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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
vernment the most ardent in their desires for the public welfare. In the first place, to choose a skillful general, one must be a military man himself, and in condition to judge, or else refer to the judgments of others, which involves necessarily the inconvenience of coteries. The embarrassment is, doubtless, not so great, when there is at command a general already illustrious from many victories; but, besides that every general is not a great captain for having gained a battle, (witness Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it does not always happen that a State has a victorious general at its disposition. After long intervals of peace, it might chance that no European general should have commanded-in-chief. In this case, it would be difficult to know by what title one general should be preferred to another; those who, by long peace services, shall be at the head of the list, and shall have the grade requisite for commanding the army, will they be the most capable of doing it?
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
erging routes the facility with which he beat Jourdan in 1796? And, in fact, do not those routes fbinations. In 1796, the armies of Moreau and Jourdan formed two exterior lines of operations againnes of manoeuvre-operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two masses of seventy thcuted that audacious manoeuvre a month before Jourdan was in condition to second him. The Austrian on Courtrai took place the 26th of April, and Jourdan only arrived at Charleroi the 3d of June, morfor throwing all his forces upon the right of Jourdan, whom he overwhelms; the battle of Wurzburg d to that effect. The passage of the Rhine by Jourdan, in 1795, was executed near Dusseldorff, for defeat. This is what happened to Moreau and Jourdan before the Arch-Duke Charles,in 1796. Departws that the Arch-Duke triumphed in 1796, over Jourdan and Moreau, by a single march, which was the should not have been crossed. But so soon as Jourdan, in contempt of that camp, showed himself on [1 more...]
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
ench army, where he was soon surrounded and taken. The splendid map and the narratives which I have published of it, are the best study that can be made upon this kind of battles. No person can have forgotten the battle of Stockach where General Jourdan conceived the unfortunate idea of causing to be attacked an army of sixty thousand combattants, by three small divisions from seven to eight thousand men, distant from each other several leagues, whilst that Saint-Cyr with the third of the aausing to be appreciated the dangers, not only of turning manoeuvres, but of every gap left in the line of battle, when we have to fight an enemy accustomed to play a close game. It will be readily judged, that if Weyrother had had to do with Jourdan, at Rivoli as at Austerlitz, he would perhaps have ruined the French army, instead of sustaining himself, a total defeat. For the general who attacked at Stockach a mass of sixty thousand men with four little masses, isolated and unable to seco
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
ave its bridges behind it, and would cover them in all its forward movements. It was thus that Jourdan, having passed at Dusseldorf (1795) upon the extreme right of the Austrians, could advance in aft a hundred and twenty thousand men paralyzed from Mayence to Basle, whilst Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan upon the Lahn. But this circumstance could alter in nothing the evident advantage which a pointhe attempt of a double passage upon the extent of the same front of operations, as occurred to Jourdan and to Moreau in 1796. If we gain by it on one side the advantage of having in need a double l possible in an interior direction, to prevent the enemy from overwhelming them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had followed this maxim, and had united at Donanwert instead of moving exteriorly — may throw upon it wooden buildings, fire ships, mills, as the Aurtrians did against the army of Jourdan, in 1796, near Neuweied upon the Rhine, where they came near compromising the army of the Sambr
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
oudy weather might make them sometimes uncertain: meanwhile as the vocabulary of similar reports could be reduced to a score of phrases, for which it would be easy to have conventional signs, I think that the mode should not be despised, though even we should be obliged to send the duplicate of its transmissions, by officers capable of well rendering verbal orders. We would always gain rapidity thereby. A trial of another nature was attempted in 1794, at the battle of Fleurus, where General Jourdan employed an aeronaut for reconnoitering and making signals of the movements of the Austrians. I do not know whether he had occasion to congratulate himself on this trial, which was not again renewed, although it was pretended at the time that it had assisted in the victory, which I very much doubt. It is probable that the difficulculty of having an aeronaut all ready to make his ascension at the moment when it should be opportune, that of observing well what passes below when one has