the night those who fought us at Frazier's Farm fell back to the stronger position of Malvern Hill, and by a night march the force which had detained Jackson at White-Oak Swamp effected a junction with the other portion of the enemy.
Early on July 1st Jackson reached the battlefield of the previous day, having forced the passage of White-Oak Swamp, where he captured some artillery and a number of prisoners.
He was directed to follow the route of the enemy's retreat, but soon found him in pose squadron at the White House, he returned to guard the lower bridges of the Chickahominy.
On the 30th he was directed to recross and cooperate with Jackson.
After a long march, he reached the rear of the enemy at Malvern Hill, on the night of July 1st, at the close of the engagement.
On July 2d the pursuit was commenced, the cavalry under General Stuart in advance.
The knowledge acquired since the event renders it more than probable that, could our infantry, with a fair amount of artiller
other intentions, the enemy relinquished all idea of assaulting us, and confined himself to the more cautious policy of a system of gradual approaches and mining.
His force was not less than sixty thousand men. Thus affairs continued until July 1st, when General Pemberton thus describes the causes which made capitulation necessary:
It must be remembered that, for forty-seven days and nights, those heroic men had been exposed to burning suns, drenching rains, damp fogs, and heavy dews, Hudson without giving up Jackson, by which we should lose Mississippi.
On June 29th General Johnston reports that—
Field transportation and other supplies having been obtained, the army marched toward the Big Black, and on the evening of July 1st encamped between Brownsville and the river.
The 2d and 3d of July were spent in reconnaissance, from which the conclusion was reached that an attack on the north side of the railroad was impracticable, and examinations were commenced on the
it would have been had the movements of Hooker been known.
Heth's, the leading division of Hill's corps, met the enemy in front of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1st, driving him back to within a short distance of the town; the advance there encountered a larger force, with which two of Hill's divisions became engaged.
Ewellral W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery, makes the following statement:
The ground southwest of the town was carefully examined by me after the engagement on July 1st.
Being found much less difficult than the steep ascent fronting the troops already up, its practicable character was reported to our commanding General.
He infof the 2d of July, after the battle of that day had ceased, and darkness had set in, being aware of the very heavy losses of the First and Eleventh Corps on the 1st of July, and knowing how severely the Third Corps, the Fifth Corps, and other portions of the army, had suffered in the battle of the 2d of July—in fact, as subsequentl
rnor Brown, of Georgia.
The purpose of his mission, as he explained, was to persuade me to write a letter to President Davis urging him to order either Morgan or Forrest with five thousand men into Sherman's rear, etc. . . .
The result of this interview was a determination on my part to go at once to see General Johnston, and place myself at his service.
I reached his headquarters near Marietta, on the line of the Kenesaw, on Friday morning, which was the last day of June or the first day of July.
We had a full and free interview, and I placed myself unreservedly at his disposal.
He explained at length that he could not attack General Sherman's army in their intrenchments, nor could he prevent Sherman from ditching round his (Johnston's) flank and compelling his retreat.
The only method of arresting Sherman's advance was to send a force into his rear, cut off his supplies, and thus compel Sherman either to give battle on his (Johnston's) terms or retreat.
In either case