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Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing) 88 88 Browse Search
Lucius R. Paige, History of Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1630-1877, with a genealogical register 51 51 Browse Search
George Bancroft, History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent, Vol. 4, 15th edition. 44 44 Browse Search
HISTORY OF THE TOWN OF MEDFORD, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT, IN 1630, TO THE PRESENT TIME, 1855. (ed. Charles Brooks) 13 13 Browse Search
Knight's Mechanical Encyclopedia (ed. Knight) 10 10 Browse Search
Benjamin Cutter, William R. Cutter, History of the town of Arlington, Massachusetts, ormerly the second precinct in Cambridge, or District of Menotomy, afterward the town of West Cambridge. 1635-1879 with a genealogical register of the inhabitants of the precinct. 8 8 Browse Search
Cambridge History of American Literature: volume 1, Colonial and Revolutionary Literature: Early National Literature: Part I (ed. Trent, William Peterfield, 1862-1939., Erskine, John, 1879-1951., Sherman, Stuart Pratt, 1881-1926., Van Doren, Carl, 1885-1950.) 8 8 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 5 5 Browse Search
Medford Historical Society Papers, Volume 9. 4 4 Browse Search
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 4 4 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia.. You can also browse the collection for 1757 AD or search for 1757 AD in all documents.

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H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
on took an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of Napoleon and Grouchy. Diverging lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in 1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Ratisbon in 1809. Interior lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extraneous circumstances of the campaign. There may, however, be cases where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus, Lille suspended for a whole year the operations of Prince Eugene and Marlborough; the siege of Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of changing the fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France her monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian conquests; Metz, in 1552, arrested the entire power of Charles V., and saved France from destruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to the brink of ruin; St. Jean d'acre, in 1799, stopped the successful career of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal, enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy; Strasburg has often been the bulwark of the French against Germany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation. In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm
ositions least liable to attack. 3d. All great depots should be placed on navigable rivers, canals, railways, or practical roads, communicating with the line of operations, so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity, as the army advances on this line. 4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days, otherwise the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed to great inconveniences. Templehoff says that the great Frederick, in the campaign of 1757, always carried in the Prussian provision-train bread for six, and flour for nine days, and was therefore never at a loss for means to subsist his forces, in. undertaking any sudden and decisive operation. The Roman soldier usually carried with him provisions for fifteen days. Napoleon says, Experience has proved that an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days food being carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days by the train of wagons; so that at l
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 8: our northern frontier defences.—Brief description of the fortifications on the frontier, and an analysis of our northern campaigns. (search)
kes connecting the St. Lawrence with the Mississippi, and Canada with Louisiana; moreover, by means of Fort Du Quesne and a line of auxiliary works, their ascendency over the Indians on the Ohio was well secured. But experience had at length taught the English wherein lay the great strength of their opponents, and a powerful effort was now to be made to displace the French from their fortresses, or at least to counterbalance these works by a vast and overwhelming superiority of troops. In 1757, a British fleet of fifteen ships of the line, eighteen frigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land force of twelve thousand effective men, were sent to attempt the reduction of the fortifications of Louisburg; but they failed to effect their object. In 1758 the forces sent against this place consisted of twenty ships of the line and eighteen frigates, with an army of fourteen thousand men. The harbor was defended by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gun ship, and five frigates, th
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 14: field-engineering.—Field Fortifications.—Military Communications.—Military Bridges.—Sapping, Mining, and the attack and defence of a fortified place (search)
nd that Indian-rubber boats may be used as supports for the bridge. The engineer department of our army are making experiments to determine this point. Under favorable circumstances, and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers, the bridge may be thrown across the river, and prepared for the passage of an army in a few hours at most. In 1746, three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the Po, near Placentia, each fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirely completed in eight hours. In 1757, two bridges of bateaux were thrown across the Rhine, at Wesel, in half an hour; again, in the same year, a third bridge was thrown across this river near Dusseldorf, in six hours. In 1841, Col. Birago, of the Austrian army, arrived on the bank of the Weisgerben arm of the Danube, with his bridge-equipage, at a round trot, and immediately began the construction of his bridge, without any previous preparation or examination. In less than three-quarters of an hour the bridge was completed, and