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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 22 0 Browse Search
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army. 17 1 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 14 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: June 7, 1864., [Electronic resource] 14 0 Browse Search
General Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War 6 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: June 13, 1864., [Electronic resource] 4 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: October 7, 1861., [Electronic resource] 4 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: May 26, 1862., [Electronic resource] 2 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: January 5, 1864., [Electronic resource] 2 0 Browse Search
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: The Opening Battles. Volume 1. 2 0 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). You can also browse the collection for Massena or search for Massena in all documents.

Your search returned 11 results in 5 document sections:

Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
f the population, what forces would not be necessary in order to be at once superior every where, and to assure remote communications' against numerous corps? It is particularly important to study well the war in the Spanish Peninsula, in order to appreciate all the obstacles which a general and brave troops may encounter in the conquest or the occupation of a country thus roused. What efforts of patience, of courage and of resignation were not necessary to the phalanxes of Napoleon, of Massena, of Soult, of Ney, and of Suchet, in order to hold out for six whole years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and Portuguese, seconded by the regular armies of the Wellingtons, the Beresfords, the Blakes, the Romanas, Cuestas, Castagnos, Redings and Balesteros! The means of succeeding in such a war are difficult enough; to display in the first place a mass of forces proportionate to the resistance and to the obstacles which are to be encountered; to calm the popular p
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
frontier of Belgium before the battle of Ligmy (1815), and that of Massena upon the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar in 1799. Even winterrdered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover; St. Cyr comes to join Massena in the Frioul, and Bernadotte, quitting Hanover, comes to take an ion the interesting campaigns of the Arch-Duke, of Suwaroff and of Massena in 1799, as well as those of Napoleon and of Moreau in 1800. The etter convinced of those truths, than by retracing the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After the loss of the battle of Stockach n inferior army without compromising it. In the situation where Massena was found after the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Berne, or unite with the Arch-Duke, all would have been over with Massena. Those events seem then to prove that, if countries with high moutains than in the plains. If it could be doubted, the campaign of Massena would for the rest prove it, for if he maintained himself in Switz
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
are not always the best for delivering battle. Indeed, a position is not strong merely because it is composed of a steep ground, but rather when it is in harmony with the object which we propose in taking it, and when it offers the greatest possible advantages to the kind of troops which constitutes the principal strength of the army; finally, when the obstacles of the ground are more injurious to the enemy than to the army which shall occupy that position. For example, it is certain that Massena, taking the strong position of the Albis, would have committed a grave fault if he had been superior in cavalry and in artillery; whilst, for his excellent infantry, it was exactly what he needed. For the same reason, Wellington, whose whole strength consisted in his weight of fire, chose well the position of Waterloo, all the avenues of which he swept to a distance by a rasant fire. Moreover, the position of the Albis was rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo a position for battl
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
ably a chef d'oeuvre of logistics. In order to appreciate the merit of similar measures, I would refer, in opposition to them, to two circumstances where faults of logistics came near becoming fatal. Napoleon recalled from Spain in 1809, by the preparations of Austria, and certain of having war with that power, despatched Berthier to Bavaria with the delicate mission of assembling the army, all dispersed from Strasburg to Erfurt. Davoust returned from this city, Oudinot from Frankfort, Massena enroute for Spain, retrograded by Strasburg upon Ulm; the Saxons, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers quitted their respective countries. Immense distances separated thus those corps, and the Austrians, united a long time since, were able easily to pierce this web and to destroy or disperse the parts of it. Napoleon, justly uneasy, ordered Berthier to collect the army at Ratisbon, if the war had not commenced at his arrival, but in the contrary case to unite it farther in rear near Ulm. The
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
e, but we are more embarrassed in speaking of the mode in which it should be made to act in combat. Here the chances multiply in such a manmer, by reason of the particular circumstances of the affair, of the ground and of the movements of the enemy, that we cannot say that the artillery has any action independent of that of the other arms. In the meanwhile we have seen Napoleon at Wagram throw a battery of a hundred pieces in the gap occasioned in his line by the departure of the corps of Massena, and thus to hold in check all the efforts of the Austrian centre; but it would be very dangerous to set up as a maxim such an employment of the artillery. We shall limit ourselves then to presenting here a few fundamental data, observing that they are based upon the condition of this arm, such as it existed in the late wars; the employment of the new discoveries not being yet well determined could not find place here. 1. In the offensive, we ought to unite a certain mass of artillery