ey of Virginia to offer battle at a point where, if he could be defeated, Richmond might fall.
Both armies had increased in numbers.
Three days after the battle Lee had 40,000 men, and McClellannotwithstanding his loss in the two battles, had 80,930, exclusive of the two divisions of Couch and Humphreys, which reached him the day after the battle.
The morning report, dated September 20th, sent by McClellanwhich included the troops at Washington under Banks and 3,500 men at Williamsport, Frederick, and Boonsboroa — showed an aggregate present for duty of 164,359, and an aggregate absent of 105,124, making a total present and absent of 293,798.
General McClellan was never in a hurry, but wanted to reach the ideal of preparation before action.
He was deliberate, his Government impatient.
The chasm between the two was widening.
The blood on the field of Sharpsburg was not dry before the Federal army commander was expressing his regret that every dispatch from his general in chie