mination of the works at the two forts.
He reported that Fort Henry was nearly completed.
It was built, not at the most favorable position, but it was a strong work, and, instead of abandoning it and building at another place, he advised that it should be completed, and other works constructed on the high lands just above the fort on the opposite side of the river.
Measures for the accomplishment of this plan were adopted as rapidly as the means at disposal would allow.
In relation to Donelson, it was his opinion that, although a better position might have been chosen for this fortification on the Cumberland, under the circumstances surrounding the command, it would be better to retain and strengthen the position chosen.
General Polk, in a report to General Johnston just previous to the battle of Shiloh, said: The principal difficulty in the way of a successful defense of the rivers, was the want of an adequate force—a force of infantry and a force of experienced artillerists.
and Hardee, as to the future plan of campaign.
It was determined, as Fort Henry had fallen and Donelson was untenable, that preparations should at once be made for a removal of the army to Nashville,and general rains.
By the junction of the command of General Crittenden and the fugitives from Donelson, who were reorganized, the force of General Johnston was increased to seventeen thousand men. nd to Murfreesboro, where I managed, by assembling Crittenden's division and the fugitives from Donelson, to collect an army able to offer battle.
The weather was inclement, the floods excessive, andot possess.
There are yet those who, self-assured, demand why Johnston did not go himself to Donelson and Henry, and why his forces were not there concentrated.
A slight inspection of the map woule overestimated.
It has been seen how these advantages were utilized by the enemy at Henry and Donelson, and not less did they avail him at Shiloh.
As has been elsewhere explained, the condition o