consternation in Richmond
anxiety of Lee.
In the midst of Sheridan's brilliant succes sever the only remaining line between Hood and Lee, and be better able, in case of need, to co-opele if by any chance, evil happened at the East, Lee might detach, or Davis assemble, an army betweemond.
Four divisions were hurried to the spot, Lee was present in person, and the troops were tolde insignificant.
Thus, at each end of his line Lee made energetic efforts to regain what he had loes and the immense advantage of interior lines, Lee was still able to hold the national columns offisparity in numbers was by no means so great as Lee declared.
The returns of each army for the monPotomac and the James, to have been 76,000, and Lee's 50,000.
There were besides 6,000 rebel troopreduced by the same long and arduous service as Lee's, and Grant's recent recruits had not been numrth and south of the James simultaneously—a blunder; but Lee, it appears, was of a different mind.
isions were essential to the armies of Hood and Lee. The damage done to the state of Georgia he estdictated the movements of each, but, by holding Lee, had rendered the success of either practicable closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his army.
You have now destroyed the roadsixty thousand men, will be a reinforcement that Lee cannot disregard.
Indeed, with my present commhe greater part of your army here, and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to be taking has sha ought to be done. . . . My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of Virginia, and, if theed men had arrived at Wilmington.
This day General Lee telegraphed to Seddon: Bragg reports the eserves at Sugar Loaf550
Hagood (Lee's dispatch)400
3,500 The garrison, it is talike; its effect was felt at home and abroad.
Lee knew its significance as thoroughly as Grant, porting Sherman's future movements, and presented an opportunity to complete the isolation of Lee