hich Hill and Longstreet should engage in front.
G. W. Smith, with his division, was to advance on the right fd the movement of the troops.
Hill, Longstreet, and Smith, indeed, were in position by eight o'clock; but not g forward on the Williamsburg road, the column of G. W. Smith, to which was intrusted the important flanking operals had been engaged, he immediately threw forward Smith's command.
Thus it happened that when Casey had beey column moving towards Fair Oaks Station.
This was Smith's column, which had at length got fairly to work.
They were no more than in time; for at that moment Smith's troops, having been gotten well in hand under the
The command, for the time being, devolved on General G. W. Smith; but the failure to make good the purpose of d the disabling of General Johnston, determined General Smith to retire his forces.
Preparations for withdrawfficial report, General Johnston simply says: Major-General Smith was prevented from resuming his attack on the
y to President Lincoln's answer to him and General Smith, 265.
Franklin's and Smith's letter to Smith's letter to the President proposing plan of campaign, 263.
Frederick the Great, seven years defensive campairmuda Hundred lines, 468; Bermuda Hundred, General Smith's force ordered from to Grant, 482; Grant'nge of base to south of, 498; Bermuda Hundred, Smith's movement on Petersburg, 500; Butler's occupay affairs, 105; reply to Generals Franklin and Smith's proposed plan of campaign, 265; opinion on Hhe ponton delay, 499; the fortifications of on Smith's arrival, 501; Grant's army all on south sideancock's march, 504; Hancock ordered to assist Smith before, 504; Grant's expectation of easy capture by Smith, and failure to notify Meade of intended attack, 504; Lee's army arrived in, 506; Meade's indorsement on noncap-ture of, 506; Smith's suspension of operations for the night, 506; Grant c 468; superseded by General Hunter, 468.
Smith, G. W., commanding Confederates, vice Johnston, wo[4 more...]