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Cornelius Tacitus, A Dialogue on Oratory (ed. Alfred John Church, William Jackson Brodribb) 40 0 Browse Search
Epictetus, Works (ed. George Long) 28 0 Browse Search
Sallust, Conspiracy of Catiline (ed. John Selby Watson, Rev. John Selby Watson, M.A.) 20 0 Browse Search
Q. Horatius Flaccus (Horace), The Works of Horace (ed. C. Smart, Theodore Alois Buckley) 10 0 Browse Search
Pliny the Elder, The Natural History (ed. John Bostock, M.D., F.R.S., H.T. Riley, Esq., B.A.) 8 0 Browse Search
M. Annaeus Lucanus, Pharsalia (ed. Sir Edward Ridley) 6 0 Browse Search
Isocrates, Speeches (ed. George Norlin) 4 0 Browse Search
Francis Glass, Washingtonii Vita (ed. J.N. Reynolds) 2 0 Browse Search
T. Maccius Plautus, Aulularia, or The Concealed Treasure (ed. Henry Thomas Riley) 2 0 Browse Search
Q. Horatius Flaccus (Horace), The Art of Poetry: To the Pisos (ed. C. Smart, Theodore Alois Buckley) 2 0 Browse Search
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Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
her to ingenuous youths. But now what happens? The teacher is a lifeless body, and you are lifeless bodies. When you have been well filled to-day, you sit down and lament about the morrow, how you shall get something to eat. Wretch, if you have it, you will have it; if you have it not, you will depart from life. The door is open.Upton has referred to the passages of Epictetus in which this expression is used, i. 24, 20; i. 25, 18; ii. 1, 19, and others; to Seneca, De Provid. c. 6, Ep. 91; to Cicero, De Fin. iii. 18, where there is this conclusion: e quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, quum beatus sit; et stulti manere in vita quum sit miser. Compare Matthew vi. 31: Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things, &c. Why do you grieve? where does there remain any room f
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
f business to another. I wish that I were now by his side to remind him of what he said when he was passing this way, and to tell him how much better a seer I am than he is. Well then do I say that man is an animal made for doing nothing?The Stoics taught that man is adapted by his nature for action. He ought not therefore to withdraw from human affairs, and indulge in a lazy life, not even a life of contemplation and religious observances only. Upton refers to Antoninus, v. 1, viii. 19, and Cicero, De Fin. V. 20. Certainly not. But why are we not active?Schweighaeuser proposes a small alteration in the Greek text, but I do not think it necessary. When Epictetus says, Why are we not active? He means, Why do some say that we are not active? And he intends to say that We are active, but not in the way in which some people are active. I have therefore added in ( ) what is necessary to make the text intelligible.(We are active.) For example, as to myself, as soon as day comes, in a few wo
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
On praecognitions.Praecognitions (prolh/yeis) is translated Praecognita by John Smith, Select Discourses, p. 4. Cicero says (Topica, 7): Notionem appello quod Graeci tum e)/nnoian, tum pro/lhyin dicunt. Ea est insita et ante percepta cujusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens. In the De Natura Deorum (i. 16) he says: Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat pro/lhyin Epicurus? id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. Epicurus, as Cicero says in the following chapter (17), was the first who used pro/lhyis in this sense, which Cicero applies to what he calls the ingrafted or rather innate cognitions of the existence of gods, and these cognitions he supposes to be universal; but whether this is so or not, I do not know. See l. c. 2; Tuscul i. 24; De Fin. iii. 6, and pro/lhyis in iv. 8. 6. PRAECOGNITIONS are common to all men, and pra
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
t is impious, on what is just and unjust? Oh, the signal wrong done by the instructed. Did they learn this here?I think that Schweighaeuser's interpretation is right, that the instructed are those who think that they are instructed but are not, as they show by their opinion that they accept in moral matters the judgment of an ignorant man, whose judgment in music or geometry they would not accept. Will you not leave the small arguments (loga/ria)He names these small arguments loga/ria, which Cicero (Tusc. Disput. ii. 12) names ratiunculae. about these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit in a corner and receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no one gives them any thing; and will you not come forward and make use of what you have learned? For it is not these small arguments that are wanted now: the writings of the Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is wanted? A man who shall apply them, one who by his acts shall bear testimony to his words.What is t
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
they may become dry? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped?Epictetus alludes to the verses from the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Compare Antoninus (vii. 40): 'Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn: one man is born; another dies.' Cicero (Teuscul. Disp. iii. 25) has translated six verses from Euripides, and among them are these two: turn vita omnibus Metenda ut fruges; sic jubet necessitas. for they are not separated from communion with other things. If then they had perception,ch destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care about the way of going down to Hades? All ways are equal.So Anaxagoras said that the road to the other world (ad inferos) is the same from all places. (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 43). What follows is one of the examples of extravagant assertion in Epictetus. A tyrant may kill by a slow death as a fever does. I suppose that Epictetus would have some answer to that. Except to a Stoic the ways to death are no
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
for I suppose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek it in an irrational animal? No. If then you seek it in a rational animal, why do you still seek it any where except in the supe- riority of rational over irrational animals?Compare Cicero, de Office. i. 27. Now plants have not even the power of using appearances, and for this reason you do not apply the term good to them. The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it re- quire this use only? For if you say that it requiressal chryselephantine statue, that is, a frame work of wood, covered with ivory and gold (Pausanias, i. 24). The figure of Victory stood on the hand of the goddess, as we frequently see in coins. See. i. 6, 23, and the note in Schweig.'s edition. Cicero, de Natura Deorum, iii. 34. stands in that attitude for ever. But the works of God have power of motion, they breathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things, and the power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
did not exist before, and others not be increased and strengthened by corresponding acts. In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases of the mind grow up.a)r)r(wsth/mata. 'Aegrotationes quae appellantur a Stoicis a)r)r(wsth/mata' Cicero, Tusc. iv. 10. For when you have once desired money, if reason be applied to lead to a perception of the evil, the desire is stopped, and the ruling faculty of our mind is restored to the original authority. But if you apply no means of cure, it a sophism beyond that which is named the Liar, and the Quiescent.Placet enim Chrysippo cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere; id est quod ab iis dicitur h(suxa/zein. Cicero, Acad. ii. Pr. 29. Compare Persius, Sat. vi. 80: Depinge ubi sistam, Inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervf Over such a victory as this a man may justly be proud; not for proposing the master sophism. How then shall this be done? Be willing at
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
our cowardice, your boasting which you showed when you sat in the school. Why did you decorate yourself with what belonged to others? Why did you call yourself a Stoic? Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find to what sect you belong. You will find that most of you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics,The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed to a happy life; but still they contended that the smallest mental excellence was superior to all other things. Cicero, De Fin. v. 5. 31. and those feeble. For wherein will you show that you really consider virtue equal to everything else or even superior? But show me a Stoic, if you can. Where or how? But you can show me an endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics. For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any worse? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them also with equal accuracy? who then is a Stoic? As we call a statue Phidiac, which is fashioned according to the art of Phi
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
dmit even this? For what else is this than to affirm that whatever is universally affirmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and say: Know that there is nothing that can be known,'Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod soiri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. Sic omnia latere censebat in occulto, neque ease quidquam quod oerni aut intelligi possit. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione adprobare.' Cicero, Academ. Post. 1. 12, Diog. Laert. ix. 90 of the Pyrrhonists. but all things are incapable of sure evidence; or if another say, Believe me and you will be the better for it, that a man ought not to believe any thing; or again, if another should say, Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn any thing; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now in what respect do these differ from those? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? 'Men, agree [with us] that
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
the will itself, when it is perverted. Therefore this (the will) is alone vice or alone virtue. Then being so great a faculty and set over all the rest, let it (the will) come forward and tell us that the most excellent of all things is the flesh. Not even if the flesh itself declared that it is the most excellent, would any person bear that it should say this. But what is it, Epicurus, which pronounces this, which wrote about the End (purpose) of our Being,This appears to be the book which Cicero (Tuscul. iii. 18) entitles on the 'supreme good' (de summo bono), which, as Cicero, says, contains all the doctrine of Epicurus. The book on the Canon or Rule is mentioned by Velleius in Cicero de Nat. Deorum i. c. 16. as 'that celestial volume of Epicurus on the Rule and Judgment. See also De Fin. i. 19. which wrote on the Nature of Things, which wrote about the Canoa (rule of truth), which led you to wear a beard, which wrote when it was dying that it was spending the last and a happy day?