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Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing) 50 2 Browse Search
Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and letters of Charles Sumner: volume 2 34 0 Browse Search
George Ticknor, Life, letters and journals of George Ticknor (ed. George Hillard) 34 0 Browse Search
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 30 0 Browse Search
Knight's Mechanical Encyclopedia (ed. Knight) 22 0 Browse Search
Elizabeth Cary Agassiz, Louis Agassiz: his life and correspondence, third edition 16 0 Browse Search
Cornelius Tacitus, The History (ed. Alfred John Church, William Jackson Brodribb) 16 0 Browse Search
George Bancroft, History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent, Vol. 10 14 0 Browse Search
George Ticknor, Life, letters and journals of George Ticknor (ed. George Hillard) 8 0 Browse Search
Cambridge History of American Literature: volume 2 (ed. Trent, William Peterfield, 1862-1939., Erskine, John, 1879-1951., Sherman, Stuart Pratt, 1881-1926., Van Doren, Carl, 1885-1950.) 8 0 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). You can also browse the collection for Vienna (Wien, Austria) or search for Vienna (Wien, Austria) in all documents.

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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Advertisement (search)
nd Bouvroy. The discussions of several authors, among others those of the Marquis de Chambray and of General Okounieff upon the fire of infantry. Finally, the dissertations of a host of officers, recorded in the interesting military journals of Vienna, of Berlin, of Munich, of Stutgard and of Paris, have contributed also to the successive progress of the parts which they have discussed. Some essays have been attempted towards a history of the art, from the ancients down to our time. Tranch is not one of my reflections which he has not repeated. Okounieff, Valentini, Ruhle; those of Messrs. de Laborde, Koch, de Chambrai, Napier; finally, the fragments published by Messrs. Wagner and Scheel, in the interesting journals of Berlin and Vienna, have all more or less assisted in the development of the science of war. Perhaps I may be permitted also to claim a small part in this result in favor of my long critical and military history of the wars of the Revolution, and of the other histo
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
ubject Spain, aroused against them as one man, would not manoeuvre like two hundred thousand French wishing to march upon Vienna, or any other capital, there to dictate peace (1809); and they would not do the guerillas of Mina the honor to combat the examples, could it be said that the two hundred thousand French of whom we have just spoken, ought equally to march upon Vienna, whatever should be the moral condition of the governments, and of the population between the Rhine and the Inn, and betwble result, which indicates the highest degree of advantages to which the chiefs of a State can aspire. The cabinet of Vienna succeeded all the more surely, as its intervention was not merely of the nature of those mentioned in article 3, that is urn if Prussia had intervened in them; that of the north of Germany in 1807, depended equally as much upon the cabinet of Vienna. Finally, that of Romelia in 1829, assured by measures of a wise and moderate policy, could have had fatal results if ca
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
hat name. The Austrian and Prussian staffs had, meanwhile, good schools already, which from time to time, have borne their fruits; the maps recently published at Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Stuttgard, Paris, as well as those of the interesting institute of Herder, at Friburg in Brisgau, assure to future generals immense resources, un 1796 he did decidedly very badly. But Louvois and Carnot directed alone the operations without assembling a council. The Aulic council of war, established at Vienna, had often the mission of directing the operations of the armies; there has never been but one voice in Europe upon the fatal effects which have resulted from it;f generals and ministers; but there, ought to be limited the action of such a council, for if it has the pretention to tell the generalissimo not only to march to Vienna or to Paris, but still to indicate to him the manner in which he must manoeuvre in order to arrive there, then the poor general will be certainly beaten, and all
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
Austrian neutrality; the second upon the great remoteness of the base of the French army which put its communications with the Elbe at the mercy of the cabinet of Vienna; it depended only upon the latter, from this epoch, to put an end to those immoderate invasions; the manoeuvre of the French general might be strategically good, ates to the environs of Verona. In 1805, the corps of Ney and Augerau alternately played this part in Tyrol and in Bavaria, as well as Mortier and Marmont around Vienna. Napoleon, marching to the war of 1806, formed such reserves on the Rhine; Mortier used them for subjecting Hesse. At the same time second reserves were forme useless material, he surpassed the mobility of all modern armies; he conquered the Peninsula by a series of strategical marches and combats. His movement upon Vienna in 1797, was a rash operation, but legitimated perhaps by the necessity of conquering the Arch-Duke Charles before the arrival of the reinforcements coming from t
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
to be victorious over these scattered fractions and to capture that one which wished to cut off their retreat, a fate from which Saint-Cyr escaped by a miracle. It is recollected how the same General Weyrother, who had wished to surround Napoleon at Rivoli, designed to do the same at Austerlitz, in spite of the severe lesson. which he had received without profit to him. It is known how the left of the Allies, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, in order to cut him off from the road to Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement of about two leagues, left an opening of half a league in its line, from which Napoleon profited by falling upon the isolated centre, and surrounding afterwards that left, thrust between the lakes of Tellnitz and Melnitz. Finally, it is known how Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a manoeuvre nearly similar, because the left of Marmont, which wished to cut him off from the route to Portugal, ]eft a gap of half a league
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
ne by Bavaria, found the Allies upon the Lech and the Iser and should be in force, it would be very delicate to throw all the Austrian army into the Tyrol or into Bohemia, with the idea of arresting thus its direct march, for it would be necessary always to leave the half of this Austrian army upon the Inn in order to cover the approaches to the capitol; then there would be a fatal division in the forces, and if it were decided to concentrate the whole army in the Tyrol, leaving the route of Vienna open, the plan would be very dangerous in presence of an enterprising enemy. In Italy beyond the Mincio the lateral defense would be easy on the side of the Tyrol, and inBohemia also against an enemy coming from Saxony. But it is especially in applying it to Prussia that this system of parallel retreats offers all the variations of which it is susceptible, for it would be perfect against an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or upon the Oder, whilst that it would be altogether im
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Note on intrenched camps. (search)
uld rarely, occur that both banks would require to be defended at the same time, the same also of the side along the Danube; now, the true defense would scarcely comprise but the distance of eight thousand yards, from the mouth of the Traun to the Danube above, so that with eighty battalions the camp would be well guarded. Denuded of troops, it would always require a garrison of five thousand men for the occupation of the towers; but those men, scattered into thirty-two small detachments, would be unable to make sorties. Definitively, if Vienna still possessed its ancient enciente, and its garrison were resolved to make good use of it, the enemy would think twice before braving two such establishments, and march without being disturbed by them upon that capital by the valley of the Danube. It could be done only by the route through Carinthia, except after having totally defeated the army as at Ulm, at Jena, and at Waterloo, or after having reduced the camp of Linz. logistics.