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Florida (Florida, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
artialed and cashiered Are not the soldiers of a republic worth even a dollar apiece! Patriotism and courage exist in great abundance in the breasts of young Americans. All they need is instruction, discipline, a little experience, such as our greatest soldier said he himself needed at first, and, above all, intelligent leadership, which can be acquired only by military education, to make them the best soldiers the world has ever known. When I joined my company as second lieutenant in Florida in the winter of 1853-4, I found the company had been reduced to one lance-sergeant, two lancecor-porals, and thirteen privates. Yellow fever had done its deadly work. But that lesson was not lost. In later years, upon the approach of that enemy, which could not be conquered even by the highest science then known or practised, the troops were marched a few mites into the pure air of the piney woods, where the dreaded fever could not reach them. At the close of the epidemic season which
Harpeth River (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
, conveying the information that Smith had not arrived, and saying nothing about any other reinforcements, but expressing the wish that the Duck River position be held until Smith arrived; and another despatch designating Franklin, behind the Harpeth River, as the place to which I would have to retire if it became necessary to fall back from Duck River. I then decided to hold on to the crossing of Duck River until the night of the 29th, thus gaining twenty-four hours more for Thomas to concentne to the river on the right. Fortunately the natural position was such that Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps was sufficient, leaving both Wood's and Wagner's in reserve. I then gave my undivided attention to the means of crossing the Harpeth River. Two days before I had telegraphed to General Thomas suggesting that he have a pontoon bridge laid at Franklin, to which he replied: You can send some of the pontoons you used at Columbia to Franklin to lay a bridge there. War Records,
Kentucky (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
d east would have been cut off, and he might have been attacked in Nashville, not later than December 2, with several thousand fewer men than he finally had there, a large part of his army—A. J. Smith's three divisions—not fully ready for battle, and with fewer effective cavalry; while Hood would have had his whole army, fresh and spirited, without the losses and depression caused by its defeat at Franklin, ready to attack an inferior force at Nashville or to cross the Cumberland and invade Kentucky. In short, the day gained at Duck River and Spring Hill was indispensable to Thomas's success. The time gained by that temerity made success possible. The additional time and relative strength gained by Hood's disastrous repulse at Franklin made final success easy and certain. A retreat at any time before nine o'clock A. M. on the 29th would have led to substantially the same result as if begun at 2 A. M. If the plan adopted and ordered early in the morning of November 29 had been ca
North Carolina (North Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
my road somewhere; for he was there in the afternoon, and I had no cavalry anywhere near to drive him away. I could not take time to go with or send infantry to find out where he was. But I had with me my headquarters troop and as gallant an aide—Captain William J. Twining—as ever wore spur. Twining was the same gallant and accomplished aide and officer of the corps of engineers, now dead, who afterward made the famous ride of one hundred and ten miles, through the enemy's country in North Carolina, to carry a despatch from me to Sherman. He was a commissioner of the District of Columbia at the time of his death. I ordered them to go at full gallop down the pike to Franklin, and to ride over whatever might be found in their way. I sat motionless on my horse at Thompson's Station until the clatter of hoofs on that hard road died out in the distance, and I knew the road was clear. I did not tell the brave Twining the object of that ride, but simply to report the situation to Gener
Spring Hill (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
moment's notice. It could have retired to Spring Hill or to Franklin without molestation or delayd, with two divisions of his corps, back to Spring Hill, to occupy and intrench a position there co I did not apprehend any serious danger at Spring Hill; for Hood's infantry could not reach that pon as I was satisfied that Hood was gone to Spring Hill and would not attack me on the bank of Duckis camp, south of Whitaker's right flank at Spring Hill, until it reached the Columbia turnpike. Bastly more serious than that at Columbia or Spring Hill, and solely because of the neglect of so si In short, the day gained at Duck River and Spring Hill was indispensable to Thomas's success. Theas well as his infantry, could have reached Spring Hill before daylight on the 30th, and would haventry, artillery, and trains to retreat from Spring Hill to Franklin in one compact column. A small force could not have been left at Spring Hill, as had been suggested, to delay Hood's advance, bec[12 more...]
Thompson's Station (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
. It was a very interesting sight, but I don't think any of Whitaker's men cared to give the Confederates a similar view of them. After stopping to see Stanley a few minutes, and learning that some of Forrest's troopers had been seen at Thompson's Station, three miles farther north, about dusk, I went with Ruger's division to drive them off and clear the way to Franklin. To my great surprise, I found only smoldering fires—no cavalry. This was where our men passed so close to the bivouac th to Sherman. He was a commissioner of the District of Columbia at the time of his death. I ordered them to go at full gallop down the pike to Franklin, and to ride over whatever might be found in their way. I sat motionless on my horse at Thompson's Station until the clatter of hoofs on that hard road died out in the distance, and I knew the road was clear. I did not tell the brave Twining the object of that ride, but simply to report the situation to General Thomas by telegraph from Franklin
Ducktown (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
. War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 1108. General Thomas or his staff should have known that it was utterly impossible for me to use the pontoons which I had at Columbia. Those pontoons were heavy wooden bateaux, and there were no wagons to transport them, the train that brought them there having been taken away, it is presumed by his order, certainly not by mine. Hence I was compelled to burn that pontoon bridge as well as the railroad bridge (partially) when my troops retreated from Ducktown. But even if this were not all true, Thomas knew the enemy was already crossing Duck River on my flank, and that I must speedily take up a new position behind the Harpeth, and that I desired him to provide the means for my army to cross that river. It was a reasonable inference that I should not have asked him to send another bridge if I already had one that I could use. Besides, I was commanding General Thomas's army, operating in his department, wherein I had no control of anything in
Duck River (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
e enemy's cavalry had forced the crossing of Duck River above Columbia, and driven our cavalry back;ridges upon my position on the north bank of Duck River, to dislodge me from that position. That w. If Hood had turned down the north bank of Duck River, across the fields, which were no worse than Hill and would not attack me on the bank of Duck River, I took the head of my troops—Ruger's divisig Hill near midnight, I found my column from Duck River there in compact order. As the road was cle, Thomas knew the enemy was already crossing Duck River on my flank, and that I must speedily take uthe march of events if we had retreated from Duck River in the night of November 28, upon first learnvade Kentucky. In short, the day gained at Duck River and Spring Hill was indispensable to Thomas'9 had been carried out, by which the line of Duck River would have been abandoned in the middle of tve. The tenacity with which the crossing of Duck River at Columbia was held was well rewarded at Fr[3 more...]
Brentwood, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
y for complete victory will, I believe, seem perfectly clear when fully stated. In anticipation of orders from General Thomas to fall back to Nashville that night, the trains had been ordered to the rear before the battle began, so as to clear the way for the march of our troops, and to render impossible any interference by the enemy's cavalry. Our ammunition had been well-nigh exhausted in the battle at Franklin, as is shown by my telegram to General Thomas to send a million rounds to Brentwood, thinking he might want me to hold Hood there until he could get A. J. Smith's troops in position and supplied with ammunition. If I had needed any such warning, that given me by the general in his despatch, War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 1171. But you must look out that the enemy does not still persist, would have been sufficient to deter me from fighting him the next day with my back to the river. Besides, it is not easy to estimate at midnight exactly the results of a desperate
Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
avalry had forced the crossing of Duck River above Columbia, and driven our cavalry back; and, about two o'clohave given the enemy the crossing of Duck River at Columbia and the turnpike road for his advance with his art reinforcements, but expressing the wish that the Duck River position be held until Smith arrived; and anotherer. I then decided to hold on to the crossing of Duck River until the night of the 29th, thus gaining twenty-s deceiving me by his thundering demonstrations at Columbia, and that I did not know he was marching to Springied: You can send some of the pontoons you used at Columbia to Franklin to lay a bridge there. War Records,possible for me to use the pontoons which I had at Columbia. Those pontoons were heavy wooden bateaux, and thanklin had become vastly more serious than that at Columbia or Spring Hill, and solely because of the neglect tenacity with which the crossing of Duck River at Columbia was held was well rewarded at Franklin. The que
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