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Polybius, Histories, book 3, Hannibal Attacks the Taurini (search)
ring was in great part lost along with the beasts that carried it. So that whereas, when Hannibal crossed the Rhone, he had thirty-eight thousand infantry, and more than eight thousand cavalry, he lost nearly half in the pass, as I have shown above; while the survivors had by these long continued sufferings become almost savage in look and general appearance. Hannibal therefore bent his whole energies to the restoration of the spirits and bodies of his men, and of their horses also.Taking of Turin. When his army had thus sufficiently recovered, finding the Taurini, who live immediately under the Alps, at war with the Insubres and inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians, Hannibal first invited them to terms of friendship and alliance; and, on their refusal, invested their chief city and carried it after a three days' siege. Having put to the sword all who had opposed him, he struck such terror into the minds of the neighbouring tribes, that they all gave in their submission out
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
mself openly against Charles Fifth, master of Spain, of Italy, and of the Germanic empire; against Charles, victorious over Francis First, and pressing France in his firm grasp. This movement, which transported the war to the heart of the Tyrol, arrested the great man who menaced to swallow up everything. In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amedius, declaring against Louis XIV, changes the face of affairs in Italy, and brings back the French army upon the banks of the Adige, to the walls of Turin, where it experienced the bloody catastrophe which immortalized the Prince Eugene. How insignificant statesmen will appear to those who have meditated upon these two events, and upon the great questions to which they apply! We have said enough upon the advantages of these opportune interventions; the number of examples could be multiplied. to infinity, but that could add nothing to the conviction of our readers. Article VI: wars of invasion through a spirit of conquest or other ca
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
been seen since the time of Louis XIV. The prince was often decorated only with the titular command, whilst a counselor was imposed upon him who commanded in reality. This was the case with the Duke of Orleans and Marsin, at the famous battle of Turin, then with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendome, at the battle of Oudenard. I believe even that it was so at Ulm, between the Arch-Duke Ferdinand and Mack. This last mode is deplorable, for then, in fact, no person is responsible. Every one knows that at Turin, the Duke of Orleans judged with more sagacity than Marshal Marsin, and the exhibition of full secret powers from the king was necessary, to cause the battle to be lost against the advice of the prince who commanded. In the same manner at Ulm, the Arch-Duke Ferdinand displayed more courage and skill than Mack, who was to serve him as mentor. If the prince have the genius and experience of an Arch-Duke Charles, he should be given the command with carte-blanche, and with the c
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
f Savoy form when it marched by Stradella and Asti to the succor of Turin, leaving the French on the Mincis at a few leagues only from his ba6 by Gera, to turn the Prussians; the march of Suwaroff to fly from Turin upon Trebbia to meet Macdonald; that of the Russian army upon TarouPrince Eugene in sight of the French camp, for turning the lines of Turin, was much more extraordinary still than that of Leuthen, and was nostrategical movements; the march of Prince Eugene, fiom Mantua upon Turin, was one of the greatest strategical operations of the age; but theand trouble as the siege itself. The famous affair of the lines of Turin, 1706, where the Prince Eugene of Savoy forced, with forty thousand of the Queich and of the Kinzig had the same fate. The lines of Turin, (1706) and those of Mayence (1795), though destined to serve for casses which are there found, and to place the bulk of the army near Turin or Carignano, is what strategy counselled. When the tactical dif
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
l the species. For example, the intrenched camps of Rehl, of Dresden, of Warsaw; the lines of Turin, and of Mayence; the strong intrenchments of Feldkirch, of Scharnitz, of the Assiette; here are eady sixty-five thousand, and the third day upwards of a hundred thousand. At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation; but if the first were strongly traced, we could ffered but a bad parapet of three feet above the ground and a proportionate ditch. Moreover, at Turin, the lines, turned and attacked from without, were found taken between two fires, since a strongreported in the history of the wars of the Revolution, (Chap. 21, and 52,) that of the lines of Turin, by Prince Eugene of Savoy, in 1706, are great lessons to study. This famous event of Turin, Turin, which we have already often cited, is too well known for us to recall its circumstances, but we could not dispense with observing that never was a triumph bought so cheaply, nor more difficult to con
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
nemy, to turning his extreme left, the tactical advantage appeared to him more sure than all the strategical; he preferred a certain half success to the chance of a victory which would have been decisive, but exposed to greater hazards. In the same campaign, the passage of the Po by Napoleon offered another example of the strategic importance which is attached to the choice of the point of passage; the army of reserve, after the combat of the ,Chiusella, could march by the left of the Po to Turin, or pass the river at Crescentino and march direct to Genoa; Napoleon preferred to pass the Ticino, to enter Milan, to unite there with Moncey, who came with twenty thousand men by the St. Gothard, then to pass the Po at Placentia, persuaded that he would more surely precede Melas upon that point, than if he changed direction too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donanwerth and Ingolstadt, in 1805, was an operation nearly of the same kind; the direction chosen beca
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Conclusion (search)
word, all that which may be called the poetry and the metaphysics of war, will ever have an influence upon its results. Is it saying, for all that, that there are no tactical rules, and that no tactical theory could be useful? What reasonable military man would dare pronounce such a blasphemy? Will it be believed that Eugene and Marlborough have triumphed only by inspiration, or by the moral superiority of their battalions? Will there not be found, on the contrary, in the victories of Turin, of Hochstaedt, of Ramillies, manoeuvres which resemble those of Talavera, of Waterloo, of Jena, or of Austerlitz, and which were the causes of victory? Now, when the application of a maxim, and the manoeuvre which has been its result, have a hundred times given the victory to skillful captains, and offer in their favor all the probable chances, will their occasional failure be sufficient for denying their efficacy, and for disputing all influence of the study of the art; will every theory
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
other belligerent powers. In a war between this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of the war. The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or no
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers; and unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of a very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken. Mezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in 1536; nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621; nor Lerida in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, and again in 1683; nor Turin in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792; nor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos in 1812. This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names of places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation. But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications have become of little comparative importance, under the new system of warfare introduced during the wars of the French Revolution. On this subject let us consul
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 12: army organization—Engineers.—Their history, duties, and organization,—with a brief discussion, showing their importance as a part of a modern army organization. (search)
ortifications in the hands of the French exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatal consequences to the Allies of neglecting these works of national defence. Every student of military history will immediately call to mind the influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Alessandria, Tortona, Pizzighitone, Peschara, Mantua, PalmaNuova, Osopo, Klagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of 1796-7; of Genoa, Fort Bard, the fortifications of the Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c., in 1800; of Milan, Turin, Mantua, Roco d'aufo, Genoa, Alessandria, &c., in 1805; the importance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c., to the French in 1806, and the fatal consequences to the Prussians in that campaign, of their total and culpable neglect of their own fortifications. All military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the Peninsular campaigns: those which had been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms, while those which