ncroft's, Eakin's, Wheeler's, Hill's, and Taft's batteries, under Major Osborne.
On the left of the cemetery the batteries of the Second Corps, under Captain Hazard—namely, those of Woodruff, Arnold, Cushing, Brown, and Rorty.
Next on the left was Thomas's battery, and on his left Major McGilvray's command, consisting of Thompson's, Phillips', Hart's, Sterling's, Ranks', Dow's, and Ames' of the reserve artillery, to which was added Cooper's battery of the First Corps.
On the extreme left, Gibbs' and Rittenhouse's (late Hazlitt's) batteries.
As batteries expended their ammunition, they were replaced by batteries of the artillery reserve, sent forward by its efficient chief, Colonel R. O. Tyler. Withholding the fire until the first hostile outburst had spent itself, General Hunt then ordered the batteries to open; and thus from ridge to ridge was kept up for near two hours a Titanic combat of artillery that caused the solid fabric of the hills to labor and shake, and filled the air
on this line, Sheridan directed it to make a detour by the Boydton plankroad.
The execution of this manoeuvre appeared to the Confederates a forced retreat on the part of Devin, and, deceived by this, they made a left wheel, and were proceeding to follow him up. This tactical change caused the Confederates to present the flank and rear of their line of battle to Sheridan's force at Dinwiddie, whereupon, seizing the opportunity, he directed a charge to be made with the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs.
This unlooked — for sally compelled the Confederates to face by the rear rank and give up the movement against Devin, who was thus enabled to rejoin the main body.
Against this the Confederates now advanced with all the force of cavalry and infantry present.
In numbers the assailants were not superior to the Union cavalry, but they had an advantage in the range of the fire-arms of their infantry.
Thus placed, Sheridan displayed very commendable pluck.
Having dismounted his troopers,