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t-a-Mousson to R6zonville, which is on the direct road from Metz to Chalons, and near the central point of the field where, la-Tour, and from it most of the country to the east toward Metz could also be seen. The point chosen was an excellent one s then taking place, and so on. Before us, and covering Metz, lay the French army, posted on the crest of a ridge extendar Saar, and, eight days later, of Colombey, to the east of Metz; while the centre and left were composed of the several corne was cut off from the Verdun road, and forced back toward Metz. At first the German plan was simply to threaten with tnd hedges, through valleys and hamlets, in the direction of Metz, but as yet the German right had accomplished little exceptded to make an obstinate fight to cover their withdrawal to Metz. As the Germans moved to the attack here, the French fire ng before word came that Bazaine's army was falling back to Metz, leaving the entire battle-field in possession of the Germa
d away, and it was plain to see, from the good shape in which the French left wing had retired to Metz, that its retreat had been predetermined by the disasters to the right wing. By this hour the German cavalry having been thrown out to the front well over toward Metz, we, following it to get a look at the city, rode to a neighboring summit, supposing it would be a safe point of observation; nly to discover that the country to the east was so broken and hilly that no satisfactory view of Metz could be had. Returning to Gravelotte, we next visited that part of the battle-field to the ntary science. The French army under Marshal Bazaine having retired into the fortifications of Metz, that stronghold was speedily invested by Prince Frederick Charles. Meantime the Third Army, undith an army called the Fourth, which had been organized from the troops previously engaged around Metz, and on the 22d was directed toward Bar-le-Duc under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony.
St. Menges. Forsyth and I started early next morning, September 1, and in a thick fog-which, however, subsequently gave place to bright sunshinewe drove to the village of Chevenges, where, mounting our horses, we rode in a northeasterly direction to the heights of Frenois and Wadelincourt, bordering the river Meuse on the left bank, where from the crest we had a good view of the town of Sedan with its circling fortifications, which, though extensive, were not so formidable as those around Metz. The King and his staff were already established on these heights, and at a point so well chosen that his Majesty could observe the movements of both armies immediately east and south of Sedan, and also to the northwest toward Floing and the Belgian frontier. The battle was begun to the east and northeast of Sedan as early as half-past 4 o'clock by the German right wing--the fighting being desultory-and near the same hour the Bavarians attacked Bazeilles. This village, some two miles so
lar troops; the rest of their splendid army had been lost or captured in battle, or was cooped up in the fortifications of Metz, Strasburg, and other places, in consequence of blunders without parallel in history, for which Napoleon and the Regency is mobilized, accepted battle with the Crown Prince, pitting 50,000 men against 175,000; the next was Bazaine's fixing upon Metz as his base, and stupidly putting himself in position to be driven back to it, when there was no possible obstacle to his g the Belgian frontier. Indeed, it is exasperating and sickening to think of all this; to think that Bazaine carried into Metz — a place that should have been held, if at all, with not over 25,000 men — an army of 180,000, because it contained, the same morning that a correspondence had begun between Bazaine and Prince Frederick Charles, looking to the capitulation of Metz, for the surrender of that place would permit the Second Army to join in the siege of Paris. Learning all this, and se
ould, in my opinion, have had ultimately no other termination. As I have previously stated, the first of these blunders was the acceptance of battle by MacMahon at Worth; the second in attaching too much importance to the fortified position of Metz, resulting in three battles-Colombey, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte-all of which were lost; and the third, the absurd movement of MacMahon along the Belgian frontier to relieve Metz, the responsibility for which, I am glad to say, does not belong to him. With the hemming in of Bazaine at Metz and the capture of MacMahon's army at Sedan the crisis of the war was passed, and the Germans practically the victors. The taking of Paris was but a sentiment-the money levy could have been made and the Rhine provinces held without molesting that city, and only the political influences consequent upon the changes in the French Government caused peace to be deferred. I did not have much opportunity to observe the German cavalry, either on the