, no doubt, her example which shortly afterwards determined the withdrawal of Tennessee, Arkansas, and North Carolina.

No sooner had Virginia's voice, through her assembled convention, pronounced her severance from the North, than the seven States forming the Confederacy, anxious to welcome her among them, hurried forward to her support a portion of their best troops. As a natural sequence to this provident measure, it followed that the most experienced and successful of our military leaders were selected to be placed at the head of such commands. Hence the order transferring General Beauregard to Virginia. Pollard, in his work entitled Lee and his Lieutenants, when writing on this subject, says: Called for by the unanimous voice of the Southern people, he was now ordered to take command of the main portion of the Confederate army in northern Virginia. Pollard's later description of the apprehension and flurry existing in the Northern mind, concerning General Beauregard's whereabouts, is, indeed, most singular, and shows the appreciation in which he was held by our enemies.

Many writers, in describing the traits of General Beauregard's character, have commented upon his very retiring disposition, amounting almost to bashfulness, which forms so strong a contrast to his boldness and indomitable spirit in the field. This was instanced upon his arrival at Richmond, May 30th, where a large concourse of people awaited him, anxious to see and welcome the Confederate commander who had already drawn upon himself the attention and admiration of the whole country. A carriageand-four was in readiness at the Richmond depot to convey him to the apartments which had been prepared for him at the Spotswood Hotel. But no sooner had he been apprised of this unexpected honor—which, though gratifying, interfered with his desire for privacy—than he, wishing to avoid all public demonstration, insisted upon taking an ordinary carriage, in which, with one or two officers of his staff, he quietly drove to other quarters.

The next day, May 31st, he called on President Davis, who was in conference with General Robert E. Lee, then commanding the Virginia State forces. General Lee had just returned from Manassas, about twenty-seven miles below Alexandria, where he had left Brigadier-General Bonham, of South Carolina, with some five thousand men of all arms. This position had been taken at the instance of Colonel Thomas Jordan, of the Virginia forces, who, in a carefully written memoir on the subject, had shown the importance of at once occupying Manassas Junction, to prevent its seizure, and the severance of communication by rail with the lower valley of Virginia.

After a full interchange of views, which lasted several hours, it was determined that General Beauregard should leave on the next morning to assume command at Manassas, whither reinforcements would be forwarded as soon as obtained. At first it had been intended to send him to Norfolk, but General Lee's report of the condition of affairs on the Alexandria line, and the probability of an early advance of the enemy on that point, caused the President to change his mind.

From the moment General Beauregard had left New Orleans, until the time of his arrival in Richmond, he had been so unremittingly occupied with public affairs as to preclude all attention to his personal interests and even his military outfit. He would have willingly remained a day or two in Richmond, in order to prepare himself better for the field; but the juncture was considered so urgent by the President and General Lee, that no such leisure was granted him, and he departed at once, with two of his aids, leaving other members of his staff, including his adjutant, to effect such arrangements as were necessary. He left Richmond on the 1st of June, and reached Manassas the same night, under the following orders:

Headquarters of the Virginia forces, Richmond, Virginia, May 31st, 1861. Special orders, no. 149.

General P. G. T. Beauregard, of the Confederate States army, is assigned to the command of the troops on the Alexandria line. He is referred to the orders heretofore given to his predecessors in that command, for the general direction of operations.

By order of Major-General Lee, R. S. Garnett, Adjt.-Gen.

We copy below an extract from the orders alluded to, as given to General Beauregard's predecessors, and transferred, as we have seen, to himself:

The policy of the State, at present, is strictly defensive. No attack or provocation for attack will therefore be given, but every attack resisted to the extent of your means. Great reliance is placed on your discretion and judgment in the application of your force, and I must urge upon you the importance of organizing and instructing the troops as rapidly as possible, and preparing them for active service. For this purpose it will be necessary to post them where their services may be needed and where they can be concentrated at the points threatened. The Manassas Junction is a very important point on your line, as it commands the communication with Harper's Ferry, and must be firmly held. Intrenchments at that point would add to its security; and in connection with its defence, you must watch the approaches from either flank, particularly towards Occoquan. Alexandria, in its front, will of course claim your attention as the first point of attack, and as soon as your force is sufficient, in your opinion, to resist successfully its occupation, you will so dispose it as to effect this object, if possible, without appearing to threaten Washington city. The navigation of the Potomac being closed to us, and the United States armed vessels being able to take a position in front of the town, you will perceive the hazard of its destruction unless your measures are such as to prevent it. This subject being one of great delicacy, is left to your judgment. The railroad communications must be secured, however, and their use by the enemy prevented. . . .

The Confederate troops in northern Virginia, east of the grand chain of the Alleghanies, now formed a series of detached commands, stretching from northwest to southeast respectively, under General Joseph E. Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, General Beauregard, at Manassas, and General Holmes, at Aquia Creek; each outnumbered by confronting forces, excepting General Holmes's command, whose position on the lower Potomac was taken only to prevent a possible landing of the enemy at that point.

The forces in front of General Johnston and those in front of Colonel Eppa Hunton, commanding a battalion at Leesburg, the western extremity of the Manassas line, were still on the north bank of the Potomac.

General Beauregard, appreciating the necessity of an immediate concerted system between these independent commands, particularly between his own and the considerable forces at Harper's Ferry, and viewing Manassas as the most important strategic point for both belligerents, and the one most likely to attract the main effort of the enemy, which, according to reports, might be made at any moment, had determined if possible to reform the Confederate military situation, in accordance with his views of sound policy. His plan, as the following letter shows, was marked, as were all his military plans, by the leading ideas of concentration and aggression.

Headquarters Manassas, Department of Va., camp Pickens, June 12th, 1861.

To His Excellency President Davis:

Sir,—The bearer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Jones of the Provisional Army of Virginia, a member of my general staff, has been instructed by me to lay before your Excellency a diagram, with my views relative to the operations of the present campaign in this State, which should be acted upon at once.

The enemy seem to be taking the offensive towards Harper's Ferry, and a few days hence may find General J. E. Johnston in such a critical condition as to render it impossible to relieve him. If he were ordered to abandon forthwith his present position and concentrate suddenly his forces with mine, guarding, with small detachments, all the passes through which the enemy might follow him, we could, by a bold and rapid movement forward, retake Arlington Heights and Alexandria, if not too strongly fortified and garrisoned, which would have the effect of recalling all the enemy's forces from northern Virginia, for the protection of Washington. But should General Johnston be unable to unite his forces with mine, then he ought to be instructed to retreat at the proper time towards Richmond, through the valley of Virginia, checking the enemy wherever and whenever he can. When compelled to abandon my present position, I will fall back also on Richmond; the forces along the lower Potomac, on the Peninsula, and at Norfolk, may have to do likewise. Then, acting on interior lines, from Richmond as a centre (our forces being increased by the reserves at that point), we could crush, in rapid succession and in detail, the several columns of the enemy, which I have supposed would move on three or four different lines. With thirty-five thousand men, properly handled, I have not the least doubt that we could an-nihilate fifty thousand of the enemy. I beg and entreat that a concerted plan of operations be adopted at once by the government, for its different columns. Otherwise, we will be assailed in detail by superior forces, and will be cut off, or destroyed entirely.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jones will present my views more in detail to your Excellency.

The President made the following reply:

Richmond, Va., June 13th, 1861.

My dear General,—Colonel Jones delivered to me your letter of the 12th instant, and, as suggested by you, I conversed with him of the matter to which it related. Your information may be more accurate than we possess, in relation to the purposes of the enemy, and I will briefly reply to you on the hypothesis which forms the basis of your suggestions.

If the enemy commence operations by attack upon Harper's Ferry, I do not perceive why General Johnston should be unable, even before overwhelming numbers, to retire behind the positions where the enemy would approach in reverse. It would seem to me not unreasonable to expect that, before he reaches Winchester, the terminus of the railroad in his possession, the people of the fertile and populous valley would rise in mass to aid him in repelling the invader. But suppose it should be otherwise, he could still, by retiring to the passes of the Manassas railroad and its adjacent mountains, probably check the progress of the enemy, and prevent him from either taking possession of the valley, or passing to the rear of your position. We hope soon to reinforce you to an extent equal to the strength you require, by the junction of General Johnston and I cannot doubt but that you would then be better circumstanced to advance upon Alexandria than if General Johnston, by withdrawing from the valley, had left the enemy the power to pass to your rear, to cut your line of communication, and advance to attack you in reverse, while you were engaged with the enemy in front.

Concurring fully with you in the effect which would be produced by the possession of Arlington Heights and Alexandria, if your rear is at the same time sufficiently covered, it is quite clear that if the case should be otherwise, your possession, if acquired, would be both brief and fruitless.

To your request that a concerted plan of operations should be adopted, I can only reply that the present position and unknown purposes of the enemy require that our plan should have many alterations. I have noted your converging lines upon Richmond, and it can hardly be necessary to remind you that we have not at this time the transportation which would enable us to move upon those lines as described. Should the fortune of war render it necessary to retire our advance columns, they must be brought mainly upon railroads, and that of Harper's Ferry would come by your present position. It would, therefore, be a necessity that General Johnston's column should make a junction with yours, before yours retired; but I have not anticipated the necessity of your retreat, and have struggled to increase your force, and look hopefully forward to see you enabled to assume the offensive. Had I been less earnestly engaged in providing for yours and other commands, I should have had the pleasure of visiting you before this date. Four regiments have been sent forward, neither of which had reached you at the date of your letter; and you will soon receive further reinforcements. They are not trained troops, but I think they are better than those of the enemy, and the capacity which you have recently exhibited, successfully to fight with undisciplined citizens, justifies the expectation that you will know how to use such force as we are able to furnish.

Very truly yours,

Still persisting, however, in his effort to make use of all possible resources in meeting the imminent crisis, General Beauregard, in his official and semi-official correspondence at the time, suggested that the troops under General Holmes, at Aquia Creek, at least two thousand five hundred men, with two batteries, should be so posted as to be available for a timely junction with his own forces. General Holmes fully concurred, asserting that his command, as then disposed, was not likely to be of any military use; but the suggestion met with no favor at Richmond.

On the 18th, having begun to receive from Norfolk the naval guns for which he had called, to arm the works at Manassas, General Beauregard made a requisition for naval officers to command those batteries and drill the recruits. They came with a number of sailors, bringing their gun-ropes, blocks, and tackles, and in their exercises the terms port and starboard, novel in the field, were used as familiarly as on board a man-of-war. Officers and men were noticeable for their zeal, efficiency, and discipline.

Meanwhile, vigilant observation of the opposite banks of the Potomac was kept up at Leesburg, an important place, which the enemy might strike in order to sever the communications between Generals Beauregard and Johnston; and such small reinforcements as could be spared from Manassas were sent thither, but without artillery, of which none was available.

From information collected in his front, General Johnston was apprehensive that General Patterson would move to attack him, and he soon abandoned the untenable salient position of Harper's Ferry, held by him unwillingly, and to which General Patterson afterwards crossed on the 2d of July. General Beauregard's views, based partly on reports from Washington, were that General Patterson's movements merely simulated the offensive, to hold General Johnston in check.

About the 20th of June, General Beauregard, having organized his forces into six brigades, began a forward movement, in order to protect his advanced positions at Centreville, Fairfax Court-House, and Sangster's Cross-roads, so as to be able—as he wrote to Colonel Eppa Hunton—to strike a blow upon the enemy, at a moment's notice, which he hoped they would long remember. His advanced forces, three brigades of three regiments each, occupied a triangle as follows: at Mitchell's Ford, on Bull Run, one regiment; at Centreville and another point half-way to Germantown, one brigade; at Germantown and Fairfax Court-House, one brigade, with a light battery; at the crossing of Braddock's old road with the Fairfax Court-House and Fairfax Station roads, one regiment; and at Sangster's Cross-roads, one battalion: all in easy and short communication with each other and with headquarters. Most of his small body of cavalry was with the advance, scouting and reconnoitring.

In view of coming events, General Beauregard now assembled his brigade commanders, and, after general directions to all of them, gave detailed instructions to those who had charge of the advanced positions (at Fairfax Court-House and Fairfax Station) touching their respective lines of retreat on Bull Run, in case they should be menaced by a combined serious movement of the enemy with largely superior forces. The substance of those instructions was embodied, with minute details, in a Special Order, No. 100, from the Adjutant-General's office, which was the order literally executed on the 17th of July. This is one of the most remarkable instances in military history, of an order providing fully and precisely, nearly a month in advance, for all the exigencies of a strategic movement, remotely contingent upon the operations of an enemy. General Bonham, upon the near approach of the forces confronting him, was to retire slowly on Centreville, by the turnpike, then to Mitchell's Ford, drawing the enemy after him to that point, which was the only portion of General Beauregard's line yet fortified. General Ewell, from Sangster's Crossroads and vicinity, was to follow the line of the railroad over a rather rough and difficult country road to Union Mills Ford, where the position was naturally strong and offered good cover to his men. The intermediate fords, McLean's and Blackburn's, were at that time occupied by Jones's and Longstreet's brigades. Early's brigade, which had been watching the fords of the Occoquan and the approaches on the right, was now held in reserve, a short distance in rear of Union Mills Ford, to act according to circumstances. A small force of infantry guarded the stone bridge, on the extreme left, where the turnpike from Alexandria, through Fairfax Court-House and Centreville, crosses Bull Run, on its way to Warrenton. The works, armed with naval guns, were manned by the seamen already alluded to, and also by a force of the State militia, which Governor Letcher had called out, at General Beauregard's request.

During the latter days of June and the first fortnight of July, thorough reconnoissances were made of the whole region of country likely to become the theatre of war in that quarter, either for a defensive or offensive campaign. In these General Beauregard had the effective aid of Colonel Williamson and Captains D. B. Harris and Walter H. Stevens, of the Engineers. And it may be of interest to mention here, that the reconnoissances we speak of included the surroundings of Leesburg and the passes westward, as well as the entire square between Difficult Run, the Potomac, Goose Creek, and Gum Spring. The object was to facilitate the movement of troops in that direction, to cross the Potomac, and be prepared to oppose the enemy, should he attempt to advance by that way so as to reach the Manassas Gap Railroad, on the left of General Beauregard's position.

In one of these reconnoissances, made in force—Colonel Maxey Gregg, at the head of a South Carolina regiment, casually encountered a Federal command, under General Schenck, coming into Vienna Station, on a train of cars. A shot from a section of Kemper's light battery brought them to a halt, and, after a few exchanges, the Federals retired, and the locomotive escaped, leaving the cars, which were burned. This was the first hostile meeting, excepting the brilliant midnight dash of Lieutenant Tompkins against the Confederate outposts at Fairfax Court-House.

On the 4th of July the Confederate pickets, well in advance of Fairfax Court-House, captured a sergeant and a private—the latter a Scotchman, who chanced to be a clerk in McDowell's Adjutant-General's office, and whose duty as such was to assist in making up the army returns. They were taking a ride for pleasure, and, having come a little too far, were picked up by the watchful cavalry. The Scotchman at once stated his position, and, being sent to headquarters, was there subjected to a close examination, in which he spoke freely, and appeared, from his statements on matters already known, to be telling the truth. Thus was Mc-Dowell's strength, at that date, pretty accurately ascertained; and events verified the correctness of the information thus obtained.

The increasing forces of McDowell, the clamor of the Northern press for an advance, and the private reports from Washington, all now indicated an early attack by an army more than twice the strength of ours in numbers. And General Beauregard, in the midst of his various solicitudes, balked in his endeavors to procure the needed reinforcements, and grieved also at his unsuccessful attempts to induce the government to adopt his views, wrote the following letter to his friend, Senator Wigfall. It shows General Beauregard's unrelieved anxiety, and his determination, while wishing and laboring for a better state of things, to make the most of his limited means:

Manassas Junction, Va., July 8th, 1861. Colonel Wigfall:

My dear Colonel,—I believe we are about to be attacked by the enemy, who has been increasing his forces rapidly in the last few days. He has doubtless at present, on this side of the Potomac, at least 30,000 men, and probably as many in or about Washington; and I am informed on good authority that he is crossing over reinforcements in large numbers every night, so that very shortly we will be attacked, probably by about 40,000 men! What do you suppose is my effective force to resist this attack? About 15,000 effective men! How can it be expected that I shall be able to maintain my ground unless reinforced immediately? I am determined to give the enemy battle no matter at what odds against us; but is it right and proper to sacrifice so many valuable lives (and perhaps our cause) without the least prospect of success? But I hope it may have the effect, at least, of delaying the advance of the enemy, and give our friends time to come to the rescue. I have to apply two or three times for the most essential things required here. To obtain anything with despatch, I have to send a special messenger to Richmond. Is this the way to direct and control the operations of an army in the field? Cannot this evil be remedied? I am sure it could be if properly represented to the President.

I fear General Johnston is no better off than I am; but his section of country is, I believe, more easily defended, being wooded and mountainous. My troops are in fine spirits and anxious for a fight. They seem to have the most unbounded confidence in me.

Oh, that I had the genius of a Napoleon, to be more worthy of our cause and of their confidence!

If I could only get the enemy to attack me, as I am trying to have him do, I would stake my reputation on the handsomest victory that could be hoped for. Yours very truly,

The following letter, written a few days later, is also of particular interest:

Headquarters army of the Potomac, Manassas Junction, July 11th, 1861.

To His Excellency Jefferson Davis:

Sir,— I have the honor to transmit herewith the Field Return of the army under my command, from which you will perceive the effective force at my disposition is as follows: Light Artillery, 533, with 27 pieces; Cavalry, 1425; Foot Artillery, 293; and Infantry, 16,150; in all 18,401 men of all arms. From this must be deducted the command of Colonel Hunton at Leesburg, of some 445 men, who will remain in position there until the enemy shall have advanced to attack my outposts, when the colonel will fall back and unite his force with that of Colonel Cocke, commanding the 5th Brigade at the stone bridge across Bull Run. Colonel Sloan's regiment, 4th South Carolina Volunteers, has already fallen back from Leesburg to Frying-pan Church, preparatory to a junction with Colonel Cocke, at Centreville.

I have every reason to believe that the enemy will begin his advance from his present position, at or about Falls Church, to-morrow or on the following day, with a force not short of 35,000 men, supported by a reserve of not less than 15,000 infantry. To these I can oppose but about 16,500, reserving about 1500, merely for camp guards, pickets, and the garrison of the intrenched camp here. In consequence of this great disparity in numbers, I have issued the Special Order No. 100, enclosed herewith, concentrating my troops, in the exigency, on the naturally strong positions enumerated therein, afforded by Bull Run, in the hope of conducting the movement so as to induce the enemy to offer me battle in front of Mitchell's Ford, where his numerical superiority would be materially counterbalanced by the difficulties of the ground and my previous preparations there for the event. But I am, however, inclined to believe he may attempt to turn my left flank, by a movement in the direction of Vienna, Frying-pan Church, and, possibly, Gum Spring, and thus cut off Johnston's line of retreat on and communications with this place, via the Manassas Gap Railroad, while threatening my own communications with Richmond and depots of supply, by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and opening his communications with the Potomac through Leesburg and Edward's Ferry.

Of course, if I had sufficient force, one less unequal to that of the enemy, I would not permit him, with impunity, to attempt so dangerous a movement on his part; but, in view of the odds against me, and of the vital importance at this juncture of avoiding the hazard of a defeat, which would open to the enemy the way to Richmond, I shall act with extreme caution, If forced, however, to retire before an overwhelming force by another route than the railroad, my line of retreat can be taken at any time through Brentsville to a junction with Brigadier-General Holmes, at or near Fredericksburg, whence we could operate on the line of communication of the enemy on their advance, so as, at least, to retard him by the way. In that event, if deemed expedient, I could leave a suitable garrison in the intrenchments here, to occupy him and retard his advance the longer, but with orders to spike our guns and follow in my rear until effecting a reunion with me. In presenting the foregoing to the consideration of your Excellency, I wish it distinctly understood, however, that if the enemy should offer battle on the line of Bull Run, I shall accept it for my command, against whatsoever odds he may array in my front.

Respectfully, Sir, your obedient servant.

A day or two after sending to the President the communication given at the end of the preceding chapter, General Beauregard, still hoping to obtain the government's assent to the concentration of our forces, in view of the impending offensive movement of the enemy, despatched to Richmond an aide-de-camp, Colonel John S. Preston, of South Carolina, a gentleman of ability and much personal weight, with special instructions to urge the absolute and immediate necessity of adopting his plan of operations.

No sooner had Colonel Preston left Manassas, than General Beauregard, engrossed with the all-absorbing idea of concentration—and, from information hourly received, certain of its wisdom —felt it impossible to remain passively on the defensive, while he had the opportunity of dealing a series of aggressive blows on the enemy, likely to produce decisive results favorable to the Confederate States. He therefore enlarged his plan of campaign, basing it partly upon the increased strength of our army, and sent another of his aids, Colonel James R. Chestnut, to present and explain it to the President. A memorandum, written by General (then Colonel) Samuel Jones, under General Beauregard's dictation, and containing the substance of all the instructions given to Colonel Chestnut, had been handed to the latter, to assist his memory, and prevent any misconception as to the main features of the projected campaign.

It is well for the truth of history, that these precautionary measures were taken at that time; for, as will be seen further on in this work, Mr. Davis, who claims, even now, that the great question of uniting the two armies was decided at Richmond, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 347. (which seems to mean decided at Richmond by Mr. Davis), subsequently denied that any such plan had ever been presented to him, and that his alleged refusal to approve it could, in no manner or form, have thwarted General Beauregard's efforts at concentration.

General Beauregard's anxiety was intense while awaiting the return of his messengers. He knew that each moment was of vital importance, and that the fate of our cause hung in the balance. First came telegrams from Colonels Preston and Chestnut, stating that the communication was before the President, who was giving it his careful consideration.

See Appendix to Chapter VIII.

After the check received at Bull Run, on July 18th, the Federal army remained inactive throughout the 19th and 20th, except in efforts to reconnoitre and determine the Confederate position and the best point for penetrating or turning it. This prolonged delay, though somewhat unaccountable, under the circumstances, was, certainly, of great advantage to General Beauregard. It allowed General Holmes to reach the theatre of operations in time, with 1265 infantry, 6 pieces of light artillery, and a company of cavalry of 90 men. General Johnston also arrived, about noon on the 20th, with Jackson's brigade,

This brigade reached Manassas Junction the evening previous. So did, at a later hour, the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments.

General Johnston was now the ranking officer at Manassas; nevertheless, as General Beauregard had already made all his plans and arrangements for the maintenance of the position, of which General Johnston was, as yet, completely uninformed, he declined assuming the responsibilities of the command until after the impending battle, but offered General Beauregard his personal services on the field, which were cordially accepted. General Beauregard thereupon explained his plan of operations, which was agreed to, and he continued his active preparations for the hourly expected conflict.

The question about to be tested was, whether our great struggle for independence should win life and honor, or fail in disaster and ruin. One or the other would necessarily be the fate of the Confederacy. Heavy, therefore, was the responsibility upon the commander who stood ready to meet the issue. What General Beauregard had urged upon the government, and so earnestly demanded, had not been accorded; the military aspect had also changed; and he was now forced to occupy that defensive position which he had tried his utmost to avoid. But McDowell's apparent hesitation in his forward movement, the confidence General Beauregard had in his troops and in the wisdom of his order of battle, were most encouraging, and justified him in looking hopefully and fearlessly to the result.

Our line remained the same as on the 18th, except as modified by the distribution of the newly arrived reinforcements. General Holmes's brigade, the 2d Tennessee and 1st Arkansas regiments were placed in rear of Ewell. Early's brigade was shifted from the rear of Ewell to the rear of Jones's brigade; Longstreet was supported by Bee's and Bartow's brigades (of General Johnston's forces), posted at even distance in rear of McLean's and Blackburn's Fords; and, still farther in the rear, was Barksdale's Mississippi regiment. Bonham was supported by Jackson's brigade (of General Johnston's forces) placed at even distance in rear of Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords. Ten companies of infantry, two of cavalry, and a battery of four 6-pounders, under Rogers, had been added to Cocke's brigade, which covered the remaining fords—Island, Ball's and Lewis's—extending to the right of Evans's demi-brigade. The latter, which formed a part of Cocke's command, held the stone bridge, and covered a farm ford, about one mile above. Hampton's Legion of infantry, which had reached the army that morning (20th), was at once thrown forward to the Lewis House, as a support to any troops that might be engaged in that quarter. Two companies of Radford's cavalry were held in reserve, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, and Stuart's (of General Johnston's forces)—some three hundred men—occupied the level ground in rear, from Bonham's to Cocke's brigades. Five pieces of Walton's battery were in reserve in rear of Bee's right, and Pendleton's in rear of Bonham's extreme left.

The following table shows the composition and the total strength, in men and guns, of the Confederate forces assembled on the morning of the 21st, awaiting the conflict: 1. The Army of the Potomac, including the garrison at Camp Pickens, Manassas21,833 & 29 guns.2. The Army of the Shenandoah6,000 & 20 guns.3. General Holmes's forces1,355 & 6 guns.In all, 29,188 & 65 guns.