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H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 82 0 Browse Search
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army. 24 0 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 2. (ed. Frank Moore) 16 0 Browse Search
Hon. J. L. M. Curry , LL.D., William Robertson Garrett , A. M. , Ph.D., Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 1.1, Legal Justification of the South in secession, The South as a factor in the territorial expansion of the United States (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 16 0 Browse Search
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 14 0 Browse Search
Benjamnin F. Butler, Butler's Book: Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major-General Benjamin Butler 14 0 Browse Search
John Esten Cooke, Wearing of the Gray: Being Personal Portraits, Scenes, and Adventures of War. 12 0 Browse Search
Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 2. 12 0 Browse Search
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army . 10 0 Browse Search
Wendell Phillips, Theodore C. Pease, Speeches, Lectures and Letters of Wendell Phillips: Volume 1 10 0 Browse Search
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ted, and the remainder of their army obliged to lay down arms, as they found their line of retreat continually closed by Napoleon's division advancing parallel with them in the direction of the Baltic Sea. In Fig. 1 we have but to replace a c by theMoreau, near Basel, was to act against Kray; and the reserve army, disposed on the Swiss frontier, was to act in Italy. Napoleon's plan was for Moreau to pass through Switzerland, cross the Rhine an Schaffhausen, to cut (ray from his communications, St. Bernard Simplon, St. Gothard, and Spluegen, and arrived in the rear of Melas. Moreau did not entirely conform to Napoleon's plan; he crossed the Rhine near Basel, where he was already in possession of a tete-de-pont, and therefore the campaigh the latter obtained the western portion of Italy as far as the Mincio. The battle of Marengo, and even the whole of Napoleon's manoeuvre, took place only after he had received a reinforcement of 15,000 men from Moreau. Defensive operations.
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of battle with center and one wing reinforced: battle of Wagram, July 6, 1809. (search)
ttle with center and one wing reinforced: battle of Wagram, July 6, 1809. The army of Napoleon amounted to 150,000 combatants, that of the Archduke Charles to 120,000. On the nights of the 4th and 5th of July the French crossed the Danube, and took on the 5th the position F F ; on the 6th they advanced in the position F‘ F‘ F‘. In consequence of this, the Austrians proceeded to the attack by taking the position A A. Their right wing, consisting of 50,000 men, advanced to the attack of Napoleon's left wing, which he had refused; this consisted of one division, commanded by General Boudet. This left for the Austrian center and left wing but 70,000 men, against which Napoleon had concentrated nearly twice that number. The length of his front for center and left wing was about 11,000 yards, the accumulation of forces amounting, therefore, to from 11 to 12 men for every yard. Massenas's corps, with Bernadotte's, is opposite to Aderklaa. Oudinot's corps, with Lannes's, is oppos<
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of a battle of the offensive defense: battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805. (search)
the right and left, and attack the enemy's wings in their flank. The allies advance with more than 50,000 men against Napoleon's right wing, composed only of about 5000 men, but afterward reinforced to 12,000 men. The advance of those 50,000 men orm; he defeated them before they could deploy in order of battle; the main column of Alvinzi was defeated in its turn by Napoleon's entire force; and the fourth column, which had arrived in his rear, was arrested for some time by a few battalions, anlucher and Wellington, who, with their armies, amounting to 220,000 men, had taken up their quarters in Belgium. It was Napoleon's intention to act speedily, and thereby surprise and defeat them separately. With astonishing rapidity he concentratedattle, the English had to contend with 55 of the French battalions, and the Prussians with 42; these last, however, were Napoleon's best troops, consisting of nearly all the Guard and of the 6th corps, which had not been present, and consequently had
2 before Napoleon; or in consequence of a preconcerted strategical plan, as in the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796; or, in consequence of strategical movements of the enemy, to keep free our lines of communication — the retreat of Moreau in 1796 was such. We may also retreat to gain a favorable position for a battle, as did Napoleon before the battle of Austerlitz; and, finally, to approach nearer our depots and magazines, if we are in a devastated country — such was the reason of Napoleon's retreat in the Russian campaign. The arrangements for a retreating army belong more to logistics than to tactics; and to well understand them, it is necessary first to read the chapter on logistics. I will only give the principal moments, and the rest will be found in the next chapter. So long as a retreating army is not pursued, its march offers nothing particular; but from the moment the enemy is in pursuit, the question changes entirely; and it becomes most difficult after a los
s: march and Manoeuvres of Napoleon near Jena, 1806. the operations near Jena were the following:-- The Prussian army, numbering 120,000 men, was thus disposed: 20,000 near Eisenach, 50,000 near Erfurth, and 50,000 men near Blankenhain. Napoleon's army was near Bamberg, and amounted to from 170,000 to 180,000 men. Napoleon determined to cut the Prussians entirely from their base of operation. For this, he advanced in three columns--one in the direction from Coburg to Sahlfeld, anotht of these marches and manoeuvres was the total loss of the Prussian army. March and manoeuvre of Napoleon near Ulm, 1805. The Austrian general, Mack, with from 70,000 to 80,000 men, advanced from the Austrian frontier as far as Ulm. Napoleon's army, arriving from Wurzburg, Mayence, Spire, and Kehl, numbered 180,000 men. This army was not directed against Ulm, but against the lower towns on the Danube. The arrangement of the columns is similar to that on a flank march. Ney formed