they sing another tune.Cf.
Phaedr. 241 AA)/LLOS
GEGONW/S, Demosth. xxxiv. 13E(/TEROS
H)/DH . . . KAI\ OU)X O( AU)TO/S.”
“Yes indeed,” he said. “Throughout their
lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They
are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes
Nigrinus 15A)/GEUSTOS ME\N
E)LEUQERI/AS, A)PEI/RATOS DE\
1176 b 19, 1179 b
15. or true friendship.” “Quite
so.” “May we not rightly call such men faithlessCf. Laws 730 C, 705
A.?” “Of course.” “Yes, and
“ Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic.
1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on
Stoics, Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 A), Renan,
Avenir de Ia science, p. 8.
Isoc.Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes only the
three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf.
1176 a 31, 1177 a
10, and supra,Introd. pp. liv-lv. of men also are
three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the
lover of gain.” “Precisely so” “And
also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to
each?” “By all means.” “Are you
aware, then” said I, “that if you should choose to ask
nsider it thus: By what are
things to be judged, if they are to be judgedi.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 DDI' OU(=, Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh.
Hypotyp. ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math.
vii. 335). Cf. Diog. L.Prologue 21, and
Laches 184 E. For the idea that the better judge cf. also
Laws 663 C, Aristot.Eth. Nic.
1176 a 16-19. rightly? Is it not by
experience, intelligence and discussionCf.
582 D, On Virtue 373 D, Xen.Mem. iii. 3.
11.? Or could anyone name a better criterion than
these?” “How could he?” he said.
“Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most
experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of