Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. You can also browse the collection for 25th or search for 25th in all documents.

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dan fell back as far as Halltown. My position, he said, in front of Charlestown at best was a bad one, and so much being dependent on this army, I withdrew . . . and took up a new line in front of Halltown. The rebels pressed forward, and on the 25th, seized Shepardstown, on the Potomac, twelve miles above Halltown; upon which Sheridan telegraphed: I will not give up this place, and hope to be able to strike the enemy divided . On the 26th, however, the rebels fell back from his front, and reins, where a small rebel force was able for a while to hold his two divisions. Had he succeeded in reaching Newmarket in time to intercept the broken and flying fragments of Early's command, the whole rebel army must have been destroyed. On the 25th, Early abandoned the main Valley road to his victor, and fell back by Port Republic to Brown's Gap, one of the south-eastern exits from the Blue Ridge. The national infantry advanced as far as Harrisonburg, and the cavalry was sent to Port Republ
f the rebel plans was published in the Southern newspapers, and Sherman was of course forewarned. The speech at Macon was made on the 23rd of September, and on the 27th, Sherman telegraphed it to Washington. Even on the 24th, however, Sherman had said: I have no doubt Hood has resolved to throw himself on our flanks to prevent our accumulating stores, etc. here, trusting to our not advancing into Georgia. He accordingly ordered a division at once to Rome, to protect the railroad. On the 25th, he said: Hood seems to be moving as it were to the Alabama line, leaving open to me the road to Macon, as also to Augusta. If I was sure that Savannah would be in our possession, I would be tempted to make for Milledgeville and Augusta, but I must secure what I have. Forrest, however, was now rapidly advancing towards the railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga, two hundred miles in Sherman's rear, and Grant, with his usual pugnacity, preferred to fight the enemy before the march should
ask. Thomas's opposition ceased this day. He forwarded a copy of Sherman's despatch to Grant, and although he had objected not only to the movement, but to his own position in it, he said not a word of this to the generalin-chief, but with true soldierly spirit declared: I feel confident that I can defend the line of the Tennessee with the force Sherman proposes to leave with me. . Also, I shall be ready to send Sherman all the cavalry he needs, and still have a good number left. On the 25th, Sherman sent him further instructions. I do believe you are the man best qualified to manage the affairs of Tennessee and North Mississippi. . . I can spare you the Fourth corps, and about five thousand men not fit for my purpose, but which will be well enough for garrison duty in Chattanooga, Murfreesboroa, and Nashville. What you need is a few points fortified and stocked with provisions, and a good, movable column of twenty-five thousand men that can strike in any direction. A copy of
5,500 men. See his return of November 20. Wilson distinctly states in his report: All the serviceable horses of McCook's and Garrard's divisions and Colonel Garrard's brigade were turned over to the Third [Kilpatrick's] division, and every effort was made to put it upon a thoroughly efficient footing; while the dismounted men of the First and Second divisions were ordered by rail to Louisville, Kentucky, for removal and equipment. These were the only troops dismounted for Sherman. On the 25th, Grant telegraphed to Halleck: I think it advisable to send orders to Missouri that all the troops coming from there should receive their directions from General Thomas, and not listen to conflicting orders. These instructions were promptly carried out, and Thomas was made absolute master of all the troops within his territorial command. On the 27th, he announced the approach of detachments from Missouri. As soon as Smith's troops arrive, he said, and are adjusted, I shall be ready to ta
he authority is, there is no other on the subject to which I can refer. On the morning of the 25th, Butler sent Weitzel to Porter to arrange the programme for the day. It was decided that the fleepposed. Butler, nevertheless, remained unshaken in his determination, and, on the night of the 25th, he embarked all his troops except Curtis's command, when the surf became high, and he sailed awanced and the landing effected, before any reinforcements reached the fort. On the morning of the 25th, only sixteen hundred men had arrived at Wilmington. This day General Lee telegraphed to Seddon: ashore two days after Butler left, with no support except from the guns of the squadron. On the 25th, therefore, there were thirty-five hundred men opposed to Butler's six thousand five hundred. nto the fort, of whom 250 were reserves. This makes 1,077 inside, and 550 at Sugar Loaf. On the 25th, Bragg reported Kirkland's brigade and 400 of Hagood's men arrived. Hoke's effective strength wa
ntly risk their lives, must expect sometimes to put even their reputations in jeopardy. On the 25th, Grant said to Halleck: It is well enough to occupy Georgetown until Sherman is in communication oper alacrity in this respect, I would have no objection to seeing the enemy get through. On the 25th, he said: Deserters from the rebel lines north of the James say it is reported among them that Hiave a very bad effect upon the troops who remain, and give rise to painful apprehensions. On the 25th, he said: Hundreds of men are deserting nightly, and I cannot keep the army together unless exampd the road being clear, the army moved to Goldsboro, where Schofield had already arrived. On the 25th, the road from Newbern was complete, and the first train of cars came up from the coast. Shermanent to pay him a visit at City Point. Lincoln assented at once, and arrived on the 22nd. On the 25th, Sherman, leaving Schofield in command, also started for City Point. He had not been summoned, b
d to the Boydton road, Grant concluded that the rebel lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated, if his estimate of Lee's forces was correct. Wright and Parke reported favorably to an assault, and Grant determined, therefore, to extend his line no further, but to reinforce Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and enable him to turn the rebel flank, while the other corps assaulted the enemy's works in front. The picket line captured from Lee, after the attack on Fort Steadman, on the 25th, especially favored this design, for it threw the belligerents, at some points, so close to each other that it was but a moment's run between the lines. Preparations were accordingly made for an assault. To Sheridan he said at the same time: If your situation is such as to justify the belief that you can turn the enemy's right with the assistance of a corps of infantry entirely detached from the balance of the army, I will so detach the Fifth corps, and place the whole under your command