Browsing named entities in John Bell Hood., Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies. You can also browse the collection for Chattanooga (Tennessee, United States) or search for Chattanooga (Tennessee, United States) in all documents.

Your search returned 17 results in 8 document sections:

States Army should go to the hotel in a carriage; but to our astonishment, on hailing a driver, we found the charge to be twenty dollars in gold. This aspect of affairs-our pay being only about sixty dollars a monthcompelled us to hold consultation with our brother officers and to adopt the only alternative: to proceed on foot to whatever quarters we desired to occupy. After having been stationed a short period at Benicia Barracks, I was directed to report for duty to Captain Judah at Fort Jones, Scott's Valley, in the northern portion of California. Colonel Buchanan was in command of my regiment, with Captain U. S. Grant as Quarter Master. It was at this post I formed a warm attachment to Lieutenant George Crook, now Brigadier General in the Army, and who has so signally distinguished himself as an Indian fighter. Although he completed his course at West Point a year before I graduated, his purse was not much longer than my own; it became therefore necessary for us to devise so
I was wounded, urging my promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, and was kind enough about the same time to send the following letter: headquarters, Chattanooga, September 24th, 1864. General:--I respectfully recommend Major General J. B. Hood for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, for distinguished conduct Your obedient servant, (Signed) J. Longstreet, Lieutenant General. General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. Endorsed: Headquarters, near Chattanooga, September 24th, 1863. W. D. 1988. J. Longstreet, Lieutenant General, recommends Major General J. B. Hood for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Gener largely re-enforce General J. E. Johnston's Army at Dalton, for the object of moving in the early Spring to the rear of the Federal Army, then concentrating at Chattanooga. He also expressed a desire to send me to command a corps under General Johnston. I was deeply impressed with the importance of this movement, and cheerfully
he name Rocky-faced Ridge indicates. The Confederate position was one of the strongest to be desired; it was necessary to hold but two gaps in the mountains: Mill Creek and Snake Creek. The approach of the Federal Army down the railroad from Chattanooga, in lieu of down the road from Cleveland, rendered the position the more secure, inasmuch as General Johnston would not have had a stone wall between him and his adversary, had General Sherman advanced by the latter route, where the country is open towards Cleveland. I have always thought General Sherman did not wish to accept a pitched battle, or he would have moved upon Dalton from that direction. His advance by the Chattanooga road, and, subsequently, in front of Rocky Face, convinces me that his intention was to initiate the policy of wasting our strength, which he so effectually carried out in the campaign from Dalton to Atlanta. He came to the position of all others most favorable, if our commander could have been induced t
be ordered with the whole of his available force into Tennessee for the same object. I intended General Wheeler should operate, in the first instance, south of Chattanooga. I was hopeful that this combined movement would compel Sherman to retreat for want of supplies, and thus allow me an opportunity to fall upon his rear with ailroads and compelling us to fall back from our conquest. To prepare for this, or any other emergency, I ordered Newton's Division of the Fourth Corps back to Chattanooga, and Corse's Division of the Seventeenth Corps to Rome, and instructed General Rosseau at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, and Stedman at Chattanooga, to adopt thChattanooga, to adopt the most active measures to protect and insure the safety of our roads. So vast were the facilities of the Federal commander to reinforce his line of skirmishers, extending from Nashville to Atlanta, that we could not bring together a sufficient force of cavalry to accomplish the desired object. I thereupon became convinced, and
ontroversy by characterizing an official act of mine in unfair and improper terms. I reiterate my former answer, and to the only new matter contained in your rejoinder add: We have no negro allies in this Army; not a single negro soldier left Chattanooga with this Army, or is with it now. There are a few guarding Chattanooga, which General Stedman sent at one time to drive Wheeler out of Dalton. I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shelling of Atlanta, a fortified townChattanooga, which General Stedman sent at one time to drive Wheeler out of Dalton. I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shelling of Atlanta, a fortified town, with magazines, arsenals, foundries, and public stores; you were bound to take notice. See the books. This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not begin, and terminate with satisfaction. I am, with respect, your obedient servant, W. T. Sherman, Major General Commanding. I preferred here to close the discussion, and, therefore, made no reply to his last communication inviting me to see the books. I will at present, however, consider this subject, and cite a few
eason of the impaired condition of the Army. The same question had arisen for consideration when Sherman moved from Chattanooga, and formed line of battle in front of Rocky-faced Ridge. My predecessor did not perceive the necessity of defeating oona, but was repulsed. We have plenty of bread and meat, but forage is scarce. I want to destroy all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make for the sea coast. We cannot defend this long line of road. On the same day he sel move to Blue Mountain. We can maintain our men and animals on the country. On the 17th, he writes Schofield, at Chattanooga: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 157. * * * We must follow Hoodtill he is beyond the reach of mischief, and untry as far north as the Ohio, if it had marched in the early Spring of ‘64, to the rear of the Federals (who were at Chattanooga assembling their forces); and when, in addition to the troops at Dalton, Polk's Army, Longstreet's Ccrps, and ten thou
the only means to checkmate Sherman, and co-operate with General Lee to save the Confederacy, lay in speedy success in Tennessee and Kentucky, and in my ability finally to attack Grant in rear with my entire force. On the 9th, I telegraphed to the Secretary of War: [no. 38.]headquarters Tuscumbia, November 9th. Hon. J. A. Seddon, Richmond, Va. Information received places Sherman's Army as follows: One corps at Atlanta, two corps at or near Marietta; and three at or north of Chattanooga. Heavy rains will delay the operations of this Army a few days. J. B. Hood, General. Although every possible effort was made to expedite the repairs upon the railroad, the work progressed slowly. Heavy rains in that section of the country also interfered with the completion of the road. I informed General Beauregard of the President's opposition to my plan, and, on the 12th, replied to His Excellency, as follows: [no. 39.]headquarters near Florence, Alabama, November 12t
, resting upon the Franklin pike, with Cheatham's Corps upon the right, and Stewart's on the left, and the cavalry on either flank extending to the river. I was causing strong detached works to be built to cover our flanks, intending to make them enclosed works, so as to defeat any attempt of the enemy should he undertake offensive movements against our flank and rear. The enemy still held Murfreesboroa with about six thousand (6000) men strongly fortified. He also held small forces at Chattanooga and Knoxville. It was apparent that he would soon have to take the offensive to relieve his garrisons at those points or cause them to be evacuated, in which case I hoped to capture the forces at Murfreesboroa, and should then be able to open communication with Georgia and Virginia. Should he attack me in position, I felt that I could defeat him, and thus gain possession of Nashville with abundant supplies for the Army. This would give me possession of Tennessee. Necessary steps were