ositions to meet the central attack were painfully feeble.
Grant, with a small force, was permitted to leisurely advance andc concentration at the threatened point might have stopped Grant and probably held the line of Kentucky many months longer—sps are now distributed Vicksburg is in danger.
Later, when Grant was closing his toils around Pemberton, he peremptorially tstood or disobeyed all his orders and wholly misapprehended Grant's warfare.
The truth is that Grant outgeneraled them all. Grant outgeneraled them all. Davis' favorite was a mere child in this Union general's hands.
Confederate commanders in the West.
Davis was unfortunan was resumed by sending Longstreet to Knoxville, affording Grant ample time on exterior lines to swoop down and clean out thta campaign, says that Sherman was relatively stronger than Grant over Lee, that his own effective force was less than fifty ly observes, that like himself, Lee was falling back before Grant in Virginia, yet constantly gaining in military renown, and
g the night of the 6th the broken fragments of Grant's army were reorganized and united with Buell'Federals.
We give below the strength of General Grant's army as compiled by the War Department, various commands made just before the battle: Grant's army, present for duty, 49,314; total presennfederates for the field on Monday.
This gave Grant, on Monday, 61,110; Beauregard, on Monday, 30,tles and Leaders, Vol.
IV, page 179.)
General Grant's tactics were to flank Lee out of all his and beat him in the race to Richmond.
When Grant had crossed the river and began his flanking, ng the Rappahannock, 38,426 reinforcements.
Grant's army, then, from the day he left the Rappahald Harbor, 76,400, against Grant's 156,426.
Grant's losses, beginning at the Wilderness, includied, wounded and captured—6,215.
Summarized, Grant's losses for thirty days were as follows: Killbelow the monthly returns of the effectives of Grant's and Lee's armies for each month thereafter u