this withdrawal of the enemy.
I believe it is designed for a decoy, wrote Fitz John Porter, Chief of Staff, to Cadwalader, second in command.
There may be a deep-laot to deceive us.
The whole affair is to me a riddle, wrote Cadwalader back to Porter.
Advancing with a painful overcaution, as if Johnston were the invader, a partas led into his fatal error mainly by the influence of his chief-of-staff, Fitz John Porter.
His senior aid-de-camp, in his testimony before the Committee on the Cont went so far that his order was written by his assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Porter.
It was very much against the wishes of Colonel Porter, and he asked GenerColonel Porter, and he asked General Patterson if he would send for Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas, and consult them on the movement.
General Patterson replied: No, sir; for I know they willder all circumstances.
That was the day before we left Bunker Hill.
Then Colonel Porter asked to have Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas sent for and consulted
foreseen delay; it marks great energy in McDowell that his expedition was only deferred a little over a week beyond the appointed time.
On the 16th of July he issued his orders to march that afternoon.
His army was organized as follows:
First Division, commanded by Tyler: an aggregate of 9,936 men, divided into four brigades, respectively under Keyes, Schenck, Sherman, and Richardson.
Second Division, commanded by Hunter: an aggregate of 2,648 men, divided into two brigades, under Porter and Burnside.
Third Division, commanded by Heintzelman: an aggregate of 9,777 men, divided into three brigades, under Franklin, Willcox, and Howard.
Fourth Division, commanded by Runyon: an aggregate of 5,752 men; no brigade commanders.
Fifth Division, commanded by miles: an aggregate of 6,207 men, divided into two brigades, under Blenker and Davies.
Thus, the total of his command, not including four regiments left in the Alexandria and Arlington forts, was 34,320 men. From t