Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2. You can also browse the collection for U. S. Grant or search for U. S. Grant in all documents.

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of the first day's battle at Nashville reached Grant as he stepped from the steamer at Washington, he fleet, and invested Savannah. On the 18th, Grant congratulated both his generals. To Sherman return soon to join my command with Sherman. Grant replied: The news from Thomas is in the highes so marked a feature of Thomas's character. Grant had not stinted his acknowledgments of the brintrary to the expectations or wishes of either Grant or Sherman, neither of whom considered the falce, he had not the army in front of Hood which Grant expected and Sherman had arranged. I did nogy, although it would never have been his own, Grant found no positive fault; for it was possible tndent on those in Tennessee— it was then that Grant became, first, disturbed, and finally, perempt Nashville would have been a rebel triumph. Grant, however, was the last man to quarrel with vice to the enemy he met on the opposite side. Grant knew all this well. The same traits which wer[11 more...]
had been transferred to a position from which Grant could either move them at once against Richmonno doubt they are all safely off. Butler to Grant, December 27. On the 27th, he arrived at Fort ault, however, was no disobedience of orders. Grant gave no order to any one to assault; that was above all, he had not appreciated the force of Grant's in structions in regard to remaining and entheir peremptory character. The order of General Grant to General Butler, which I saw published iace. A copy of this letter was forwarded to Grant, together with the substance of various other two persons in Washington and two officers of Grant's staff were informed of the destination of thhat they were intended for Sherman's army; and Grant telegraphed to the Secretary of War: I will inlly rising to the command of the Tenth corps. Grant desired to send against Fort Fisher the same fthat he was to reinforce Sherman. On the 3rd, Grant announced to Stanton: Here, there is not the s[45 more...]
al of Sherman's army at the coast, it had been Grant's intention to transport it by sea to Richmondstituted an object of primal importance, which Grant was far more anxious to accomplish than the ca a hero is fit to command armies. Meanwhile Grant had got word, through the rebel newspapers, fiderson was in Schofield's hands. On the 24th, Grant learned of the capture of Wilmington, and at oan those from which they had been removed; but Grant never consented that those whom he had once di These were the identical views entertained by Grant when he assumed command of the armies the yeare, which impeded and prevented the action that Grant expected of them; but greater soldiers overcamd be collected, or rebel arms be manufactured, Grant directed a national force, so that at each poi day on which Sheridan arrived at White House, Grant sent him further orders: Start for this place n as we are across Cape Fear river. Sherman to Grant, March 12. . . If I can now add Goldsboro wit[125 more...]
efore Richmond and Petersburg, March 25, 1865 Grant's disposi-tions in Virginia and North CarolinaMeade inexcusable delay of Warren chagrin of Grant Disarrangement of Sheridan's plan advance of with an effective total, which he ascribes to Grant, of 162,239. But this total of Grant's includvision. Parke's Report. Taking advantage of Grant's order allowing deserters to bring their armsl probably be able to communicate with you. Grant read these instructions himself to Sheridan, tic manner and stirring words, and knew how apt Grant was to be affected by the temper of his subordme in co-operation with you on the left. Thus Grant with his usual policy was preparing, not only e direction of Dinwiddie. At seven o'clock, Grant had further intelligence. Colonel Porter, of he describes, and with just such expedition as Grant demanded. The Fifth corps so moved, again andeuvre of the rebel general, and open a way for Grant to destroy the entire army of Northern Virgini[100 more...]
so as to prevent reinforcing against Sheridan.—Grant to Meade, April 1, 5.45 P. M. Miles's divisnnonading began, several officers arrived, and Grant remained to receive their intelligence, and wright. I am not certain that I can do that. Grant had early detected the movement of Longstreet.was repulsed at every point with severe loss. Grant now ordered up two brigades from City Point tods north of the river. The only question with Grant was, whether at once to assault the inner line orders to report to Sheridan. At 7.40 P. M., Grant said to Meade: I would send Humphreys no orderIf we can hit the bridge once, it will pay. Grant was perfectly right in his intuitions. Lee wa wherever they could find a bridge or a ford. Grant encompassed the city with his right wing, and our command up the Cox road. At the same time Grant dispatched an officer to Sheridan, announcing to the Danville road as rapidly as possible. Grant replied, at 10.20 A. M.: The troops got off fr[53 more...]
c points to strike at. On the 5th of April, Grant still marched with the army of the James. Shory cavalrymen were bivouacked along the road. Grant and his party picked their way among them, if -day. After further consideration, however, Grant could not be easy until he had seen Meade. Ththe supplies at Appomattox court-house. But Grant was at his heels. Sheridan had started from Sn of its surrender. This note was handed to Grant early on the morning of the 8th, while he was f a farmer named McLean for the interview with Grant. Information was at once sent back to Sheridall put them into writing, I will sign them. Grant then sat down at the little table and wrote the; and Sheridan, Ord, Griffin, and the men on Grant's staff, met them cordially. First, of course, the rebels were presented to Grant, who greeted them with kindness. Most of them he knew personaer and collect his scattered troops at Amelia, Grant pushed rapidly forward for the same point, on [156 more...]
o pass. On the 10th of April, in obedience to Grant's orders to push on and finish the job with Leroops, and to contrast this with what he calls Grant's, of 180,000 men; Sherman's, of 110,000 at le All proclaimed especially their admiration of Grant's generosity. Lee refused to present his petinesty until he had ascertained in advance that Grant would recommend it. The wife of Jefferson Daviwhere it could be reached by no rebel army. Grant's greatness consisted in his perception of thinks failed to cooperate at all before Mobile. Grant himself entered upon an encounter as terrible nor all these altogether would have sufficed. Grant was indeed peculiarly and fortunately placed. ould have combined strategical dispositions as Grant did during the last year of the war, or was caTo overthrow him and his desperate supporters, Grant needed more help than he could get even from tn. The former rebel chief at once appealed to Grant, who went in person to the President, and prot[46 more...]
omac. It was stated, however, that the garrisons of Harper's Ferry, Charleston, Martinsburg, and other points, together with escorts to trains, were of sufficient size to reduce the force in the field to the numbers given in Sheridan's report to Grant, which were taken at the time from the official returns of effective or fighting strength present for duty. But as these returns were never sent to Washington, and were destroyed as above stated, it was impossible to furnish copies of them. Aere of sufficient size to reduce the force in the field to the numbers given in Sheridan's report to Grant, which were taken at the time from the official returns of effective or fighting strength present for duty. But as these returns were never sent to Washington, and were destroyed as above stated, it was impossible to furnish copies of them. At Grant's Headquarters it was always understood that Sheridan's effective force in the Valley campaign was about thirty thousand men. —Author
ntends doing—whether he will move across the Ridge, send a part of his force to Grant, or content himself with protecting the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. If he movn the east of the mountains. But what shall I do if he sends reinforcements to Grant, or remains in the lower Valley? He has laid waste nearly all of Rockingham anta for my supplies, and they are not abundant there. Sheridan's purpose, under Grant's orders, has been to render the Valley untenable by our troops by destroying purposes if he should contemplate moving across the Ridge, or sending troops to Grant. On the 13th I made a reconnoissance in force beyond Strasburg, and found the ithout compensating benefits. The Sixth corps had already begun to move off to Grant, and my movement brought it back, and Sheridan's forces are now so shattered that he will not be able to send Grant any efficient aid for some time. I think he will be afraid to trust the Eighth and Nineteenth corps. The enemy's loss in kill
Appendix to Chapter XXVIII. General Halleck to General Grant. Washington, D. C., October 2, 1864. Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point: General: Some time since General Sherman asked my opinion in regard to his operations after the capture of Atlanta. While free to give advice to the best of my ability, I felt it my Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point: General: Some time since General Sherman asked my opinion in regard to his operations after the capture of Atlanta. While free to give advice to the best of my ability, I felt it my duty to refer him to you for instructions, not being advised of your views on that subject. I presume, from his dispatches, that you have corresponded upon the subject, and perhaps his plan of future operations has already been decided upon. At one time he seemed most decidedly of opinion that he ought to operate by Montgomery Stanton.—(telegram.) New York, November 4, 1864. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: When I saw you a fortnight ago to-morrow, you told me you would ask General Grant to send me five thousand troops, of which I informed you I wished to place three thousand on the frontier, not only in reference to threatened attack, but to s