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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
r so little dissidence. What would a council of war have done in which Napoleon, in quality of counselor, should have proposed the movement of Arcola, the plan of Rivoli, the march by the St. Bernard, the movement of Ulm, and that upon Gera and Jena? The timid would have found those operations rash even to folly; others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution; all would have rejected them. If, on the contrary, the council should have accepted them, and another than Napoleon sho the empire was lost. I have said that it is necessary never to inspire too much contempt for the enemy, because that where you should find an obstinate resistance, the moral of the soldier might he shaken by it. Napoleon, addressing himself at Jena to the corps of Lannes, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that it could do nothing against the bayonets of his Egyptians! It is necessary also to forewarn the officers, and through them the soldiers, against those sudden turns which of
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
in 1806, was combined absolutely in the same manner; he occupied at Jena and at Naumburg the line Fgh, and marched afterwards by Halle and De; it is.the exact application of the manoeuvres at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. When the theatre of war shall not be adjacent to the sea, it wilof the hostile army that must be aimed at. The manoeuvres at Ulm and Jena could not be advised to an army which should march merely to besiegeategic manoeuvre. Thus, the splendid operations of Marengo, Ulm and Jena, could not have had such results upon a theatre as extended as that m thence upon his line of retreat? What were the marches to Ulm and Jena but the same manoeuvre? What was the march of Blucher to Waterloo, ortuneness of such movements. In fact, the often cited marches of Jena and of Ulm were veritable flank manoeuvres, quite like that upon Milsuch efforts the most decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena and at Ratisbon. The whole art of strategical warfare is contained
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
actively engaged upon the left until towards one o'clock. At Dresden he attacked by the two wings, for the first time perhaps in his life, because his center was sheltered by a fort and an intrenched camp; moreover, the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the line of retreat of the Allies. At Marengo, if Napoleon himself is to be trusted, the oblique order which he took in resting his right upon Castel Ceriolo, saved him from an almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles gained strategically, before being delivered even, and tactics had but little part in them; at Ulm there was not even a battle. I think then I can conclude that, if it be absurd to expect to draw upon the ground rectilinear orders of battle such as are traced upon a plan, a skillful general can nevertheless have recourse to dispositions which would produce a distribution of the acting masses, similar very nearly to what it would have been in one or another of the orders of bat
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
one shall receive the information of those movements, he will know nothing of those which supervene in the interval, nor of the ulterior end which the enemy proposes to himself; he will know well, for example, that such a corps has passed through Jena, directing itself upon Weimar — such another has passed through Gera, directing itself towards Naumburg; but where will they go? What do they wish to undertake? This is what will be very difficult to learn even from the most skillful spy. Whements, since the interest was always the same? Thus well convinced of these truths, I did not hesitate to announce--a month before the war--that it would be what Napoleon would undertake, and that if the Prussians passed the Saale, it would be at Jena and at Naumburg that they would fight. What suppositions did the Duke of Brunswick and his counsellors make at the same instant that I saw so accurately? In order to credit it, it is necessary to read them in the works of Mm. C. de W. and Ruhl
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
re has but an instantaneous effect, of which it is necessary to profit briskly before the enemy drive back your cavalry disunited. The fine charge of the French upon Gosa, at the battle of Leipsic, 16th of October, is a great example of this kind. Those which they executed at Waterloo with the same object, were admirable, but without results, for want of support. In the same manner the audacious charge of the feeble cavalry of Ney upon the artillery of the Prince Hohenloe, at the battle of Jena, is an example of what may be done in such a case. Finally, general charges are made against the enemy's cavalry for driving it from the field of battle and returning afterwards against his battalions with more liberty. The cavalry could be launched with success for taking the hostile line in flank or in reverse, at the moment of a serious attack, which the infantry should execute in front. If it be repulsed, it can return at a gallop, and be rallied upon the army; if it succeed, it ma
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Conclusion (search)
the greater or less martial spirit, not only of nations, but even of epochs The famous Spanish proverb, he was brave on such a day, may be applied to nations as well as to individuals. One could not compare the French at Rosback with those at Jena nor the Prussians at Prenzlow with those at Dennewitz.--in a word, all that which may be called the poetry and the metaphysics of war, will ever have an influence upon its results. Is it saying, for all that, that there are no tactical rules, agh have triumphed only by inspiration, or by the moral superiority of their battalions? Will there not be found, on the contrary, in the victories of Turin, of Hochstaedt, of Ramillies, manoeuvres which resemble those of Talavera, of Waterloo, of Jena, or of Austerlitz, and which were the causes of victory? Now, when the application of a maxim, and the manoeuvre which has been its result, have a hundred times given the victory to skillful captains, and offer in their favor all the probable cha
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Note on intrenched camps. (search)
uld rarely, occur that both banks would require to be defended at the same time, the same also of the side along the Danube; now, the true defense would scarcely comprise but the distance of eight thousand yards, from the mouth of the Traun to the Danube above, so that with eighty battalions the camp would be well guarded. Denuded of troops, it would always require a garrison of five thousand men for the occupation of the towers; but those men, scattered into thirty-two small detachments, would be unable to make sorties. Definitively, if Vienna still possessed its ancient enciente, and its garrison were resolved to make good use of it, the enemy would think twice before braving two such establishments, and march without being disturbed by them upon that capital by the valley of the Danube. It could be done only by the route through Carinthia, except after having totally defeated the army as at Ulm, at Jena, and at Waterloo, or after having reduced the camp of Linz. logistics.