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The Photographic History of The Civil War: in ten volumes, Thousands of Scenes Photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, Volume 3: The Decisive Battles. (ed. Francis Trevelyan Miller) 8 0 Browse Search
The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South (ed. Alexander Kelly McClure) 4 0 Browse Search
Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing) 4 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 18. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 4 0 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 2. (ed. Frank Moore) 2 0 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 2 0 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 8. (ed. Frank Moore) 2 0 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 7. (ed. Frank Moore) 2 0 Browse Search
The Photographic History of The Civil War: in ten volumes, Thousands of Scenes Photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, Volume 4: The Cavalry (ed. Francis Trevelyan Miller) 2 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: October 12, 1863., [Electronic resource] 2 0 Browse Search
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The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South (ed. Alexander Kelly McClure), The First great crime of the War. (search)
n up by Hon. Andrew Johnson, then a member of the committee, who demonstrated that a force of 50,000 men ought to be detached from the Army of the Potomac, marched through Leesburg, thence southwest through West Virginia, so as to reach and set free from the rebels East Tennessee. The matter of transportation and provisions in a march through such a country was below the attention of the committee, and any suggestion looking to difficulty in that direction was considered as an indication of Fabian policy. General McClellan's position during this period was one of great difficulty and delicacy. He had determined upon a plan of campaign which involved a delay of movement of the armies until spring. The delay being misunderstood, his enemies, who, in some noted cases, pretended to be his best friends, quietly insinuated that he was not the man for the position. The duties of his command were excessively harassing, and the undercurrent of detraction began to come to the surface, an
The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South (ed. Alexander Kelly McClure), The Union men of Maryland. (search)
a fealty to the Union. There were many secessionists — not a few, able, earnest, and fearless; but the real, true sentiment of the mass of the people was on the other side. Governor Hicks, too, notwithstanding some mistakes, and despite the overawing of him on the 19th of April, was a Union man to the core. I knew him well, and for more than three years had been in almost daily intercourse with him. In dealing with the Union question he had endeavored to practice in the State the same Fabian tactics that President Lincoln so successfully carried out in his management of National affairs. This policy on the part of the Governor was a wise one-at least it was so up to the 18th of April, 1861. He paid respect to the opinions and humored the prejudices of the great body of his people, being himself, in fact, one of them. He possessed great personal popularity. His appearance told much in his favor. He had a downright honest look — a very John Bull he was-softened with a most b
which they absolutely required at his hands has disappointed them. The same people who a month ago curled the lip in scorn at General Johnston's sloth and want of energy, and praised General Hood's course from the beginning of the war, now shrug their unmilitary shoulders, whose straps have never graced a battle-field, and pronounce the change unfortunate and uncalled for. General Hood, they say, was an admirable Brigadier, but his promotion was most unfortunate ; while General Johnston's Fabian policy is now pronounced the very thing for the situation the course which would have saved Atlanta, and have made all right. This may all be true, but it is very distressing to hear it harped upon now; quite as much so as it was six weeks ago to hear the President called obstinate, because he was ruining the country by not removing General J. But I will no longer make myself uneasy about what I hear, for I have implicit confidence in our leaders, both in the Cabinet and on the field. Were
onnect Richmond with the North. Indeed, I had deemed the demonstration of the rebels on the previous day but so much of an incentive to advance brave troops as a general might desire. The blood of the men was set coursing, the dispositions were admirable, and the coolness of the General, his officers and attendant aids-de-camp, such as to inspire confidence in the men. There was nothing which should deter the faintest heart from daring an advance. But what at first seemed a questionable Fabian policy proved to be the result of an astute understanding and a perfect comprehension of what even a few hostile troops could do in a country checkered with woods and small open fields — too small for opposing troops to operate in, but large enough, if tempted or commanded to enter them, to make their deadly marks upon ambushed enemies and masked batteries against treble their number. This I at once saw and admitted, after a couple of hours' ride, taken alone within the lines, and with the
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
russia, are examples which may serve as models. Wellington played a similar part in the Spanish peninsula. To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the advances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or provinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflict on him some fatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity; such a system is always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and cowardice; but such is far from being the true Fabian system of defensive war. Instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habitually refusing to look the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his march undisturbed; instead of abandoning, without contest, points strong by nature or by art ;--instead of all this, the true war of defence seeks every occasion to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy or defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in motion, and never unprepared for either attack or defence. When
t under the circumstances. Fresh accessions will be made to their numbers, and, with their present knowledge of the ground, they will return with fresh energy and determination to the work of putting down the rebellion. And the people at large will rally with still greater devotion to the Government, the Constitution, and the Union. In the Revolution, our troops were terribly cut up on Brooklyn Heights; yet that calamity proved the salvation of the country, since it developed the masterly Fabian system of tactics subsequently pursued by Washington.--N. Y. Commercial Advertiser. To the brave man defeat is only an argument for new effort. Our banner, which has been trailing in the dust, must be lifted up towards the stars. Overwhelming numbers have repulsed our army, after it had conquered an equal force entrenched behind earthworks and masked batteries. Our retreating columns have fallen back to Alexandria and Washington, leaving hundreds of our brave fellows on the soil where
eir attack and ravages how they please. If the six hundred troops who fled from Alexandria had imitated the brave spirit of its single defender, and had laid it in ashes rather than have surrendered it, Virginia and the South would have been in a very different position this day. Let us give over the silly idea of a war without destruction, and like the Russians of Moscow, give our enemies desolation instead of submission as the fruit of their victories. By assuming the position of the defensive, we have lost Maryland, endangered Missouri, neutralized Kentucky, and are now making Virginia our battle-field. Is this wise statesmanship? Is it efficient generalship? Fabian tactics are out of place. We trust the war policy of the South is about to become aggressive and efficient. It is time, and we are glad to see that our gallant Commander-in-Chief, after directing the preparations of the War Bureau for two months, has made Richmond his Headquarters.--Charleston Mercury, June 2.
e enemy, will be about as one to five. And so of all the other positions. But there is one view of the subject which should quiet all fears of the soldier on the score of numbers, and it is this: that it is absolutely impossible for Grant to conquer Johnston in the case supposed, because it is absolutely impossible for him to force Johnston into a fight upon ground of his own choosing. Upon the whole, then, there is no great cause of alarm to the soldier in the numbers opposed to him. The Fabian policy avoids defeat at least. 2. Superiority in Arms.--Except in artillery, I know of no advantage the enemy have of us in arms — certainly none to be feared. Of artillery I have already spoken, and shown that they are the least formidable implements of war of any that are used. For the destruction of fortifications, ships, and towns, cannon are useful; but for field service they are the most inconvenient, cumbersome, inefficient, expensive, worthless engines of war that ever were inve
r position of the Confederates at new hope church cause for grumbling both on the part of his army and of the inhabitants of the region through which he was passing. His men were eager to defend their country, and they could not understand this Fabian policy. They would have preferred defeat to these repeated retreats with no opportunity to show what they could do. Johnston, however, was wiser than his critics. The Union army was larger by far and better equipped than his own, and Shermancurate in speech. His dark firm face, surmounted by a splendidly intellectual forehead, betokened the experienced and cautious soldier. His dismissal was one of the political mistakes which too often hampered capable leaders on both sides. His Fabian policy in Georgia was precisely the same as that which was winning fame against heavy odds for Lee in Virginia. The countenance of Hood, on the other hand, indicates an eager, restless energy, an impetuosity that lacked the poise of Sherman, w
r position of the Confederates at new hope church cause for grumbling both on the part of his army and of the inhabitants of the region through which he was passing. His men were eager to defend their country, and they could not understand this Fabian policy. They would have preferred defeat to these repeated retreats with no opportunity to show what they could do. Johnston, however, was wiser than his critics. The Union army was larger by far and better equipped than his own, and Shermancurate in speech. His dark firm face, surmounted by a splendidly intellectual forehead, betokened the experienced and cautious soldier. His dismissal was one of the political mistakes which too often hampered capable leaders on both sides. His Fabian policy in Georgia was precisely the same as that which was winning fame against heavy odds for Lee in Virginia. The countenance of Hood, on the other hand, indicates an eager, restless energy, an impetuosity that lacked the poise of Sherman, w