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John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter IX (search)
guards which had been deemed essential during the preceding operations in Georgia; and many of those were soon to be discharged by expiration of their terms of enlistment, their places to be supplied by new regiments coming from the rear. General A. J. Smith's corps, then in Missouri, about ten thousand strong, was ordered to Tennessee, and Sherman also ordered Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, about twelve thousand men, to return from Georgia to Tennessee and report to Thomas. Stanley had starthe north bank of the river in the night of the 27th. It was still hoped that the line of Duck River might be held until reinforcements could arrive. General Thomas was very urgent that this should be done, if possible, as the arrival of General A. J. Smith's corps from Missouri had been expected daily for some time, when General Thomas intended, as it was understood, to come to the front in person with that corps and all the other troops he could assemble in his department, take command, and
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter X (search)
roops in his department somewhere, but what had been accomplished I was not informed. About A. J. Smith I was in a like state of uncertainty. Only one thing was clear, and that was that I must hol9th came a despatch from Thomas, dated 8 P. M. of the day before, conveying the information that Smith had not arrived, and saying nothing about any other reinforcements, but expressing the wish that the Duck River position be held until Smith arrived; and another despatch designating Franklin, behind the Harpeth River, as the place to which I would have to retire if it became necessary to fall cember 2, with several thousand fewer men than he finally had there, a large part of his army—A. J. Smith's three divisions—not fully ready for battle, and with fewer effective cavalry; while Hood wo million rounds to Brentwood, thinking he might want me to hold Hood there until he could get A. J. Smith's troops in position and supplied with ammunition. If I had needed any such warning, that gi
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XI (search)
diate command in the field, and that of General A. J. Smith's three divisions, which had been orderI should hold Hood in check until he could get Smith up. He was still relying entirely upon A. J. Sead of waiting for the uncertain arrival of A. J. Smith. On November 27 I received an important ood moves on the Chattanooga road, I will send Smith to Murfreesboroa, as we shall be enabled theres despatch of 8 A. M., already quoted, that A. J. Smith's troops were not, as I had supposed, alrea all the force that is necessary here, and General Smith's troops should be placed with reference tition, I wish you to do so until I can get General Smith here. After his arrival we can withdraw grs in the records, in which he said: . . . General Smith will certainly be here in three days. . . 64. Major-General Schofield, Franklin: General Smith reported to me this morning that one divis to take position at Brentwood at once. If A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesboroa garrison j[26 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIII (search)
s to be made on the enemy's extreme left by A. J. Smith's corps and the cavalry. After the order wor a real attack; and that, on the other hand, Smith's force was not large enough for the real attaHence I suggested that my corps should support Smith instead of remaining on the left of Wood. To osition it was ordered to the right to join A. J. Smith's troops in the attack. Hence it would seen should be known, and an order for some of A. J. Smith's troops to support the right if necessary.ouch, commanding my left division, that one of Smith's divisions was about to assault, I had ordereour left announced that McArthur's division of Smith's corps had already carried the enemy's work iis official report, and also in that of General A. J. Smith. The fact is that Hood's left wing h horseback just in rear of Wood's right and of Smith's left, on ground overlooking nearly the entirded in delaying Hood until Thomas could get A. J. Smith and Steedman to Nashville, when he became a[1 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIV (search)
neral Thomas had at any time so ordered. In the report of General A. J. Smith, dated January 10, 1865, occurs the following: About 3 P. M.contrary, during a period in which General Thomas had requested General Smith to delay the movement. General Wilson's report, dated Decembt to reinforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major-General Smith's command. In response to this order, General Smith sent fiGeneral Smith sent five regiments and a battery (about 1600 men), which were put in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the enemy still held pike in rear of the enemy. About noon, the troops on my left (Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with the enemy inient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's division; afidential letter, and, as he said, at the instance of Schofield and Smith. War Records, Vol. XLV, part II, p. 184. But the battle of the
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XV (search)
y in check, should he advance, long enough to enable General A. J. Smith's corps, then expected from Missouri, to reach Nashvssible, without risking a general engagement, until Maj.-Gen. A. J. Smith's command could arrive from Missouri, and Maj.-Gen.mas at Nashville, on my way to Johnsonville, he expected A. J. Smith to arrive from Missouri very soon, when he intended to cesides his statement about the few alterations: Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as I expecterve to which it had been assigned over to the right of General Smith . . .—leaving it necessarily to be inferred that the poird Corps moved over from that position to the right of General Smith after General Thomas gave directions to that effect in ordered; otherwise it could not possibly have moved over to Smith's right before dark. In fact, one of the divisions (Couch's) of the Twenty-third Corps advanced with Smith's corps, keeping within supporting distance, as stated in my report, so that
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVI (search)
simply shows that they were both in the same error; for A. J. Smith's troops did not begin to arrive at Nashville until the his march would have disclosed to him the impossibility of Smith's arrival in time, and have enabled him to send another cor all the time; also Rosecrans promises the two divisions of Smith and Mower belonging to me, but I doubt if they can reach Tens, you will have Generals Schofield and Stanley and General A. J. Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments and all e a statement of the troops Thomas would have, including A. J. Smith's from Missouri, adding, but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten days. Now Smith's troops did not reach Tennessee in less than thirty days instead of ten days, andign was passed; and the effective force in Tennessee before Smith's arrival was 13,000 men less than Sherman had stated it. Sr field service, to take care of Hood until he could get A. J. Smith from Missouri, incorporate new regiments into the army a
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Index (search)
ations, 351,352 Brentwood, Tenn., request for ammunition to be sent to, 187; proposal to send Smith to, 221, 223-225; S. proposes to stand at, 223-225; proposal to send Steedman to, 225; S.'s arri position at, 217; Hood captures road between Spring Hill and, 217, 218; proposed movement of A. J. Smith to, 220, 221, 223; Thomas's desire to hold, 221, 223; delays of telegraphic communication wit236 et seq., 243, 249, 260, 261, 271, 294-296; Thomas's attitude at, explained to Grant, 198; A. J. Smith's delay in reaching, 212, 213, 217, 218, 223, 301, 325; Thomas unprepared for action at, 220 et seq.; arrival of A. J. Smith at, 220, 221, 254; Wilson ordered to fall back to, 224; delays of telegraphic communication with Franklin, 224; general feeling concerning immediate action against Hoo, 281, 282; his military duty to provide for his army, 176; advantages of delay to, 185, 186; A. J. Smith ordered to reinforce, and his delays in reaching Nashville, 185, 187, 190-194, 196, 211-213;