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y quartered at Macon, whilst McPherson's and Schofield's Corps were tearing up the Georgia Railroadming line of battle facing Peach Tree creek; Schofield was on his left, and McPherson well on towarnight, where he came into communication with Schofield's troops, which had also reached Decatur. across Peach Tree creek; that McPherson and Schofield were well over toward, and even on, the Georin order to completely isolate McPherson and Schofield's forces from those of Thomas; and, finally,lroad crossing. The Army of the Ohio, under Schofield, was also about to cross east of the Buckheahe could fortify himself, and then turn upon Schofield and McPherson. To do this, Cheatham was ordeous position to hold in check McPherson and Schofield. The result was not, however, materially af by drawing two of Howard's Divisions nearer Schofield. On the 20th I was with General Schofield neGeneral Schofield near the centre, and soon after noon heard heavy firing in front of Thomas's right, which lasted an h[3 more...]
may say, unchanged, with the exception that Schofield and McPherson had advanced slightly toward Ange blunder in separating Thomas so far from Schofield and McPherson. Sherman evidently perceived There was quite a gap between Thomas and Schofield, which 1 endeavored to close by drawing two on the 2Ist: it was but partiallyentrenched; Schofield and McPherson were still separated from Thomof parapet, Peach Tree line, to the front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were adnd in person was on horseback at the head of Schofield's troops, who had advanced in front of the Hmanned, with guns in position at intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and I could n of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed that we ought to brous, defeated the movement of McPherson and Schofield upon our communications, in that direction, ever, is not likely, as Thomas's command and Schofield's together, made a much larger force than th[2 more...]
line, with the Blue Mountain Railroad in rear, by which means the Confederate Army could, with ease, have been provisioned. See Official Report, Appendix page 324. Notwithstanding the presence of one of Sherman's Corps at the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, I would have made this move. I would have thrown upon our left flank a sufficient force to occupy the Federals, at the bridge, whilst we laid pontoons and passed round to their rear, as we subsequently did in the presence of Schofield, at Columbia, Tennessee. Had I been enabled to carry into effect this plan, Hardee and Lee would not have been sent to Jonesboroa, as the cavalry would have been instructed to retard, to the utmost, the advance of the enemy, whilst Major General Cobb made demonstrations from the direction of Macon. Thus, while Sherman was destroying the road to Macon, I would have been upon his communications with Nashville, and the desertions, together with the demoralization which followed the evacuati
, as he approached Atlanta, and the move of McPherson and Schofield upon the Augusta road was ably conceived and executed. Team and the Chattahoochee, and thus isolated himself from Schofield and McPherson. His right should have rested in the vicinant demonstrations against the city, whilst McPherson and Schofield destroyed the road to Augusta. At the same time, by use could not have attacked either his left or McPherson and Schofield, without marching out of Atlanta, and exposing our left fence. After my loss of the Augusta road, McPherson and Schofield should have marched by the right flank down Peach Tree, i Army to join the two corps below Camp creek, followed by Schofield and McPherson. The transportation of the Federal Army ding to or across the West Point Railway; have instructed Schofield and McPherson to move rapidly, as they had done upon Decal de sac aforementioned, separated him from McPherson and Schofield, and subjected him to an assault by the main body of our
page 156. Send me Morgan's and Newton's old Divisions. Re-establish the road, and I will follow Hood wherever he maygo. I think he will move to Blue Mountain. We can maintain our men and animals on the country. On the 17th, he writes Schofield, at Chattanooga: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 157. * * * We must follow Hoodtill he is beyond the reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive. Ten days after this declaration, he was still undecided as to the plan he shoultillery to accompany the Army, in order to overcome any serious opposition by the Federal gunboats; to cross the Tennessee at or near Guntersville, and again destroy Sherman's communications, at Stevenson and Bridgeport; to move upon Thomas and Schofield, and attempt to rout and capture their Army before it could reach Nashville. I intended then to march upon that city where I would supply the Army and reinforce it, if possible, by accessions from Tennessee. I was imbued with the belief that
I hoped by a rapid march to get in rear of Schofield's forces, then at Pulaski, before they were d been made with the hope of cutting off General Schofield from Columbia, and barely failed in this the campaign. I was confident that after Schofield had crossed the river and placed that obstruhe artillery, to demonstrate heavily against Schofield, and follow him if he retired. Since I ha him off from Nashville. I also knew that Schofield was occupied in his front, since I could disould be at Spring Hill, as couriers reported Schofield's main body still in front of Lee, at Columbbia, to have enveloped, routed, and captured Schofield's Army that afternoon and the ensuing day. GFullerton, of the United States Army; he was Schofield's adjutant general at the time of these eveny infantrymen (post troops). The rest of General Schofield's Army was in the vicinity of Columbia, repulsed by General Cox, and at 3 p. m., General Schofield became satisfied that the enemy would no
g to the lateness of the hour and my inability, consequently, to post it on the extreme left. Schofield's position was rendered favorable for defence by open ground in front, and temporary entrenchmrticipation of Lee's entire Corps on the extreme left. This, it may safely be asserted, saved Schofield's Army from destruction. I might, with equal assurance, assert that had Lieutenant General Lee been in advance at Spring Hill the previous afternoon, Schofield's Army never would have passed that point. Shortly afterward I sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War and to Generall causes, in order to avoid possible error. After the failure of my cherished plan to crush Schofield's Army before it reached its strongly fortified position around Nashville, 1 remained with an ur inability to attack the Federals in their new stronghold with any hope of success, although Schofield's troops had abandoned the field at Franklin, leaving their dead and wounded in our possession
northeasterly direction, emptying into the Chattahoochee river near the railroad crossing. The Army of the Ohio, under Schofield, was also about to cross east of the Buckhead road. The Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, was moving on the Georm's on the right, entrenched. My object was to crush Thomas's Army before he could fortify himself, and then turn upon Schofield and McPherson. To do this, Cheatham was ordered to hold his left on the creek in order to separate Thomas's Army from ank him on his left, he retired slowly to Franklin. I learned from dispatches captured at Spring Hill from Thomas to Schofield, that the latter was instructed to hold that place till the position at Franklin could be made secure, indicating the ition of Thomas to hold Franklin and his strong works at Murfreesboroa. Thus I knew that it was all important to attack Schofield before he could make himself strong, and if he should escape at Franklin, he would gain his works about Nashville. The
ecution of its laws, and oppose a barrier to the schemes by which the President sought to restore the. rebels to power. The rebel states were divided into five military districts, each to be commanded by a major-general. These officers were selected by Grant, though appointed to those places by the President, and in making the selection he took those whom he knew to be faithful to the policy on which the rebellion had been suppressed, and opposed to the restoration of rebels to power. Schofield, Sickles, Thomas, Ord, and Sheridan were the officers appointed to the several districts; but Thomas, desiring to remain in command in Kentucky and Tennessee, Pope was designated in his place. The authority of these commanders was great, but their acts were subject to the approval or disapproval of General Grant, who thus had the responsibility of the execution of the laws and the exercise of military power in the rebel states, so far as such responsibility could be separated from the Pre
head, and seemed for the moment to confuse him. He walked a few paces to the rear, saying to Maj. Schofield, his Adjutant, I fear the day is lost ; to which Schofield responded, No, General; let us trSchofield responded, No, General; let us try them once more. Maj. Sturgis offered him his own horse, which Lyon at first declined, but soon after mounted, and, bleeding from his two wounds, swung his hat in the air, and called upon the trooplear, so far as we could see, an almost total silence reigned for a space of twenty minutes. Maj. Schofield now informed me of the death of Gen. Lyon, and reported for orders. The responsibility whicr and a half, was myself in an ambulance. I did not see the latter part of the action, but Major Schofield stated to me that, after the last repulse, it was a perfect rout — that the enemy fled in the wildest confusion. Everybody says that. * * * Schofield also stated that, in attempting to ride forward to reconnoiter and see where the enemy were, their dead were piled up so thick that he coul
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