hide Matching Documents

The documents where this entity occurs most often are shown below. Click on a document to open it.

Document Max. Freq Min. Freq
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 22 0 Browse Search
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army. 17 1 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 14 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: June 7, 1864., [Electronic resource] 14 0 Browse Search
General Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War 6 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: October 7, 1861., [Electronic resource] 4 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: June 13, 1864., [Electronic resource] 4 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 8. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 2 0 Browse Search
Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865 2 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: October 9, 1861., [Electronic resource] 2 0 Browse Search
View all matching documents...

Your search returned 105 results in 27 document sections:

1 2 3
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: The Opening Battles. Volume 1., Notes of a Confederate staff-officer at Shiloh. (search)
ally, moreover, by a conference with their corps commanders, Johnston and Beauregard could best ascertain the condition of all the troops and determine the best course to be pursued. It was after the reports thus made with the mutual blame of each other of two of the corps commanders for the delay, that Beauregard, confirmed in his apprehension that the campaign had miscarried, urged that its objective should be given up,--much as Wellington once, in Spain, after taking the field to attack Massena, finding the latter more strongly posted and prepared than he had been misled to believe, had not hesitated to retire without fighting. The course of events demonstrated the correctness of Beauregard's judgment. V. That night, soon after supper, an aide-de-camp from General Johnston informed me of the general's desire to see me, and guided me to where he was bivouacking in the open air. I was wanted to issue the order for the immediate transfer of Maney's regiment of Tennessee infant
The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South (ed. Alexander Kelly McClure), Stonewall Jackson and his men. (search)
son. Golden opportunities lost have changed many a shout of victory into a cry of defeat, and from Carrick's ford to Gettysburg the track of war is lined with the graves of brave men who died while their generals were deliberating. In absolute freedom from this weakness, Stonewall Jackson deserves a place by the side of Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and Frederick the Great. General Jackson was never elated by victory, nor depressed by disaster. It might be said of him, as it was of Massena: He was endowed with that extraordinary firmness and courage which seemed to increase in excess of danger. When conquered, he was as ready to fight again as if he had been conqueror. Always victorious, with one exception, General Jackson was not often called upon to illustrate this virtue. But at Strasburg, when he determined to wait for Winder, as Napoleon did for Ney in Russia, while Fremont and Shields were closing in on both flanks, and escape seemed almost impossible, his face was a
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
f the population, what forces would not be necessary in order to be at once superior every where, and to assure remote communications' against numerous corps? It is particularly important to study well the war in the Spanish Peninsula, in order to appreciate all the obstacles which a general and brave troops may encounter in the conquest or the occupation of a country thus roused. What efforts of patience, of courage and of resignation were not necessary to the phalanxes of Napoleon, of Massena, of Soult, of Ney, and of Suchet, in order to hold out for six whole years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and Portuguese, seconded by the regular armies of the Wellingtons, the Beresfords, the Blakes, the Romanas, Cuestas, Castagnos, Redings and Balesteros! The means of succeeding in such a war are difficult enough; to display in the first place a mass of forces proportionate to the resistance and to the obstacles which are to be encountered; to calm the popular p
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
frontier of Belgium before the battle of Ligmy (1815), and that of Massena upon the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar in 1799. Even winterrdered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover; St. Cyr comes to join Massena in the Frioul, and Bernadotte, quitting Hanover, comes to take an ion the interesting campaigns of the Arch-Duke, of Suwaroff and of Massena in 1799, as well as those of Napoleon and of Moreau in 1800. The etter convinced of those truths, than by retracing the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After the loss of the battle of Stockach n inferior army without compromising it. In the situation where Massena was found after the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Berne, or unite with the Arch-Duke, all would have been over with Massena. Those events seem then to prove that, if countries with high moutains than in the plains. If it could be doubted, the campaign of Massena would for the rest prove it, for if he maintained himself in Switz
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
are not always the best for delivering battle. Indeed, a position is not strong merely because it is composed of a steep ground, but rather when it is in harmony with the object which we propose in taking it, and when it offers the greatest possible advantages to the kind of troops which constitutes the principal strength of the army; finally, when the obstacles of the ground are more injurious to the enemy than to the army which shall occupy that position. For example, it is certain that Massena, taking the strong position of the Albis, would have committed a grave fault if he had been superior in cavalry and in artillery; whilst, for his excellent infantry, it was exactly what he needed. For the same reason, Wellington, whose whole strength consisted in his weight of fire, chose well the position of Waterloo, all the avenues of which he swept to a distance by a rasant fire. Moreover, the position of the Albis was rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo a position for battl
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
ably a chef d'oeuvre of logistics. In order to appreciate the merit of similar measures, I would refer, in opposition to them, to two circumstances where faults of logistics came near becoming fatal. Napoleon recalled from Spain in 1809, by the preparations of Austria, and certain of having war with that power, despatched Berthier to Bavaria with the delicate mission of assembling the army, all dispersed from Strasburg to Erfurt. Davoust returned from this city, Oudinot from Frankfort, Massena enroute for Spain, retrograded by Strasburg upon Ulm; the Saxons, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers quitted their respective countries. Immense distances separated thus those corps, and the Austrians, united a long time since, were able easily to pierce this web and to destroy or disperse the parts of it. Napoleon, justly uneasy, ordered Berthier to collect the army at Ratisbon, if the war had not commenced at his arrival, but in the contrary case to unite it farther in rear near Ulm. The
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
e, but we are more embarrassed in speaking of the mode in which it should be made to act in combat. Here the chances multiply in such a manmer, by reason of the particular circumstances of the affair, of the ground and of the movements of the enemy, that we cannot say that the artillery has any action independent of that of the other arms. In the meanwhile we have seen Napoleon at Wagram throw a battery of a hundred pieces in the gap occasioned in his line by the departure of the corps of Massena, and thus to hold in check all the efforts of the Austrian centre; but it would be very dangerous to set up as a maxim such an employment of the artillery. We shall limit ourselves then to presenting here a few fundamental data, observing that they are based upon the condition of this arm, such as it existed in the late wars; the employment of the new discoveries not being yet well determined could not find place here. 1. In the offensive, we ought to unite a certain mass of artillery
e conducted:-- Example: passage of the Limmat by Massena, 1799. In 1799, the Archduke Charles, with an Austrian army, was opposed by General Massena; their two armies were separated by the Lake of Zurich, the Limmat,waroff, coming from Italy, was to join Kutusoff. Massena, being informed of the allies' plan, took the deciseneral Markoff, were placed near the spot chosen by Massena; their position is shown in the plan. Near Hongg000 Russians at Kloten, four or five miles distant, Massena, with 30,000 men, opposes 18,000; of these, 6000 artier's attack; so that, in fact, the main attack of Massena is executed with 20,000 against 6400. Passage. urn repulsed. It was only in the afternoon, when Massena had arrived at the gates of Zurich, and even summon000 men opposed to Soult, he was enabled to repulse Massena, forcing him back as far as Wipkingen. General Klegreat part of his army. Passage of the Limmat by Massena 25th September 1799. Retreat and pursuit. th
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
ain the brave men who headed the column almost perished at the foot of the intrenchment; and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the enterprise. While the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of Austrian success, Massena, in the fortifications of Genoa, sustained a blockade of sixty, and a siege of forty days, against an army five times as large as his own; and when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he almost dictated to the enemy the terms of the ons of money were appropriated for this place alone. Roco d'aufo, Genoa, and several smaller works; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against Austrian aggression in Italy. These works were of great service to the French in 1805, enabling Massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check the Archduke Charles with more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grand army, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed Germany and seized upon the capital of Austria. The neglect of the
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 12: army organization—Engineers.—Their history, duties, and organization,—with a brief discussion, showing their importance as a part of a modern army organization. (search)
ruction, when the brave and skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting a passage at the Ponte Nova; the same daring officer opened, on the same day, a way for the further escape of the French across the Misarella by the Saltador. In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to the English to cross the Guadiana, and attack the French before Badajos could be put in a state of defence. Beresford was directed by Wellington to pass this river at Jerumina, where the Portuguese had promised to f those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained Lord Wellington more than a year on the frontiers of Portugal. We might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the Ceira and Alva, and their influence on the pursuit of Massena; Wellington's passage of the Tagus, and his retreat from Burgos in 1812 ; the passage of the Adour and Garonne in 1814 ; and the failure of the mines to blow up the bridges of Saltador, Alcantara, &c.; but a sufficient number of examples, it is
1 2 3