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Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 9. (ed. Frank Moore) 52 52 Browse Search
The Atlanta (Georgia) Campaign: May 1 - September 8, 1864., Part I: General Report. (ed. Maj. George B. Davis, Mr. Leslie J. Perry, Mr. Joseph W. Kirkley) 46 46 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 11. (ed. Frank Moore) 38 38 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 5. (ed. Frank Moore) 32 32 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 10. (ed. Frank Moore) 26 26 Browse Search
Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing) 23 23 Browse Search
Maj. Jed. Hotchkiss, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 3, Virginia (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 23 23 Browse Search
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Chapter XXII: Operations in Kentucky, Tennessee, North Mississippi, North Alabama, and Southwest Virginia. March 4-June 10, 1862. (ed. Lieut. Col. Robert N. Scott) 22 22 Browse Search
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2. 22 22 Browse Search
Admiral David D. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War. 20 20 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. You can also browse the collection for 28th or search for 28th in all documents.

Your search returned 11 results in 8 document sections:

up the Weldon road seems to be a blow the enemy cannot stand. . . Watch closely, and if you find this theory correct, push with all vigor. Give the enemy no rest, and if it is possible to follow to the Virginia Central road—follow that far. On the 26th of August, Lee made his last attempt, at Ream's station, to regain possession of the Weldon road. Unsuccessful there, and finding his plans frustrated in the Valley, he at once, as Grant had foreseen, directed the return of Anderson. On the 28th, Grant telegraphed to Sheridan: If you are so situated as to feel the enemy strongly without compromising the safety of your position, I think it advisable to do so. I do not know positively that any troops have yet returned from the Valley, but think you will find the enemy in your immediate front weaker than you are. Meanwhile, there were rumors that a part of Early's force had been sent west of the Alleghanies, and Grant meant to lose no opportunity. On the 29th, he ordered Sheridan:
cially against Sherman. Troops should be got to Sherman as rapidly as the lines of communication will carry them. If there are no troops in the Western states, then send them there from further East. On the same day, Sherman announced: Forrest has got into Middle Tennessee, and will, I feel certain, get on my main road to-night or to-morrow; but I will guard well from this back to Chattanooga, and trust to troops coming up from Kentucky to hold Nashville and forward to Chattanooga. On the 28th, he sent Thomas in person back to Chattanooga, to supervise operations in Middle Tennessee. It would indeed have been a sad ending to Sherman's brilliant campaign, to have lost his army in the heart of Georgia, for want of supplies, or to have been forced to make his way back to the Tennessee, discomfited and repelled. Armies larger than his and as successful at the start, had met such a fate before, in history; some in this very war; and on such a result the rebel President and his new
herefore deemed it advisable to withdraw. This decision was approved by Meade, and was in conformity with the orders and intentions of Grant when he left the field. Hancock began moving at ten P. M., and Warren at one o'clock; and by noon of the 28th, the whole army was back in its former camps. It is stated by rebel writers that during the night of the 27th, Lee massed 15,000 infantry and all of Hampton's cavalry opposite Hancock, with a view of crushing the Second corps in the morning; bu might have enabled us after all to have gained the end we started for. The enemy attacking rather indicates that he has been touched in a weak point. Do not change, however, the directions that have been given. To Stanton, he telegraphed on the 28th: The attack on General Hancock, now that a report is received, proves to be a decided success. He repulsed the enemy and remained in position, holding possession of the field until midnight, when he commenced withdrawing. Orders had been given f
l the crossings in the neighborhood of Columbia, Stanley was placed in reserve on the Franklin road, to keep open communication in that direction, and the cavalry, under Wilson, covered the crossings on the left or east of the command. But on the 28th, the rebel cavalry succeeded in pressing Wilson back, and effected a crossing at Hewey's Mills, five miles above Columbia, and by daybreak on the 29th, Hood's infantry was following in force. From Hewey's Mills a road leads direct to Spring Hill,r. Wood's corps kept well closed up with the cavalry, but Smith followed no further than Pulaski, and Schofield remained at Columbia. On the 27th of December, the whole rebel army, including the rearguard, crossed the Tennessee river, and on the 28th, Thomas directed further pursuit to cease. On that day, the advanced guard of the cavalry reached the Tennessee, just in time to see the rebel pontoons swing to the other side. My authorities for this account of the battle of Nashville, are a
ent, he said, can be undertaken, and but a temporary defence of our scattered posts. If no more means can be had, our only policy is to make sacrifices and concentrate. The country is being utterly devastated, wherever the enemy moves. On the 28th, the adjutant-general at Richmond said to the commander at Charleston, now clamoring for help: You must be as fully aware as the authorities here that there are no reinforcements that can be sent you. On the 29th, Hardee telegraphed from Savannah when the surf became high, and he sailed away, leaving these ashore. They were under cover of the gunboats, he said, and I have no doubt they are all safely off. Butler to Grant, December 27. On the 27th, he arrived at Fort Monroe, and on the 28th, had an interview with Grant, after which the general-in-chief telegraphed to the President: The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. Many of the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of the expeditio
hink the cause desperate, and write to the soldiers advising them to take care of themselves, assuring them that, if they will return home, the bands of deserters so far outnumber the home guards that they will be in no danger of arrest. . . . These desertions have a very bad effect upon the troops who remain, and give rise to painful apprehensions. On the 25th, he said: Hundreds of men are deserting nightly, and I cannot keep the army together unless examples are made of such cases. On the 28th, he reported twelve hundred more. One hundred and seventy-eight in one division are reported to have gone over to the enemy. In addition to the above . . . on the night of the 26th, from seventy-five to one hundred deserted. . . . These men generally went off in bands, taking arms and ammunition, and I regret to say that the greatest number of desertions have occurred among the North Carolina troops, who have fought as gallantly as any soldiers in the army. . . . I shall do all in my power
felt that the fates were against them, and it mattered little what they did—their doom was close at hand. To this condition had the strategy and persistency of Grant reduced his opponents. This battle made no difference whatever in Grant's plans. The army was to move on the 29th of March, and the orders remained unchanged. On the night of the 27th, Ord left the trenches north of the James, and, by daylight on the 29th, he had reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's run. On the 28th, Grant instructed Sheridan: The Fifth corps will move by the Vaughan road at three A. M. to-morrow morning. The Second moves at about nine A. M., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth corps. . . . Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or through Di
entrenched lines. . . . I shall go along myself, and will take advantage of anything that turns up. If Lee detaches, I will attack, or if he comes out of his lines, I will endeavor to repulse him, and follow it up to the best advantage. It would be difficult to find words to describe more exactly the operations which actually occurred than these written in advance. The same general ideas, pervaded by the same spirit, were communicated to Sherman in person, when he visited City Point on the 28th; were explained to Lincoln, and again included in the final instructions to Meade and Sheridan and Ord. In all there was the same definiteness of outline and aim which always characterized Grant's strategy, and the same distinct intention to take advantage of emergencies as yet unforeseen. When the campaign began, everything proceeded regularly towards the designed consummation. The very difficulties and delays of the first three days facilitated the development of the plan. The dangers