hide Matching Documents

The documents where this entity occurs most often are shown below. Click on a document to open it.

Document Max. Freq Min. Freq
Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and letters of Charles Sumner: volume 2 12 0 Browse Search
Raphael Semmes, Memoirs of Service Afloat During the War Between the States 12 0 Browse Search
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 12 0 Browse Search
Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and letters of Charles Sumner: volume 4 10 0 Browse Search
Knight's Mechanical Encyclopedia (ed. Knight) 8 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: June 28, 1862., [Electronic resource] 8 0 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 8 0 Browse Search
Laura E. Richards, Maud Howe, Florence Howe Hall, Julia Ward Howe, 1819-1910, in two volumes, with portraits and other illustrations: volume 1 6 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: December 14, 1865., [Electronic resource] 6 0 Browse Search
James Parton, Horace Greeley, T. W. Higginson, J. S. C. Abbott, E. M. Hoppin, William Winter, Theodore Tilton, Fanny Fern, Grace Greenwood, Mrs. E. C. Stanton, Women of the age; being natives of the lives and deeds of the most prominent women of the present gentlemen 6 0 Browse Search
View all matching documents...

Your search returned 778 results in 224 document sections:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ...
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
1796, both from their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the completely paralyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim. Strategy may therefore be r
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
emoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the fate of the war. Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it would have enabled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl, by a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a junction with the forces of General Hiller and the Archduke John. If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would have rallied there and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had been strongly fortified in 1808, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched towards that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Valladolid, both the English army of General Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. If Moscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have been avoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusoff encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible. Had
infantry, pursuing the Archduke Ferdinand in his retreat from Ulm, marched thirty miles a day in dreadful weather, and over roads almost impassable for artillery. Again, in the campaign of 1806, the French infantry pursued the Prussians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day. In 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued Sir John Moore's army at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of winter. Napoleon transported an army of fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga with nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows, across high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter rains. The activity, perseverance, and endurance of his troops, during these ten days march, are scarcely equalled in history. In 1812, the activity of the French forces under Clausel was truly extraordinary. After almost unheard — of efforts at the battle of Salamanca, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours In 1814, Napoleon's army march
Admiral David D. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War., Chapter 45: the cruise of the Sumter and the havoc she committed. (search)
the greatest injuries from the United States Government. We can understand that a man may be led by his sympathies and the persuasion of his friends to embark in a bad cause, but there should be enough of humanity in him to cause him to feel regret at deserting tile flag he had professed to love for so many years. Semmes was not received at Cadiz with that consideration he thought lie had a right to expect, and after some correspondence with the authorities was ordered by a dispatch from Madrid to proceed to sea within twenty-four hours; but after consideration the Sumter was allowed to go into dock for repairs and Semmes was permitted to land his prisoners, who were making serious inroads on his provisions. He met with no encouragement at Cadiz. In the eyes of the Spaniards the secession movement was a mere political outbreak, in which Spain was not concerned. Part of the Sumter's crew deserted while the vessel was in dock. Semmes' money had given out; he could not purchase
uld insure a speedy surrender of the rebel works. The force I took with me consisted of eight companies Forty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Slack; four companies Thirty-fourth Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron; two companies Fiftyfourth Illinois Volunteers; four companies Second Illinois cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Hogg; a section from each of the two companies of the Second Illinois Artillery at this post; three pieces of Captain De Golyer's Michigan battery, from lew Madrid, and one-half of the Missouri company of Volunteer Sappers and Miners stationed at this post. These, together with the troops under Colonel Fitch, made an aggregate of about 2,500 effective men. On reaching the flotilla, I began to inform myself of the position and character of the enemy's works and of the number and disposition of his troops. A personal reconnaissance satisfied me that his position was very strong, and that a land approach with my small command was impracticable.
New Madrid I did not suppose that disaster was just then upon them, though I had a deep interest at stake in a son who was there. Now that interest is doubled for my oldest son, just eighteen, is with his brother on Island 10. In a fair field I should glory in their meeting all the chances of battle, but, general, is not this sacrificing the lives of one or two thousand men without an end or an object I beg your pardon if I seem importunate, but the disastrous and disorderly evacuation of Madrid justifies at least the apprehension of a worse disaster under greater disadvantages. The country looks hopefully-oh! how hopefully — to you in this hour of its deepest trials here, and I feel all of that confidence which I know is in the hearts of all good patriots, but still another hope, selfish, perhaps, in its motive and inception, comes up, that is, that you will not abandon to mismanagement this handful of brave men, unless by the sacrifice of their lives the country, or even this
ed, combine to invade and conquer that island. Mr. Clay had already April 27, 1825. written as Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander H. Everett, our Minister at Madrid, instructing him to urge upon Spain the expediency of acknowledging the independence of her lost colonies. He said: It is not for the new Republics that the y all the means necessary to their security. Several years later, Mr. Van Buren, writing as Gen. Jackson's premier to Mr. C. P. Van Ness, our then Minister at Madrid, urges upon Spain, through him, the acknowledgment of South American independence, on this among other grounds: Considerations connected with a certain class Secretary of State, Dated Washington, August 16, 1854. directed Messrs. James Buchanan, John Y. Mason, and Pierre Soule, our Embassadors at London, Paris, and Madrid respectively, to convene in some European city, there to confer with regard to the best means of getting possession of Cuba. They met accordingly at Ostend, O
d been thoughtfully preserved for this purpose. The whole country was aglow with loyal rejoicings and congratulations; and the President, after attending a meeting of his Cabinet to receive a personal report from Gen. Grant, just arrived from Appomattox, listening to the story of Lee's surrender from his son, Capt. Robert Lincoln, who, being on Grant's staff, had been an eye-witness of the scene, and giving audience to several public men — among them John P. Hale, just appointed Minister to Madrid, and Speaker Colfax, who was taking leave for an overland journey to California and Oregon--concluded to seek relaxation from his many and weighty cares by spending the evening at Ford's Theater, where Gen. Grant and he had been publicly announced as probable visitors that night, while the former had been compelled by inexorable duties to disappoint the expectation thus excited. At 8 P. M., the President and his wife, with two others, rode to the theater, and were ushered into the private b
tion of Columbus, and repeating a near approach to that place, while Capt. Stewart, with his company, pushed a reconnoissance, eight miles, quite to Milburn, taking the town by surprise and picking up a man just from Columbus, from whom he derived much valuable information respecting the condition of the rebel force at that point. He learned from this source that our demonstrations toward Columbus had excited alarm, and induced the enemy to call in his forces at Jackson, Beauregard, New — Madrid and other places. Milburn is reproached as a Union town by the rebels. Joined at Weston's by the Seventh Illinois, (Col. Cook,) our whole force encamped for the night, in line of battle, ten miles from Columbus, taking a strong position, commanding the approaches to that place by two roads which intersect the road leading to Putney's Bend and Elliott's Mills to Milburn. Brig.-Gen. Grant, commanding the various forces in the field, came up with us at this point, and expressed his approva
o attempt against the battery was made, and all communication from below with the forces near Island No.10 was cut off. One of the gunboats would occasionally, during a dark night, steal up close along the opposite shore to Tiptonville, but always at such great risk that it was seldom undertaken. Neither supplies nor men could be taken up or carried off in this way. Such was the condition of affairs on the six-teenth of March. The object for which the land-forces had been moved on New — Madrid was accomplished in the capture of that place and the blockade of the river to any supplies and reeforcements for the enemy at and around Island No.10. Meantime the flotilla had been firing at long range, both from the gun and mortar-boats, at the batteries of the enemy in and opposite the Island, for seven consecutive days, without any apparent effect, and without any advance whatever toward their reduction. This result was doubtless due to the defective construction of the boats. On
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ...