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George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), chapter 10 (search)
Appendix C: telegrams between Halleck and Meade, mentioned in letter of July 14, 1863. see page 134, Vol. II Halleck to Meade July 14 (in part): I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore. Meade to Halleck July 14: Having performed mybest of my ability, the censure of the President conveyed in your dispatch of 1 P. M. this day, is, in my judgment, so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army. Halleck to Meade July 14: My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit. It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved.
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), Appendix F (search)
an impassable river obstructing their retreat; and while letter-writers were announcing their hopelessness of its escape, Lee's army was quickly making arrangements for crossing without the slightest interruption from Gen. Meade, or serious effortm into the river, his pontoons or other bridges might be swept away. But Gen. Meade's frequently declared belief was, that Lee could cross when he pleased; that he did not intend to cross, but meant to fight. The sequel shows how completely he was y a cavalry reconnaissance on the south side of the Potomac, and a forced one on the Maryland side, have easily discovered Lee's true intentions; and had he attacked him with his army divided by that river, he must have inevitably destroyed or captured one half of it. But blinded and deceived by Lee, timidity ruled the hour, and the golden opportunity, that is only to be seen and grasped by genius, was lost forever. Here, then, we have a commander but a few days previous magnified into a grea
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), Appendix G (search)
tal of Pennsylvania, and the main body of the rebel army was in Maryland, following the advances, Lee, supposing that he had out-generaled Hooker, and made sure of Baltimore and Washington, was startome of the troops in the field (on Maryland Heights) under his command to prepare for a blow upon Lee's flank, before the latter could contract his lines, which would have resulted in cutting the reb's) own request, feeling justly indignant at the treatment he had received, he was relieved. General Lee, in his report to Jeff Davis, acknowledges he was outflanked and outgeneraled by Hooker. So ected by Hooker to keep well to the right in order to cover Baltimore, intending thereby to force Lee to fight at Gettysburg or thereabouts. So much to the credit of Hooker. It is a matter of his! Mr. Everett, in his oration at Gettysburg, did not fail to do Gen. Hooker justice; nor did Gen. Lee, the leader of the crestfallen and defeated rebel army. We regret the more, therefore, that th
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), chapter 15 (search)
ated by Gen. Sickles, and forced on Meade in part by the enemy, but principally by General Sickles, that Meade did not know on Friday night that our men had whipped Lee, or distrusted the fact that night, and was so uncertain of it on Saturday that he dared not pursue the beaten enemy, and weakly and ignorantly threw away the certa he was not in condition to pursue was not true; that his army was abundantly able and in condition to make immediate pursuit, and, if necessary, to fight and crush Lee's disordered columns; that the 6th Corps was fresh and substantially intact; it had lost only 100 men, the 12th Corps had lost only 700 and had about 12,000 left, trfect condition, and Couch's great force was also at Meade's call. That, in a word, he had over 40,000 effective and ardent troops with which to pursue and destroy Lee's flying and demoralized army, but refused to use them and suffered the enemy to escape. It is upon the question of the issuance of the second order to retreat tha
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), chapter 16 (search)
s too slow; that but for the dash of some of his division commanders the victory at Gettysburg would have been a cowardly retreat; that he erred in not following up Lee immediately after that battle; and that since that time he has let slip more than one opportunity of adding new laurels to those of which the Army of the Potomac chimore, and Washington, and perhaps of the nation itself, depended upon him, and with this in mind he had no business to take any risks. We see now how a pursuit of Lee immediately after the battle might have proved advantageous; but General Meade could not feel sure of it then, and under the circumstances he ought not to have undee then, though not ending in the results which were hoped for, have stamped him as an able general. His retreat in the valley of the Shenandoah, when outflanked by Lee, was more than redeemed by the fact that he captured a number of rebel prisoners, which is, we believe, the only instance in the war in which a retreating force not
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), chapter 17 (search)
of General Longstreet (opposite our left wing), Lee remarks, the enemy held a position from which, o carry this position. It is plain enough that Lee regarded the point where our left was posted as on the defeated Third corps, for the object of Lee, as he states, was to carry the ground which Sieir efforts to carry out the original design of Lee, by overthrowing our left wing, and Longstreet em in flank or rear, or anywhere or anyhow, General Lee might have got across the Potomac, but his he trains, with the wounded and prisoners, says Lee's report, were compelled to await at Williamspotheir preparations for flight. An attack, says Lee, was awaited during that and the succeeding dayrossing was not completed until one P. M., says Lee, when the bridge was removed. The enemy offereary of a British officer who was a guest of General Lee during the campaign in Pennsylvania, and whhis, of course, could make no difference to General Lee's plans. Ammunition he must have, as he ha[6 more...]
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), Appendix O (search)
e than to my surprise, I find that not only was the outline of my picture correct but nearly every detail and incident exact. I stated, it may be remembered, that the left wing of our army, under the command of General Sickles was selected by General Lee as his report shows for the main point of his attack. I stated, also, that whilst this formidable attack was preparing all the morning of Thursday, July 2, General Sickles was left without orders, in spite of his urgent entreaties to the Commf the Army of the Potomac that it will be a singular indifference to public opinion on the part of the government if he is allowed to remain longer in that important post. It has been most conclusively proved that nothing was easier than to force Lee's whole army to an unconditional surrender at Williamsport, where he was without ammunition or subsistence, and the swollen Potomac preventing his escape. It was stated that our army was so humiliated at the vacillation and timidity of General Me
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), chapter 24 (search)
he laurels which belonged to Howard and to Hancock; who at Williamsport suffered a beaten army to escape him; who, when holding the line of the Rapidan, fled before Lee without a battle to the gates of the capital; who at Mine Run drew back in dismay from a conflict which he had invited and which his army longed to convert into triMeade. The dispatches of Gen. Butler, wholly confirmed by one from Gen. Grant, show that he has maintained the line heretofore gained on the north of the James. Lee assaulted in force on Friday last, and carried a picket defended only by cavalry, but was utterly repulsed and driven off with heavy loss in attempting to recover n can be numerically stated; for the assault proves two things. First, that the line Butler has occupied is a severe loss to the enemy; and, second, that, although Lee is forced to assume the offensive with his attenuated army in order to regain this line, he cannot carry the coveted position. Butler is within four miles of Richm
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), chapter 28 (search)
Appendix U: newspaper article, in favor of General Meade, mentioned in letter of April 18, 1865. see page 273, Vol. II (New York Herald, April 14, 1865） General Meade The impression seems to have gotten out at the North that General Meade is not very popular with his army. This is a great mistake, and has been fully verified in the past two days. I never saw so much enthusiasm displayed for any man as was for him after the surrender of Lee's army. Our troops were drawn up on either side of the road and when General Meade rode through they seemed nearly crazed with joy. Cheer followed cheer, and hats were thrown up in the air with apparent disregard of where they should land or what became of them. General Meade was equally excited. He seemed for the time to throw off his reserve and dignity and enter fully into the spirit of the occasio
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), chapter 29 (search)
en I could have done so with perfect ease at any moment. Longstreet's advice to Lee To move from his right upon General Meade's communications. was sound military sense; it was the step I feared Lee would take, and to meet which, and be prepared for which was the object of my instructions to Butterfield, which he has so misr was unoccupied and commanded Cemetery Ridge, when he received an order from General Lee directing him to assume the defensive, and not to advance; that he sent to GGeneral Lee urging to be permitted to advance with his reserves, but the reply was a reiteration of the previous order. To my inquiry why Lee had restrained him, he Lee had restrained him, he said our troops coming up (Slocum's) were visible, and Lee was under the impression that the greater part of my army was on the ground and deemed it prudential to awLee was under the impression that the greater part of my army was on the ground and deemed it prudential to await the rest of his — as you quote from his report. But suppose Ewell with 20,000 men had occupied Culp's Hill, and our brave soldiers had been compelled to evacu
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