should be suspended, and a more radical remedy be sought
for the present dangers; for they came to the conclusion that
their affairs were in such a state, as to require a commander
with absolute powers.
Feeling now entirely confident of success, Hannibal rejected
the idea of approaching Rome for the present; but traversed
the country plundering it without resistance, and
directing his march towards the coast of the
Adriatic. Hannibal's advance after the battle. Having passed through Umbria and
Picenum, he came upon the coast after a ten days' march
with such enormous booty, that the army could neither
drive nor carry all the wealth which they had taken, and
after killing a large number of people on his road. For
the order was given, usual in the storming of cities, to kill
all adults who came in their way; an order which Hannibal was
prompted to give now by his deep-seated hatred of Rome.This treatment of non-combatants was contrary to the usages of civilised
warfare even in t
ected with the subject-matter.
In the first six books I wrote prefaces, because I thought a
mere table of contents less suitable. . . .
After the battle at Baecula, Hasdrubal made good his passage
over the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cevennes, B.C.
208. In the spring of B.C. 207 he crossed the Alps and descended
into Italy, crossed the Po, and besieged Placentia. Thence he
sent a letter to his brother Hannibal announcing that he would
march southward by Ariminum and meet him in Umbria. The
letter fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who was at Venusia,
and who immediately made a forced march northward, joined his
colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked Hasdrubal. See
above, 10, 39; Livy, 27, 39-49.
Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal's journey into
Italy. . . .See Livy, 27, 39.
Never at any other time had Rome been in a greater state
of excitement and terrified expectation of the result. . . .Livy, 27, 44.
None of these arrangements satisfied Hasdrubal. ButBat