corps alone was intrusted with the cipher in which General Thomas and I could communicate with each other by telegraph.
Neither he, nor I, nor any of our staff officers were permitted to know the telegraph code.
The work was so badly done that from eight to forty-eight hours were occupied in sending and delivering a despatch.
Finally the cipher-operator attached to my headquarters in the field deserted his post and went to Franklin, so that the time required for a messenger to ride from Franklin to my position in the field was added to the delay caused by deciphering despatches.
From all this it resulted that my superior at Nashville was able to give me little assistance during the critical days of that campaign.
It has been generally supposed that I was all that time acting under orders or instructions from General Thomas, and his numerous despatches have been quoted in histories as evidence in support of that supposition.
The fact is that I was not only without any appropriate
at a moment's notice.
It could have retired to Spring Hill or to Franklin without molestation or delay, but that would have given the enemy tion be held until Smith arrived; and another despatch designating Franklin, behind the Harpeth River, as the place to which I would have to rf his death.
I ordered them to go at full gallop down the pike to Franklin, and to ride over whatever might be found in their way. I sat motisimply to report the situation to General Thomas by telegraph from Franklin, and if any troops were at that place, as had been reported, to orreplied: You can send some of the pontoons you used at Columbia to Franklin to lay a bridge there.
War Records, Vol.
XLV, part i, p. 1108.ake operations which he thought appropriate to such an emergency.
Franklin was the last opportunity he could expect to have to reap the resulour infantry, artillery, and trains to retreat from Spring Hill to Franklin in one compact column.
A small force could not have been left at
men to the line of Duck River, or perhaps even to Franklin.
They were sent to Nashville, reaching there afte issued—that is, soon after 8 A. M.—a courier from Franklin brought me the two following despatches from Generd records say that it was telegraphed in cipher to Franklin at 9 P. M., and there deciphered and sent by couri the cipher-operator had left his post and gone to Franklin.
Hence the despatch could not be read by me in tireceived by me. If it was telegraphed in cipher to Franklin, and there deciphered and sent by courier, the samvember] 30, [1864,] 4 A. M. Captain W. J. Twining, Franklin:
Your despatch of 1 A. M. to-day is received.
ate necessity to retain him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to circumstances.
If you isk too much.
I send you a map of the environs of Franklin.
Again I telegraphed at 9:50 A. M.:
My traville, November 30, 1864. Major-General Schofield, Franklin:
General Smith reported to me this morning tha
h Kentucky of the Twenty-third Corps at Franklin, the conduct of those troops was beyond all praise.
I believe little disputes always arise out of the honorable rivalry which exists between bodies of troops acting together in a great battle.
Franklin was no exception to that general rule.
For the purpose of pouring oil on the troubled waters after Franklin, I said that in my opinion there was glory enough won in that battle to satisfy the reasonable ambition of everybody who was on the fielFranklin, I said that in my opinion there was glory enough won in that battle to satisfy the reasonable ambition of everybody who was on the field, and of some who were not there, but who were at first given the lion's share; but if the disputants were not satisfied with that, they might take whatever share of credit was supposed to be due to me, and divide it among themselves.
I was then, as I am now, perfectly satisfied with the sense of triumph which filled my soul when I saw my heroic comrades hurl back the hosts of rebellion with slaughter which to some might seem dreadful, but which I rejoiced in as being necessary to end that fra
Indeed, Thomas could have given battle the second or third day after Franklin with more than a fair prospect of success.
Considering the feeling of nervo which General Thomas's pontoon-train was sent toward Murfreesboroa instead of Franklin added somewhat to the delay, but probably did not essentially change the resul instructive comparisons that on November 30 Hood advanced from Spring Hill to Franklin and made his famous assault in just about the same length of time that it tooknd Twenty-third corps on November 29 and 30 fought two battles—Spring Hill and Franklin—and marched forty miles, from Duck River to Nashville, in thirty-six hours. Tig my troops with Stanley's, we were able to hold Hood in check at Columbia and Franklin until General Thomas could concentrate at Nashville, and also to give Hood hisrt him considerably.
Finally he got across the Duck River above, and made for Franklin via Spring Hill.
I headed him off at Spring Hill with a division, and concent
en general officers, at Franklin on November 30.
Therefore 24,000 must be a liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of Franklin.
The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin.
Hence Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater than mine.
The disparity in cavalry was still greater at first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade, which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in holding the line of Duck River.
It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own strength in infantry and in cavalry—an opportunity
ta, 247; pursuit of, 248-250; advance from Spring Hill to Franklin, 251; escape across the Tennessee, 251; Franklin his deatFranklin his death-blow, 252-254;
Thomas's inactivity toward, 255-257; purpose of pursuing him into the Gulf States, 255, 256; strength a in Tennessee, 300; effect of his delays from Columbia to Franklin, 301; illustration of his attitude toward Sherman, 305, 3ll back to, 224; delays of telegraphic communication with Franklin, 224; general feeling concerning immediate action against's omission to give proper credit to, for Spring Hill and Franklin, 279 et seq.; disappearance of papers belonging to, 280; nds, and engagements see Brentwood; Columbia; Duck River; Franklin; Harpeth River; Nashville; Pulaski; Spring Hill, and the 's omission to give proper credit to, for Spring Hill and Franklin, 279; at Pulaski, 252; telegram from Thomas, Nov. 8, 1864sion to give proper credit to Stanley for Spring Hill and Franklin, 279; report of the Tennessee campaign, 277, 279 et seq.;