and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battlefield.
Having accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into western Maryland, establish our communication with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to withdraw from our territory for the protection of his own.
General D. H. Hill's division, being in advance, crossed the Potomac, between September 4th and 7th, at the ford near Leesburg, and encamped in the vicinity of Frederick.
It had been supposed that this advance would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley.
This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the garrisons from those positions before concentrating the army west of the mountains.
For this purpose General Jackson marched very rapidly, crossed the Potomac near Williamsport on the 11th,
ristic selfdenial, had consented to remain for a time on the defensive for the purpose of reenforcing Bragg's army, and General Longstreet had been detached with his corps for that purpose.
These troops were to come by rail from Atlanta, and might soon be expected to arrive.
It was, therefore, determined to retire toward our expected reenforcements, as well as to meet the foe in front when he should emerge from the mountain gorges.
As we could not thus hold Chattanooga, our army, on September 7th and 8th, took position from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette, on the road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of Lookout Mountain.
The forces on the Hiawassee and at Chickamauga Station took the route by Ringgold.
A small cavalry force was left in observation at Chattanooga, and a brigade of infantry at Ringgold to cover the railroad.
The enemy immediately moved the corps that threatened Buckner into Chattanooga; shortly after, it commenced to move on our re