up into East Tennessee to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was in danger, etc.; and that record history of this failure on the part of Burnside, is necessary to any fair review of Rosecransow are from General Halleck at Washington, to Burnside on the march and in East Tennessee:
ing telegrams were sent by Mr. Lincoln to General Burnside:
Washington, D. C., September 21st., 2 A. M. To General Burnside, Knoxville:
Go to Rosecrans with your full force without a moment a moment. A. Lincoln.
September 27. To Burnside, at Knoxville.
Your dispatch just receivedill answer you fully.
September 27. To General Burnside, Knoxville.
It was suggested to you, n A. Lincoln.
It would be unjust to General Burnside to present these dispatches from the recooval of the Department.
Thus it was that Burnside failed Rosecrans.
These dispatches throw ahen at Chattanooga; and I was forced to leave Burnside for the present to contend against superior f[4 more...]
south side of James River.
This will give Butler thirty-three thousand (33,000) men to operate with; General W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gilmore the left wing.
I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand (25,000) effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army wherever it may be found.
Sigel collects all his available force in two columns—one, under Ord and Averill, to start from Beverly, etary Stanton presenting a very elaborate plan for an advance from Murfreesboro to Mobile, through Atlanta.
It involved the immediate abandonment of Grant's move against Vicksburg, and the transfer of his army to Rosecrans' front, an advance by Burnside through Cumberland Gap, the occupation of Chattanooga with a permanent garrison of sixty thousand men, and a movement thence on Atlanta with a force at least one hundred and fifty thousand strong.
At the same time he proposed that forty thousan
ccupation after the battle as a retreat into it. He describes the terrible condition of affairs in Chattanooga, following the battle of Chickamauga, and seeks to create the impression that Rosecrans alone was in fault, when the records show that Burnside failed him on one flank and Sherman on the other—this too after the pressing necessities of the case had been repeatedly represented to them both-and that finally Burnside never came, and Sherman himself was seven weeks behind the time set for hBurnside never came, and Sherman himself was seven weeks behind the time set for his arrival at Chattanooga, exhibiting no special activity in his advance until after Rosecrans was removed, when suddenly, under Grant's request to come on, the energy of his movement surpassed praise.
While he states that Grant was afraid the Army of the Cumberland could not be drawn out of its trenches to attack Bragg, and wanted Sherman's men to come up and coax them into fighting by the power of their example, the records show that Grant had confidence enough in Thomas' army to order it-bef