ese circumstances, and for the further reason that the enemy, being on the alert, Buell's junction would no doubt be hastened, he was no longer in favor of making the attack, but favored inviting one by turning this offensive movement into a reconnoissance in force, to draw the enemy after us nearer to our base—Corinth—and thereby detach him further from his own, at Pittsburg Landing.
Somewhat similar strategy had been resorted to by Wellington in 1810, when, advancing to attack Massena at Santarem, he unexpectedly found that able officer on his guard, ready for battle, on ground of his own choosing, and much stronger than he had anticipated.
After making some demonstrations in front of his wily adversary, to draw him away from his stronghold, Wellington did not hesitate to retire without giving battle.
General Beauregard's views produced a visible effect on all present.
General Johnston, although shaken, after some reflection said that he admitted the weight and force of Genera