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Frederick H. Dyer, Compendium of the War of the Rebellion: Regimental Histories 71 1 Browse Search
Elias Nason, McClellan's Own Story: the war for the union, the soldiers who fought it, the civilians who directed it, and his relations to them. 70 4 Browse Search
Benjamnin F. Butler, Butler's Book: Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major-General Benjamin Butler 66 0 Browse Search
Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing) 57 1 Browse Search
Fitzhugh Lee, General Lee 52 0 Browse Search
The Photographic History of The Civil War: in ten volumes, Thousands of Scenes Photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, Volume 10: The Armies and the Leaders. (ed. Francis Trevelyan Miller) 50 0 Browse Search
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2. 48 0 Browse Search
William F. Fox, Lt. Col. U. S. V., Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 1861-1865: A Treatise on the extent and nature of the mortuary losses in the Union regiments, with full and exhaustive statistics compiled from the official records on file in the state military bureaus and at Washington 44 2 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 5. (ed. Frank Moore) 44 4 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: September 30, 1861., [Electronic resource] 36 0 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Elias Nason, McClellan's Own Story: the war for the union, the soldiers who fought it, the civilians who directed it, and his relations to them.. You can also browse the collection for West Point (Virginia, United States) or search for West Point (Virginia, United States) in all documents.

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neral officer who served in the late war will agree with me that his labors would have been immensely lightened and the efficiency of his command very much increased if he could have had a competent staff at his disposal. In comparison with the difficulties of the work that fell to my lot the task of a general officer of the German army seems mere child's play. None of the officers at my disposal had ever seen large armies or the operations of war on a grand scale. Those who came from West Point had a good education, so far as the theory of war was concerned. That was a great advantage, but by no means all that was required. Those whom I selected were usually comparatively young men, and, under my direction, soon grasped the situation; but one very great obstacle arose from the incompetence of many of the permanent heads of departments, who found it very difficult to get out of the ruts in which they had been accustomed to move. To pass suddenly from the small scale on which th
s practicable in the spring throw them forward; commencing their advance so much earlier than that of the Army of the Potomac as to engage all the Confederate Western forces on their own ground, and thus prevent them from reinforcing their army in front of Richmond. As early as the beginning of Dec., 1861, I had determined not to follow the line of operations leading by land from Washington to Richmond, but to conduct a sufficient force by mater to Urbana, and thence by a rapid march to West Point, hoping thus to cut off the garrison of Yorktown and all the Confederates in the Peninsula; then, using the James river as a line of supply, to move the entire Army of the Potomac across that river to the rear of Richmond. In pursuance of this plan I did not propose disturbing the Confederate forces at Manassas and Centreville, but, while steadily pushing forward the fortifications of Washington and the instruction and organization of the Army of the Potomac, I desired to hold them ther
teries, the regular infantry, one bridge-train, a few squadrons of cavalry, and a small number of wagons; with them to push by a forced march to the vicinity of West Point, and then cross the Mattapony and Pamunkey rivers, thus compelling the evacuation of Yorktown, and perhaps cutting off Magruder's force in the Peninsula. Meanw the force first landed. Prior to the evacuation of Yorktown the remaining portions of the army would have been landed at Urbana, and, subsequently to that, at West Point or on the James, as circumstances required. As soon as the leading divisions of infantry crossed the Pamunkey they would have moved on Richmond, covered by con the lower Rappahannock. This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught; it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula and enable us to
After the Fort Monroe movement was decided upon my first intention was to inaugurate the operation by despatching the 1st corps in mass to the Sand-Box, three or four miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn all the entrenched crossings referred to, and receive a base of supplies as near as possible to Yorktown; or else, should the condition of affairs at the moment render it des irable, to land it on the Gloucester side of the York river at the mouth of the Severn, and throw it upon West Point. But transports arrived so slowly, and the pressure of the administration for a movement was so strong and unreasonable, that I felt obliged to embark the troops by divisions as fast as transports Map of the Penninsula. arrived, and then determined to hold the 1st corps to the last, and land it as a unit whenever the state of affairs promised the best results. A few hours after I had determined to act upon this determination McDowell telegraphed me from Washington, suggesting that th
een detached from my command. It is no longer in my power to make a movement from the Severn river upon Gloucester and West Point. I am reduced to a front attack upon a very strong line. I still hope that the order detaching the 1st corps may be rmmenced I counted upon an active and disposable force of nearly 150,000 men, and intended to throw a strong column upon West Point either by York river or, if that proved impracticable, by a march from the mouth of the Severn, expecting to turn in thval of the divisions of Hooker and Richardson and the 1st corps, intending to employ the 1st corps in mass to move upon West Point, reinforcing it as circumstances might render necessary. The advance was made on the morning of the second day after. They are not drawing off their troops from Yorktown. Give me McCall's division and I will undertake a movement on West Point which will shake them out of Yorktown. As it is, I will win, but I must not be blamed if success is delayed. I do not
ons of which I am ignorant, I would be glad to have McCall's division, so as to be enabled to make a strong attack upon West Point to turn the position of the enemy. After all that I have heard of things which have occurred since I left Washington aClellan to the front, I have to inform you that the general has ordered all the available transports to carry troops to West Point, and a part of them have started for Cheeseman's creek. Your despatch will be laid before the general this evening. R. Mr. Tucker's telegram relating to the vessels was received after Franklin's division had embarked and on the way to West Point. Another division goes in the morning, and the last is absolutely necessary to support the first. This movement is oft it is a slow business on account of want of cavalry. I still think it may be an open question between this point and West Point. W. B. Franklin, Brig.-Gen. headquarters, Franklin's division, Brick House, May 7, 1862. Gen. R. B. Marcy, Chie
ieving me from command. If they will simply let me alone I feel sure of success; but will they do it? May 5, 9.30 A. M. . . . You will have learned ere this that Yorktown is ours. It is a place of immense strength, and was very heavily armed. It so happened that our preparation for the attack was equally formidable, so that Lee, Johnston, and Davis confessed that they could not hold the place. They evacuated it in a great hurry, leaving their heavy guns, baggage, etc. I sent the cavalry after them at once, and our advance is now engaged with them at Williamsburg. The weather is infamous; it has been raining all night, and is still raining heavily; no signs of stopping; roads awful. I hope to get to West Point to-day, although the weather has delayed us terribly. It could not well be worse, but we will get through nevertheless. The villains (secesh) have scattered torpedoes everywhere — by springs, wells, etc. It is the most murderous and barbarous thing I ever heard of
supported promptly and strongly, as rapidly as possible up the York river by water, to land on its right bank opposite West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever works might exist between that point and Yorktown, and to cut off, if possible, tliamsburg was an accident, brought about by the rapid pursuit of our troops. The enemy were very anxious to get beyond West Point before we could reach it by water. Late in the afternoon of the 4th Gen. G. W. Smith was ordered to march at 2.30 A. M enemy's transports they could find. If the condition of affairs near Williamsburg justified it, I intended going to West Point by water myself. Early on the 5th I sent Col. Sweitzer and Maj. Hammerstein, of my staff, to the front, to keep me inf into line on Smith's left, and I could perfectly well hold my own and keep the enemy in position while the movement to West Point was being carried out. Therefore, during the night, I countermanded the orders to Sedgwick and Richardson, and directed
, where I met you in the afternoon and received my instructions. Of course, after arriving at West Point, the landing was slow, although not nearly so slow as the loading. The infantry and artilleryxpedition. The flotilla started at daybreak of the 6th; the infantry transports arrived off West Point about noon, and the landing commenced at once. The artillery transports did not arrive until main body of the advanced guard. On the 9th Stoneman occupied and held the junction of the West Point and Williamsburg roads, about three miles from New Kent Court-House. The occupation of this pcourse, gain the James, and adopt that as the line of supply; second, to use the railroad from West Point to Richmond as the line of supply, which would oblige us to cross the Chickahominy somewhere nco-operation. When Gen. McDowell is in position on your right his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff-officers to be prepared to supply him by that route. The
iamsburg, May 6, 1862. I telegraphed you this morning that we had gained a battle. Every hour its importance is proved to be greater. On Sunday I sent Stoneman in pursuit with the cavalry and four batteries of horse-artillery. He was supported by the divisions of Hooker, Smith, Couch, Casey, and Kearny, most of which arrived on the ground only yesterday. Unfortunately I did not go with the advance myself, being obliged to remain to get Franklin and Sedgwick started up the river for West Point. Yesterday I received pressing private messages from Smith and others begging me to go to the front. I started with half a dozen aides and some fifteen orderlies, and found things in a bad state. Hancock was engaged with a vastly inferior force some two miles from any support. Hooker fought nearly all day without assistance, and the mass of the troops were crowded together where they were useless. I found everybody discouraged, officers and men; our troops in wrong positions, on the w
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