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Polybius, Histories 38 0 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Polybius, Histories. You can also browse the collection for Tarentum (Italy) or search for Tarentum (Italy) in all documents.

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Polybius, Histories, book 1, The Romans Build Ships (search)
ith such extraordinary audacity, that, without so much as a preliminary trial, they took upon themselves there and then to meet the Carthaginians at sea, on which they had for generations held undisputed supremacy. Proof of what I say, and of their surprising audacity, may be found in this. When they first took in hand to send troops across to Messene they not only had no decked vessels but no war-ships at all, not so much as a single galley: but they borrowed quinqueremes and triremes from Tarentum and Locri, and even from Elea and Neapolis; and having thus collected a fleet, boldly sent their men across upon it. A Carthaginian ship used as a model. It was on this occasion that, the Carthaginians having put to sea in the Strait to attack them, a decked vessel of theirs charged so furiously that it ran aground, and falling into the hands of the Romans served them as a model on which they constructed their whole fleet. And if this had not happened it is clear that they would have been c
Polybius, Histories, book 2, Forces Available to the Romans (search)
usand horse of the allies. Lists of men for service had also been returned, of Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse; of Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse; of Iapygians and Messapians together fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse; and of Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; of Marsi, and Marrucini, and Ferentani, and Vestini, twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. And besides these, there were in reserve in Sicily and Tarentum two legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand two hundred foot, and two hundred horse. Of the Romans and Campanians the total of those put on the roll was two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twentythree thousand horse; so that the grand total of the forces actually defending Rome was over 150,000 foot, 6000 cavalry:This clause is bracketed by Hultsch, Mommsen, and Strachan-Davidson. See the essay of the last named in his Polybius, p. 22. Livy, Ep. 20, gives the number of R
Polybius, Histories, book 2, The First Achaean League (search)
h state; and the Greek cities in that part of Italy became the scene of murder, revolutionary warfare, and every kind of confusion; deputations were sent from most parts of Greece to endeavour to bring about some settlement of these disorders.The Pythagorean clubs, beginning in combinations for the cultivation of mystic philosophy and ascetic life, had grown to be political,—a combination of the upper or cultivated classes to secure political power. Thus Archytas was for many years ruler in Tarentum (Strabo, I.3.4). The earliest was at Croton, but they were also established in many cities of Magna Graecia. Sometime in the fourth century B. C. a general democratic rising took place against them, and their members were driven into exile. Strabo, 8.7.1; Justin, 20, 4; Iamblichus vit. Pythag., 240-262. But the disturbed states preferred the intervention of the Achaeans above all others, and showed the greatest confidence in them, in regard to the measures to be adopted for removing the evi
Polybius, Histories, book 3, Better Success in Spain (search)
s; and were besides being supplied with necessary provisions by sea up the Padus, the Roman people became only too certain of what had really happened in the battle. Winter of B.C. 218-217. Great exertions at Rome to meet the danger. It was a most unexpected reverse, and it forced them at once to urge on with energy the remaining preparations for the war. They reinforced those positions which lay in the way of the enemy's advance; sent legions to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as garrisons to Tarentum, and other places of strategical importance; and, moreover, fitted out a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the citizen legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria, with a view of going to the seat of war by those two routes. They sent also to king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who sent them five hundred Cretan archers and a thousand peltasts. In fact they pushed on their preparatio
Polybius, Histories, book 8, The Hannibalian War — Tarentum (search)
then it looks out for a master; and when it has got one, it is not long before it hates him, because it is seen that the change is for the worse. This is just what happened to the Tarentines on that occasion. . . . On this news being brought to Tarentum and Thurii there was great popular indignation. . . . The conspirators left the town at first under the pretext ofHannibal marched south early in B.C. 212 to renew his attempt upon Tarentum, on which he had wasted much of the previous summer (LiTarentum, on which he had wasted much of the previous summer (Livy, 25, 1) The severity of the punishment of the Tarentine hostages who tried to escape from Rome caused a conspiracy of Tarentines to betray the town to Hannibal. Livy, 25, 7-8. a foray, and got near Hannibal's camp before daybreak. Then, while the rest crouched down on a certain wooded spot by the side of the road, Philemenus and Nicon went up to the camp. They were seized by the sentries and taken off to Hannibal, without saying a word as to where they came from or who they were, but simply s
Polybius, Histories, book 8, Tarentum Betrayed To Hannibal (search)
Tarentum Betrayed To Hannibal For some time before this, Hannibal had given out that Hannibal prepares to act. he was ill, to prevent the Romans wondering when they were told of his staying so long on the same ground; and he now made a greater pretence than ever of ill-health, and remained encamped three days' march from Tarentum. But when the time was come, he got ready the most conspicuous for their speed and daring in his cavalry and infantry, to the number of about ten thousand, and gave orTarentum. But when the time was come, he got ready the most conspicuous for their speed and daring in his cavalry and infantry, to the number of about ten thousand, and gave orders that they should take provisions for four days. He started just before daybreak, and marched at full speed; having told off eighty Numidian horsemen to keep thirty stades ahead, and to scour the country on both sides of the road; so that no one might get a sight of the main body, but might either be taken prisoners by this advanced guard, or, if he escaped, might carry a report of it into the city as if it were merely a raid of Numidian horsemen. When the Numidians were about a hundred and
Polybius, Histories, book 8, Hannibal Secures Tarentum (search)
Hannibal Secures Tarentum A vast quantity of miscellaneous property having been Fortifications raised to preserve the town from attack from the citadel. got together by this plundering, and a booty fully answering the expectations of the Carthaginians, they bivouacked for that night under arms. But the next day, after consulting with the Tarentines, Hannibal decided to cut off the city from the citadel by a wall, that the Tarentines might not any longer be under continual alarm from the Romans in possession of the citadel. His first measure was to throw up a palisade, parallel to the wall of the citadel and to the trench in front of it. But as he very well knew that the enemy would not allow this tamely, but would make a demonstration of their power in that direction, he got ready for the work a number of his best hands, thinking that the first thing necessary was to overawe the Romans and give confidence to the Tarentines. But as soon as the first palisade was begun, the Romans began
Polybius, Histories, book 9, The Hannibalian War (search)
The Hannibalian War In the previous year (212 B. C.) Syracuse had fallen: the two Scipios had been conquered and killed in Spain: the siegeworks had been constructed round Capua, at the very time of the fall of Syracuse, i. e. in the autumn, Hannibal being engaged in fruitless attempts upon the citadel of Tarentum. See Livy, 25, 22. Entirely surrounding the position of Appius Claudius, B. C. 211. Coss. Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus, P. Sulpicius Galba. The Romans were still engaged in the siege of Capua. Hannibal at first skirmished, and tried all he could to tempt him to come out and give him battle. But as no one attended to him, his attack became very like an attempt to storm the camp; for his cavalry charged in their squadrons, and with loud cries hurled their javelins inside the entrenchments, and the infantry attacked in their regular companies, and tried to pull down the palisading round the camp.Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the Consuls of the previous year, were continued in c
Polybius, Histories, book 9, When Audacity is the Truest Safety (search)
s movement that Polybius seems to wish to commend. and success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result of deliberate thought. . . . When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar theThe Carthaginian fleet invited from Sicily to relieve Tarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the people, B. C. 211. Livy, 26, 20. admiral of the Carthaginian fleet came to its relief with a very large force; anTarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the people, B. C. 211. Livy, 26, 20. admiral of the Carthaginian fleet came to its relief with a very large force; and being unable to afford efficient aid to those in the town, owing to the strict blockade maintained by the Romans, without meaning to do so he used up more than he brought; and so after having been constrained by entreaties and large promises to come, he was afterwards forced at the earnest supplication of the people to depart. . . .
Polybius, Histories, book 10, The Hannibalian War — The Recovery of Tarentum (search)
The Hannibalian War — The Recovery of Tarentum THE distance from the strait and town of Rhegium to B.C. 209, Coss. Q. Fabius Maximus V. Q. Fulvius Flaccus IV. Tarentum is more than two thousand stades; and that portion of the shore of Italy is entirely destitute of harbours, except those of Tarentum: I mean the coast facing the Sicilian sea, and verging towards Greece, which contains the most populous barbarian tribes as ne of these cities are compelled to drop anchor in the harbours of Tarentum; and the exchange and commerce with all who occupy this coast of Itheir town and harbour, which yet cannot be compared with those of Tarentum. For, even at this day, Tarentum is in a most convenient position Tarentum is in a most convenient position in respect to the harbours of the Adriatic, and was formerly still more so. Since, from the Iapygian promontory as far as Sipontum, every onefrom the other side and dropping anchor at Italy always crossed to Tarentum, and used that city for his mercantile transactions as an emporium