dent in history, and the basic principle upon which it rests being that of the possibility of a divided sovereignty—a thing therefore by all and since by many, deemed an impossibility — the Federal Government to be supreme with respect to certain—sovereign powers delegated to it and surrendered by the States; and the State Governments, or the people thereunder, to remain sovereign and supreme with respect to certain powers not delegated to the States, or to the people thereof—it needed no Cassandra to foretell that long years of debate, and, perchance, the trial by wage of battle, would be needed to define and fix the resultant effect of so momentous an innovation in matters of government.
And this indeed has come to pass.
Was the delegation and surrender by the States of a portion of their sovereign power to the Federal Government absolute—irrevocable?
Upon this pivotal question the decision turned.
That it was not so intended by the framers of the Federal Constitution,