sixth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-second and Twenty-third regiments.
Grant had massed 65,000 men opposite this brigade.
Beauregard's whole force in the line was only three-and-a-half brigades.
The theory of the assault, as stated by General Meade in the Court of Enquiry, held by the Federals soon after, was for General Burnside, with 15,000 men to rush in the opening made by the explosion, and dash over to Cemetery Hill, five hundred or six hundred yards to the rear; this corps to be the enemy from rushing down the hill and getting in the rear of our lines.
This order was promptly executed, and gave the remainder of the Seventeenth in the main trench more room to use their guns.
The damage done — let the enemy tell.
General Meade says the assault came principally from his right (our left) of the crater.
The enemy brought guns from all points and threw shells into the crater.
General Potter began his movement towards the crest, and was met by another force of the e
tisfied not to come within reach of O'Neil, but remained at a safe distance, where they were leisurely shelled by Carter's artillery.
Johnson's division was ordered to take position near the river, to prevent the enemy's cutting us off from the ford at Front Royal, and though not required in action, was promptly in place.
Early's division, much jaded, was fifteen miles off near Winchester, and could not possibly reach me before the afternoon of the next day.
I had reason to believe that Meade's whole army was in our front, and having but two divisions to oppose him I decided to send Early up the Valley to Strasburg and New Market, while I marched the other two divisions up the Page valley to Luray, the route pursued by Jackson in 1862 in his campaign against Banks.
Johnson's and Rodes's divisions moved back two to four miles and encamped near Front Royal — the rear-guard, under Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, of Johnson's division, leaving Front Royal after 10 o'clock next day — the