Grant felt it necessary to remain at City Point in order to be in communication with both Meade and Butler, as Lee's troops were that day moving rapidly south past Butler's front.
My duties kept me on Meade's front a large part of thprepared to hold it. I suppose you cannot make any more attacks, and I feel satisfied all has been done that can be done.
Lee himself did not arrive at Petersburg until noon that day.
After I had returned to headquarters that evening, and had ghe had received them by despatches during the day, he sat in his tent and discussed the situation philosophically, saying: Lee's whole army has now arrived, and the topography of the country about Petersburg has been well taken advantage of by the e portion of the line, but will give the men a rest, and then look to extensions toward our left, with a view to destroying Lee's communications on the south and confining him to a close siege.
At ten o'clock he turned to his table and wrote the fol
e to go up the James the next day, to see that portion of our lines and visit the flagship of Admiral Lee, who commanded the gunboats.
All arrangements were made for the trip, and the President's bo about eight o'clock the next morning, stopping at Bermuda Hundred to take on General Butler. Admiral Lee came aboard from his flag-ship, and the party proceeded up the river as far as it was safe to, while he moved out with the other portion against the railroads, with the design of cutting off Lee's communications in that direction.
Wright's entire corps had been sent back from Butler's fronton to the north side of the North Anna River, upon which he had been sent on the 7th.
As soon as Lee learned of Hunter's success he sent Breckinridge's troops to oppose him; and hearing that Sheridan had started, he ordered Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry commands to move against our cavalry.
They were to attack Sheridan during the night of the 10th and surprise him; but that officer was n
tion of military stores had caused so much alarm that Lee, as has been said before, was compelled to send Breckase.
The result of the campaign, besides compelling Lee to detach troops from his own army, was the burning otunity for cutting off and destroying the troops that Lee had detached from his command, Grant ordered one diviment against Early is that this is probably just what Lee wants me to do, in order that he may transfer the sea at one time that Hill's corps had been detached from Lee's front, and there was some anxiety to know whether iand destroy him if possible before he could return to Lee. Early, however, had gained a day's start, and althouurg, and in the mean time march Early's corps back to Lee, and make a combined attack upon the Army of the Poto with one foot out of bed and with one eye open, lest Lee might make some unexpected movement which would requim to magnify the dangers which were to be feared from Lee's methods of warfare.
The fact that he never nagged
st Richmond, which should be conducted with such a show of serious intention that it would induce Lee to throw a large portion of his command to the north side of the James, and leave the works at Pe were on that side of the river before giving directions for carrying out the rest of his plans.
Lee was now rushing troops to the north side of the James to reinforce the defenses of Richmond.
The was called the battle of Darbytown.
Now that Grant had satisfied himself that more than half of Lee's command had been sent to the north side of the James, he made preparations to throw Hancock's c corps withdrew stealthily from Deep Bottom, followed by the cavalry.
On the morning of the 30th Lee was holding five eighths of his army on the north side of the James, in the belief that Grant was competent force down the valley of Virginia, and hold permanently that great granary, upon which Lee was drawing so largely for his supplies.
The most important thing was to find a commander equal
the captor of Atlanta
an evening with General Thomas
It was found that Lee had sent a division of infantry and cavalry as far as Culpeper to cooperate withain object is to call troops from Early and from the defenses of Petersburg.
If Lee withdraws the bulk of his army from Meade's front, Meade will have a good oppoRailroad.
Hard fighting ensued that day, in which the enemy suffered severely.
Lee hurried troops from north of the James to Petersburg, and in the afternoon of thenched.
All of Hancock's corps was withdrawn from the north side of the James.
Lee soon discovered this, and hurried more troops back to Petersburg.
On the morning of August 21 Hill's whole corps, with a part of Hoke's division and Lee's cavalry, attacked Warren.
Thirty pieces of artillery opened on him, and at ten o'clock v which was of such vital importance to him, but in this he had signally failed.
Lee had been so constantly threatened, or compelled to attack around Petersburg and
(Grant) would turn upon him with his whole command, crush him, and then go after Lee; and that as soon as the weather cleared up the roads would dry rapidly, and thewith ease, and if an infantry force is added to my command, I can strike out for Lee's right, and either crush it or force him to so weaken his intrenched lines thatwork intrenching at Five Forks and to a point about a mile west of that place.
Lee had been as prompt as Grant to recognize Five Forks, the junction of five roads,d take the initiative the next morning, and cut off the whole of the force which Lee had detached.
He said: This force is in more danger than I am. If I am cut off from the Army of the Potomac, it is cut off from Lee's army, and not a man in it ought ever be allowed to get back to Lee. We at last have drawn the enemy's infantryLee. We at last have drawn the enemy's infantry out of its fortifications, and this is our chance to attack it.
He begged me to go to General Grant at once, and urge him to send him Wright's corps, because it ha
My cavalry are rapidly exhausting their ammunition, and if the attack is delayed much longer they may have none left.
And then another batch of staff-officers was sent out to gallop through the mud and hurry up the columns.
At four o'clock the formation was completed, the order for the assault was given, and the struggle for Pickett's intrenched line began.
The Confederate infantry brigades were posted from left to right as follows: Terry, Corse, Steuart, Ransom, and Wallace.
General Fitzhugh Lee, commanding the cavalry, had placed W. H. F. Lee's two brigades on the right of the line, Munford's division on the left, and Rosser's in rear of Hatcher's Run, to guard the trains.
I rode to the front, in company with Sheridan and Warren, with the head of Ayres's division, which was on the left.
Ayres threw out a skirmish-line and advanced across an open field which sloped down gradually toward the dense woods just north of the White Oak road.
He soon met with a fire from the edge
eing driven back, the enemy (Munford's and Rosser's cavalry divisions, under Fitzhugh Lee) having made a bold stand north of the river.
Humphreys was also on the norh side, isolated from the rest of our infantry, confronted by a large portion of Lee's army, and having some heavy fighting.
On my return to general headquarters thad spoken with them, as well as with Wright, about sending some communication to Lee that might pave the way to the stopping of further bloodshed.
Dr. Smith, formerponsible, and it would be little better than murder.
He could not tell what General Lee would do, but he hoped that he would at once surrender his army.
This statethe news that had been received from Sheridan, saying that he had heard that General Lee's trains of provisions, which had come by rail, were at Appomattox, and that he expected to capture them before Lee could reach them, induced the general to write the following communication:
Headquarters, Armies of the U. S., 5 P. M., Apri