ovements of Kirby Smith demanding the presence of all of Canby's surplus forces in another direction, has made it impossible to carry out the plan as early as was contemplated.
Any considerable force to cooperate with Sherman on the sea-coast must now be sent from here.
The question is whether, under such circumstances, Augusta and Savannah would not be a better line than Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile.
I think Savannah might be taken by surprise with one corps from here and such troops as Foster could spare from the Department of the South.
This is my view, but before giving positive orders I want to make a visit to Washington and consult a little on the subject.
All Canby can do with his present force is to make demonstrations on Mobile and up the Appalachicola toward Columbus.
He can not positively have the force to require the transportation your letters would indicate he has called for, or to consume the supplies.
Either line indicated would cut off the supplies from the ric
interesting letter of the 22d inst., brought by Major Gray, of General Foster's staff, is just at hand.
As the Major starts back at once, Iis inadequate to feed his army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures me that he has his force on that very road, near the heaps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, belonging to General Foster's command, might be moved from its then position at Broad Rivert, after receiving Hardee's letter and before any further word from Foster, that the latter held this plank road, he thought, by looking at his maps, that one of Foster's divisions might be moved down to a point from which it could reach this road; but there would be risk, since HardHarvest Moon) to Hilton Head, where I represented the matter to General Foster, and he promptly agreed to give his personal attention to it. Ddent, because the same result would be better accomplished from General Foster's position at Broad River.
The following extracts from Gen