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Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), A review of the First two days operations at Gettysburg and a reply to General Longstreet by General Fitz. Lee. (search)
t he was the hardest man to move I had in my army. Does this testimony prove that General Lee regretted that he had not adopted another's plan to fight the battle of Gettysburg, or is it not cumulative to all the other well-known facts? Gen. Pleasanton, Meade's cavalry commander, writes a paper for the Philadelphia Times, January. 19th, 1878, in which he tells us what he said to Meade after our repulse on the 3rd, and this is it: I rode up to him, and after congratulating him on the splend general. Order the army to advance while I take the cavalry; get in Lee's rear and we will finish the campaign in a week. A Sandwich Islander, knowing nothing about the war except what he might read in these papers of Generals Longstreet and Pleasanton, but of a humane and benevolent disposition, would inwardly rejoice that they did not command their respective armies lest the historic feat of the Kilkenny Cats should have been eclipsed by not even leaving to the public their two tales. In
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Reply to General Longstreet's Second paper. (search)
to protect our left flank, which was very much exposed before the arrival of Stuart's cavalry. This has been fully explained heretofore, and the fact shown that these two brigades never constituted any part of our line; so that it was not broken by their being assigned the position they occupied. If General Longstreet found it necessary to take two of his divisions, which were intended to support the attacking column on the 3d, in order to protect his right flank against two brigades of Pleasanton's cavalry, it was certainly not unreasonable to take two brigades to protect a flank that was very much more exposed. This objection is really too insignificant to discuss. In the second article there is this passage: In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while of course it was offensive in strategy. I have italicized the words his council to fix attention upon th