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ost pronounced advocates of a strong central government in the convention, said: He came here to form a compact for the good of Americans. He was ready to do so with all the States. He hoped and believed they all would enter into such a compact. If they would not, he would be ready to join with any States that would. But, as the compact was to be voluntary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on what the Southern States will never agree to. Madison Papers, pp. 1081, 1082. Madison, while inclining to a strong government, said: In the case of a union of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been understood, etc. Ibid., p. 1184. Hamilton, in the Federalist, repeatedly speaks of the new government as a confederate republic and a confederacy, and calls the Constitution a compact. See especially Nos. IX and LXXXV. General Washington—who was not only the first President under the new Constitution, but who had presided over the convent
hose days, made this declaration: The people inhabiting the territory formerly called the Province of Massachusetts Bay do hereby solemnly and mutually agree with each other to form themselves into a free, sovereign, and independent body politic, or State, by the name of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts. New Hampshire, in her constitution, as revised in 1792, had identically the same declaration, except as regards the name of the state and the word state instead of commonwealth. Madison, one of the most distinguished of the men of that day and of the advocates of the Constitution, in a speech already once referred to, in the Virginia convention of 1788, explained that We, the people, who were to establish the Constitution, were the people of thirteen sovereignties. Elliott's Debates, Vol. III, p. 114, edition of 1836. In the Federalist he repeatedly employs the term—as, for example, when he says: Do they [the fundamental principles of the Confederation] require tha
derations which may conduce to a clearer understanding of this supremacy of the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof: 1. In the first place, it must be remembered that, when the federal Constitution was formed, each then existing state already had its own constitution and code of statute laws. It was, no doubt, primarily with reference to these that the provision was inserted, and not in the expectation of future conflicts or discrepancies. It is in this light alone that Madison considers it in explaining and vindicating it in the Federalist. Federalist, No. Xliv. 2. Again, it is to be observed that the supremacy accorded to the general laws of the United States is expressly limited to those enacted in conformity with the Constitution, or, to use the exact language, made in pursuance thereof. Hamilton, in another chapter of the Federalist, calls particular attention to this, saying (and the italics are all his own) that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the
1787, and their fate further testimony Hamilton, Madison, Washington, Marshall, etc. later theories Webstee of each state, Gouverneur Morris—as we learn from Madison—moved that the reference of the plan [i. e., of thee would be unknown to us but for the record kept by Madison. The extracts which have been given, in treatingthe Federalist, in conjunction with his associates, Madison and Jay, the most distinguished expounder and advociation of the same truth soon afterward asserted by Madison in the Virginia convention—that the people who orda the people as composing thirteen sovereignties. Madison, in the Philadelphia convention, had at first held citation from them. The evidence of Hamilton and Madison—two of the most eminent of the authors of the Constly in accord with these truths are the arguments of Madison in the Federalist, to show that the great principlen to the authors of the declarations above quoted. Madison was a leading member of the Virginia convention, w
formed the Constitution, it was proposed to confer upon Congress the power to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof. When this proposition came to be considered, Madison observed that a union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be consr this recourse unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This motion was adopted nem. con., and the proposition was never again revived. Madison Papers, pp. 732, 761. Again on a subsequent occasion, speaking of an appeal to force, Madison said: Was such a remedy eligible? Was it practicable? . . . Any government for the United States, formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacio
Chapter 14: Early Foreshadowings opinions of Madison and Rufus King safeguards provided their failure State Interpositions the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions their endorsement by the people in the presidential Elections of 1800 and ensuing terms South Carolina and Calhoun the Compromise of 1833 action of Majudge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress. In the Virginia resolutions, drawn by Madison, adopted on December 24, 1798, and reaffirmed in 1799, the General Assembly of that state declares that it views the powers of the Federal Government as resultingxty years, with two exceptions. The last victory obtained under them, and when they were emphasized by adding the construction of them contained in the report of Madison to the Virginia legislature in 1799, was at the election of Buchanan—the last President chosen by vote of a party that could with any propriety be styled national
ic whereof one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets. New York Tribune of November 9, 1860, quoted in The American Conflict, Vol. I, Chapt. XXIII, p. 359. The only liberty taken with this extract has been that of presenting certain parts of it in italics. Nothing that has ever been said by the author of this work, in the foregoing chapters, on the floor of the Senate, or elsewhere, more distinctly asserted the right of secession. Nothing that has been quoted from Hamilton, or Madison, or Marshall, or John Quincy Adams, more emphatically repudiates the claim of right to restrain or coerce a state in the exercise of its free choice. Nothing that has been said since the war which followed could furnish a more striking condemnation of its origin, prosecution, purposes, and results. A comparison of the sentiments above quoted, with the subsequent career of the party, of which that journal was and long had been the recognized organ, would exhibit a striking incongruity and
y independent of the action of anybody else; unless it be intended, by the remarks made here, to refer its action to the great principles of those who have gone before us, and who have left us the rich legacy of the free institutions under which we live. If it be attempted to assign the movement to the nullification tenets of South Carolina, as my friend near me seemed to understand, then I say you must go further back, and impute it to the State rights and strict-construction doctrines of Madison and Jefferson. You must refer these in their turn to the principles in which originated the Revolution and separation of these then colonies from England. You must not stop there, but go back still further, to the bold spirit of the ancient barons of England. That spirit has come down to us, and in that spirit has all the action since been taken. We will not permit aggressions. We will defend our rights; and, if it be necessary, we will claim from this Government, as the barons of Engl
k as the time of the Confederation, when no narrow, miserable prejudice between Northern and Southern men governed those who ruled the States, a committee of three, two of whom were Northern men, reporting upon what they considered the bad faith of Spain in Florida, in relation to fugitive slaves, proposed that negotiations should be instituted to require Spain to surrender, as the States did then surrender, all fugitives escaped into their limits. Hamilton and Sedgwick from the North, and Madison from the South, made that report—men, the loftiness of whose purpose and genius might put to shame the puny efforts now made to disturb that which lies at the very foundation of the Government under which we live. A man not knowing into what presence he was introduced, coming into this Chamber, might, for a large part of this session, have supposed that here stood the representatives of belligerent States, and that, instead of men assembled here to confer together for the common welfare
? Do not our whole people, interior and seaboard, North, South, East, and West, alike feel proud of the hardihood, the enterprise, the skill, and the courage of the Yankee sailor, who has borne our flag far as the ocean bears its foam, and caused the name and character of the United States to be known and respected wherever there is wealth enough to woo commerce, and intelligence to honor merit? So long as we preserve and appreciate the achievements of Jefferson and Adams, of Franklin and Madison, of Hamilton, of Hancock, and of Rutledge, men who labored for the whole country, and lived for mankind, we can not sink to the petty strife which would sap the foundations and destroy the political fabric our fathers erected and bequeathed as an inheritance to our posterity for ever. Since the formation of the Constitution, a vast extension of territory and the varied relations arising therefrom have presented problems which could not have been foreseen. It is just cause for admiration
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