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Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing) 147 147 Browse Search
Lucius R. Paige, History of Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1630-1877, with a genealogical register 52 52 Browse Search
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 28 28 Browse Search
Benjamin Cutter, William R. Cutter, History of the town of Arlington, Massachusetts, ormerly the second precinct in Cambridge, or District of Menotomy, afterward the town of West Cambridge. 1635-1879 with a genealogical register of the inhabitants of the precinct. 23 23 Browse Search
Knight's Mechanical Encyclopedia (ed. Knight) 20 20 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 17 17 Browse Search
HISTORY OF THE TOWN OF MEDFORD, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT, IN 1630, TO THE PRESENT TIME, 1855. (ed. Charles Brooks) 14 14 Browse Search
Francis Jackson Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879; the story of his life told by his children: volume 1 9 9 Browse Search
Francis Jackson Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879; the story of his life told by his children: volume 2 8 8 Browse Search
Cambridge History of American Literature: volume 3 (ed. Trent, William Peterfield, 1862-1939., Erskine, John, 1879-1951., Sherman, Stuart Pratt, 1881-1926., Van Doren, Carl, 1885-1950.) 8 8 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). You can also browse the collection for 1805 AD or search for 1805 AD in all documents.

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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Advertisement (search)
he science somewhat scattered in the narration of those campaigns; but, as for myself, I confess I have profited much more from the attentive reading of a discussed campaign, than from all the dogmatic works put together; and my book, published in 1805, was designed for officers of a superior grade, and not for schoolboys. The war with Austria supervening the same year, did not permit me to give the work all the care desirable, and I was able to execute but a part of my project. Some years aich does as much honor to the illustrious prince as the battles which he has gained, put the complement to the basis of the strategic science, of which Lloyd and Bulow had first raised the veil, and of which I had indicated the first principles in 1805, in a chapter upon lines of operations, and in 1807, in a chapter upon the fundamental principles of the art of war, printed by itself at Glogau in Silesia. The fall of Napoleon, by giving up many studious officers to the leisures of peace, bec
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
terest; those troops, thrown far from their base, were at the mercy of a good or bad manoeuvre of their allies. Such remote excursions expose to dangers, and are ordinarily very delicate for the general of an army. The campaign of 1799, and of 1805, furnished sad proofs of this, which we shall recall in treating of those expeditions under the military aspect, (art. 30.) It results from these examples, that those remote interventions often compromise the armies which are charged with them; se. If policy is especially decisive in remote expeditions, that is not saying that it is without influence even upon contiguous invasions, for a hostile intervention may arrest the most brilliant career of success. The invasions of Austria in 1805 and 1809, would probably have taken another turn if Prussia had intervened in them; that of the north of Germany in 1807, depended equally as much upon the cabinet of Vienna. Finally, that of Romelia in 1829, assured by measures of a wise and mod
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
lementary treatise, and remain yet to be developed. Lloyd, who has made on them an essay in the fifth part of his Memoirs, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe has not been happy in his sayings and his predictions; he sees obstacles everywhere; he presents, among others, as impregnable, the frontiers of Austria upon the Inn, between the Tyrol and Passau, where we have seen Moreau and Napoleon manoeuvre, and triumph with armies of a hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805 and 1809. The greater part of those reasonings are open to the same criticism; he has seen things too materially. But if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the European staffs must be rich with valuable documents for teaching them, at least in the special schools of this corps. In waiting for some studious officer to profit from those documents, published or unpublished, for giving the public a good military and strategical geography, it may, thanks to the immense
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
for example, Mack, being found concentrated in 1805, near Ulm, and awaiting the Russian army by Morlosely the first publication of this chapter in 1805, I believe that the following maxims may be dedon which he knew how to assign to his masses in 1805, on Donauwerth, and in 1806 on Gera; skillful mfrom the departure from the camp of Boulogne in 1805, to the arrival upon the plains of Moravia, and exercised a great influence upon the events of 1805 and 1809 if it had existed at that epoch, for t yet present to the memory of every body. In 1805, Napoleon occupied Naples and Hanover; the Allitowards his centre by Friburg in Brisgau. In 1805, Napoleon, master of Vienna, threw the corps ofmitted to recall the one which Napoleon made in 1805, to cut off Mack from Ulm; if it were facilitat00, or the taking of Leutasch, and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, who threw himself with fourteen thousan which assured the success of Napoleon in 1800, 1805 and 1806, by the direction given to his forces [5 more...]
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
t any one having thought of turning him. At Rivoli the turners were completely beaten, and they were not more happy either at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805. As will be seen in Art. 33, I am far from rejecting manoeuvres tending to outflank and to turn a wing, for I have constantly insisted upon them, but it is importie-Sainte, and the stream of Papelotte, presented to Ney obstacles more serious than the famous position of Elchingen, where he forced the passage of the Danube in 1805, upon the remnant of a burnt bridge. The courage of the defenders could, in fact, not have been absolutely equal in the two circumstances; but, apart from this chrring important passages, like the two attacks which took place in 1799 upon the Fort of Lucisteig in the Grisons; the taking of Leutasch and of Sharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally the carrying of a post not fortified even but which should serve as g<*> depot for provisions and munitions indispensable to the enemy, such<*> the enterp
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
han if he changed direction too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donanwerth and Ingolstadt, in 1805, was an operation nearly of the same kind; the direction chosen became the first cause of the destruction of the army of Mr him than that where he is found; it is a prudent manoeuvre rather than a retreat. It was thus that Napoleon retired, in 1805, from Wischan upon Brunn, in order to lead the allies upon the point which suited him. It was thus that Wellington retreateing defended by lateral movements. This assertion has received, as we have said, cruel denials in the campaigns of 1800, 1805 and 1809, but as the lateral defense has not been precisely well attempted there, the question is still susceptible of conshed for the study of military men and statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France from 1803 to 1805, will be one of the most extraordinary monuments of the activity, foresight and skill of Napoleon; they cannot be too high
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
armont, detached to the right, and that of Augereau detached to the left, were disposable for acting upon the flanks. But from the passage of the Danube at Donauwert, all was disordered; Ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the main body was dislocated, part to the right, a part to the left, so that this fine order of battle became useless. It will ever be difficult to give an organization at all stable; meanwhile events are not always as complicated as those of 1805, and the campaign of Moreau in 1800, proves that the primitive organization can, to a certain point, be maintained, at least for the bulk of the army. To this end it seems that the organization of the army into four fractions, viz: two wings, a centre, and a reserve, is the only rational one; the composition of those fractions may vary according to the strength of the army, but in order to be able to maintain it, it will be indispensable to have a certain number of divisions out of line, to