le was done, and here a determined effort of the Federal cavalry to reach the right rear of the Confederate army on the 3d of July was frustrated — an attempt which, if successful, must have resulted disastrously to that army.
The meagerness of thigadier, I succeeded to the command of Hood's division, and directed its movements during the engagements of the 2d and 3d of July.
But owing to the active and constant movements of our army for some weeks after the battle, I was only able to obtain to a direct attack.
The whole matter then resolves itself into this: General Lee failed at Gettysburg on the 2d and 3d of July because he made his attack precisely where his enemy wanted him to make it and was most fully prepared to receive it. Eoud that hung so darkly over the field of Gettysburg after the disastrous charge of Pickett.
Late in the afternoon of July 3d I was ordered to withdraw the division from the lines it had held since the evening of the 2d to the ridge near the Emmi