Browsing named entities in Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). You can also browse the collection for Krasnoi (Moldova) or search for Krasnoi (Moldova) in all documents.

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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
mstance which made all the chances of the campaign turn in their favor. In the same manner, in 1812, it was, by basing themselves perpendicularly upon the Oka and Kalouga, that the Russians were able to execute their flank march upon Wiazma and Krasnoi. Moreover, to be convinced of this, it is sufficient to reflect, that the front of operations of an army, the base of which should be perpendicular to that of the enemy, would be found established parallelly to the line of operations of its aommunications of Melas; those which he made in 1805 by Donauwert, to cut off Mack, and 1806 by Gera, to turn the Prussians; the march of Suwaroff to fly from Turin upon Trebbia to meet Macdonald; that of the Russian army upon Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive operations, not from their relations with la logistique, but from their relations with strategy. However, properly considered, those skillful marches are never but means of putting in practice, the various applications of the p
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
spects the steadiness and the admirable firmness of the body of troops which executed it. Finally, although the retreat from Moscow was for Napoleon a bloody catastrophe, it cannot be denied that it was glorious for him and for his troops, at Krasnoi as at the Beresina; for the skeleton of the army was saved, whilst not a man ought to have returned. In this memorable event, the two parties covered themselves with equal glory, the chances alone differed like the results. The magnitude of each other,) and committed in that a fault, so much the more serious, that the enemy did not follow in his trail, but rather in a lateral direction, and chanced to fall almost perpendicularly in the midst of his isolated corps; the three days of Krasnoi, so fatal to his army, were the result of it. This system of echelons upon the same route, can only have for its object to avoid being encumbered; now it suffices that the interval between the time of departure of the corps be sufficiently great
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
y Napoleon who had just left Moscow with all his army to commence his retreat. He was not at first believed and it was necessary that Seslawin, piqued, should go and carry off an officer and some soldiers of the guard, in the midst of the French bivouacs, to confirm his report. This information which decided the march of Kutusoff upon Malo-Jaroslawitz, prevented Napoleon from taking the route of Kalouga, where he would have found more resources,where he would have avoided the disasters of Krasnoi and of the Beresina, which for the rest, would have diminished the catastrophe without preventing it entirely. Such examples however rare they may be suffice to give an idea of what can be expected from good partisans conducted by capable officers. To conclude I would sum up this article with the following truths: 1st. That a general ought to neglect nothing in order to be informed of the movements of the enemy and employ to this effect reconnoissances, spies, light corps conducte